SUI, SUN Communities, Inc
We self-administer, self-manage, operate, or hold an interest in, and develop the majority of our properties, and a select number of our communities are operated by independent third-party contractors on our behalf under management agreements.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have compounded about 17% a year across the record. Debt is 59% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $834M | $983M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $2.3B | $3.0B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $26M | $72M | $107M | $162M | $132M | $408M | $261M | ($207M) | $104M | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $248M | $334M | $394M | $490M | $503M | $823M | $851M | $276M | $391M | $1.9B | $2.0B |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $3.74 | $4.35 | $4.81 | $5.51 | $5.16 | $7.15 | $6.92 | $2.23 | $3.08 | $15.35 | $15.61 |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 53% | 50% | 47% | 41% | 42% | 42% | 42% | 46% | 45% | 20% | 62% |
| Total debtDebt | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $4.8B | $5.7B | $7.2B | $7.8B | $7.4B | $2.5B | $7.7B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $34.61 | $33.87 | $37.87 | $42.96 | $56.67 | $57.55 | $63.55 | $57.21 | $55.67 | $55.69 | $53.81 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $15.35 per shareNet income $1.4B + depreciation $508M − gains on sale $5M
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Not enough data
FFO or dividends missing.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 59%ElevatedTotal debt $7.4B ÷ assets $12.5B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Strong(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $127M
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio302:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$37M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $15.61 per share on 126M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The most restrictive financial covenants for the senior credit facility are as follows: Covenant (1) Requirement As of December 31, 2025 Maximum leverage ratio 65.0% 18.6% Minimum fixed charge coverage ratio 1.40 3.66 Maximum secured leverage ratio 40.0% 10.3% (1) As of December 31, 2025, we did not…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$6.8B heavy net debt · interest covered 4.3× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In the past, securities class action litigation has often been instituted against companies following periods of volatility in their stock price.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“The cyclical and seasonal nature of the RV and UK segments may lead to fluctuations in our operating results .”
From the recordWorst year on record−9.9% operating margin (FY2025) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Completed the redemption of $956.5 million in outstanding unsecured senior notes, inclusive of prepayment costs of $56.5 million.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “The most restrictive financial covenants for the senior credit facility are as follows: Covenant (1) Requirement As of December 31, 2025 Maximum leverage ratio 65.0% 18.6% Minimum fixed charge coverage ratio 1.40 3.66 Maximum secured leverage ratio 40.0% 10.3% (1) As of December 31, 2025, we did not…”
- “Gain / (loss) on foreign currency exchanges - for the year ended December 31, 2025, was a gain of $26.7 million, as compared to a loss of $25.8 million during the same period in 2024, primarily due to a gain of $14.4 million from the settlement of six foreign currency forward swaps, as well as the w…”
- “These adjustments include acquisition and other transaction costs, gains and losses from the early extinguishment of debt, costs related to catastrophic weather events, net of insurance recoveries, gains and losses on foreign currency exchanges, and other miscellaneous non-comparable items. 28 SUN C…”
- “Asset impairments - for the year ended December 31, 2025, increased due to asset impairment charges at 22 properties, primarily within the RV and UK segments, driven by, in certain cases, a change in strategic plan for the properties, and in other cases, a decrease in projected future cash flows for…”
- “There can be no assurance that the application of laws, regulations, or policies, including proposed federal or state legislative or regulatory initiatives or policy recommendations that may limit or restrict ownership of housing or real estate by certain classes of institutional investors, or chang…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AREAlexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. | $3.0B | -24% | -2.1% | — | 36% |
| EQREquity Residential | $2.7B | — | — | — | 40% |
| SUISUN Communities, Inc | $2.3B | 83% | 15.3% | — | 59% |
| MAAMid-america Apartment Communities, Inc. | $2.2B | 48% | 8.9% | 66% | — |
| KIMKimco Realty Corporation | $2.1B | 52% | 5.7% | 64% | 39% |
| WPCW. P. Carey Inc. | $1.7B | 47% | 4.5% | 98% | 48% |
| GLPIGaming and Leisure Properties, Inc. | $1.6B | 69% | 8.6% | 79% | 56% |
| REGRegency Centers Corporation | $1.6B | 58% | 7.0% | 56% | 36% |