GLPI, Gaming and Leisure Properties, Inc.
We are focused primarily on regional gaming markets where customers are less dependent on air travel and where demand has historically been resilient.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, drawn from its own SEC filings. The lens to bring to the numbers below, not the answer.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have compounded about 7% a year across the record. The dividend takes 79% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 56% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
No model wrote a word of this. Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below; the judgment is yours.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $828M | $971M | $1.1B | $128M | $103M | $110M | $0 | $0 | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $289M | $381M | $340M | $391M | $506M | $534M | $685M | $734M | $785M | $825M | $892M |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $405M | $505M | $488M | $650M | $707M | $764M | $872M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $2.24 | $2.37 | $2.27 | $3.01 | $3.22 | $3.24 | $3.43 | $3.81 | $3.85 | $3.96 | $4.14 |
| Dividend payout (FFO)Payout | 106% | 105% | 113% | 91% | 33% | 83% | 88% | 83% | 79% | 79% | — |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 63% | 61% | 68% | 68% | 64% | 61% | 56% | 56% | 59% | 56% | 59% |
| Total debtDebt | $4.7B | $4.4B | $5.9B | $5.7B | $5.8B | $6.6B | $6.1B | $6.6B | $7.7B | $7.2B | $8.1B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $2.37 | $2.49 | $2.56 | $2.73 | $1.05 | $2.68 | $3.04 | $3.15 | $3.04 | $3.11 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $13.47 | $11.55 | $10.55 | $9.61 | $12.17 | $14.35 | $16.22 | $15.69 | $15.61 | $16.52 | $16.35 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $3.96 per shareNet income $825M + depreciation $283M − gains on sale $125K
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- CoveredDividends $872M ÷ FFO $1.1B
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 56%ElevatedTotal debt $7.2B ÷ assets $12.9B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Comfortable(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $374M
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio39:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$21M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $4.14 per share on 284M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We operate in a highly competitive industry and face competition from other REITs (including other gaming-focused REITs), investment companies, private equity and hedge fund investors, sovereign funds, lenders, gaming companies and other investors, some of whom are significantly larger and have grea…”
From the recordOperating margin78.8% now (TTM), off a 785.7% peak (FY2020) - Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Several wholly-owned subsidiaries of PENN lease a substantial number of our properties and account for a significant portion of our revenue.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)70% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Subject to customary conditions, including pro forma compliance with financial covenants, GLP Capital can obtain additional term loan commitments and incur incremental term loans or revolving commitments, and outstanding bridge revolving loans shall not exceed $3.5 billion outstanding under the Amen…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$7.2B heavy net debt · interest covered 3.2× - Litigation & contingenciesBusiness
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“The percentage rent component is recalculated periodically, every five years for the Amended PENN Master Lease and every two years for the other leases, based on 4% of the average annual net revenues of the applicable facilities in excess of a contractually defined baseline, subject to certain floor…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“Furthermore, fluctuations in the price of our common stock may impact our ability to finance additional acquisitions through the issuance of common stock and/or cause significant dilution.”
From the recordDiluted share count+4.6%/yr (FY2016→TTM) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The TRS rules impose a 100% excise tax on transactions between a TRS and its parent REIT or the REIT's tenants that are not conducted on an arm's-length basis.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “The increase in cash receipts collected from our customers for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the corresponding period in the prior year, was due to increased rental income from the Company's recent acquisitions and lease escalations and the increase in interest paid was due to inc…”
- “The Company's net income or loss is allocated to noncontrolling interests based on the respective ownership or voting percentage in the Operating Partnership associated with such noncontrolling interests and is removed from consolidated income or loss on the Consolidated Statements of Operations in …”
- “Loss on debt extinguishment Losses on debt extinguishment of $3.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 related to the make-whole premium payment and accelerated amortization of debt issuance costs related to the redemption of the April 2026 Notes.”
- “The provision for credit losses declined by $28.6 million due to primarily due to changes in estimates to property specific credit and performance metrics as well as changes in economic forecasts.”
- “Changes in trade policy, including the imposition of new tariffs or the expansion of existing tariffs on imported goods, may increase the cost of construction materials, equipment, furnishings, technology, and other goods used in the development, renovation, maintenance, and operation of our propert…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAAMid-america Apartment Communities, Inc. | $2.2B | 48% | 8.9% | 66% | — |
| KIMKimco Realty Corporation | $2.1B | 52% | 5.7% | 64% | 39% |
| WPCW. P. Carey Inc. | $1.7B | 47% | 4.5% | 98% | 48% |
| GLPIGaming and Leisure Properties, Inc. | $1.6B | 69% | 8.6% | 79% | 56% |
| REGRegency Centers Corporation | $1.6B | 58% | 7.0% | 56% | 36% |
| ELSEquity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. | $1.5B | 40% | 10.6% | 64% | 58% |
| FRTFederal Realty Investment Trust | $1.3B | 54% | 7.5% | — | 54% |
| AMTAmerican Tower Corp. | $936M | — | 7.2% | 70% | 67% |