WPC, W. P. Carey Inc.
We disposed of 128 properties for total proceeds, net of selling costs, of $1.5 billion, including 63 self-storage operating properties for total proceeds, net of selling costs, of $772.2 million, and one student housing operating property for proceeds, net of selling costs, of $77.8 million.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have shrunk (−2% a year). The dividend takes 98% of FFO, leaving little cushion. Debt is 48% of assets, moderate for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $942M | $848M | $886M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $268M | $277M | $412M | $305M | $455M | $410M | $599M | $708M | $461M | $466M | $517M |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $476M | $505M | $591M | $747M | $802M | $860M | $1.1B | $987M | $893M | $810M | $856M |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $3.06 | $3.21 | $3.45 | $4.36 | $4.59 | $4.70 | $5.37 | $4.57 | $4.05 | $3.66 | $3.86 |
| Dividend payout (FFO)Payout | 88% | 85% | 75% | 94% | 91% | 89% | 78% | 93% | 86% | 98% | — |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 53% | 52% | 45% | 43% | 46% | 44% | 44% | 45% | 46% | 48% | 48% |
| Total debtDebt | $4.4B | $4.3B | $6.4B | $6.1B | $6.7B | $6.8B | $7.9B | $8.1B | $8.0B | $8.7B | $8.8B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $2.67 | $2.74 | $2.57 | $4.11 | $4.16 | $4.17 | $4.17 | $4.25 | $3.47 | $3.57 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $21.19 | $20.30 | $39.84 | $40.53 | $39.33 | $41.40 | $44.87 | $40.32 | $38.23 | $36.72 | $37.65 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $3.66 per shareNet income $466M + depreciation $538M − gains on sale $194M
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- TightDividends $790M ÷ FFO $810M
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 48%ModerateTotal debt $8.7B ÷ assets $18.0B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Adequate(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $291M
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$22M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $3.86 per share on 222M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our success is materially dependent on the financial stability of our tenants.”
From the recordRevenue (TTM)$1.8B - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Certain financial covenants could be affected by higher operating and debt service costs, which may also place restrictions on our liquidity.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$8.6B heavy net debt · interest covered 0.7× - Cyclicality & demandMD&A
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“If one or a series of bankruptcies or insolvencies is significant enough (more likely during a period of economic downturn), it could lead to a reduction in the value of our shares and/or a decrease in our dividend.”
From the recordWorst year on record34.0% operating margin (FY2016) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“If the limits set forth in these covenants do not jeopardize our qualification for taxation as a REIT, but prevent us from distributing 100% of our REIT taxable income, we will be subject to federal corporate income tax, and potentially a nondeductible excise tax, on the retained amounts.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Although the majority of our tenants are responsible for obtaining insurance on their properties, we maintain insurance coverage on some of our properties with third-party carriers who provide a portion of the coverage of potential losses and we maintain contingency coverage on all of our properties…”
- “We also currently self-insure a portion of our North American portfolio and NLOP's North American portfolio through our captive insurance company and may be required to fund additional capital to our captive insurance company, or we may be required to bear that loss.”
- “The credit agreement for our Senior Unsecured Credit Facility and the indentures governing our Senior Unsecured Notes contain financial and operating covenants that, among other things, require us to meet specified financial ratios and may limit W.”
- “As of December 31, 2025, we have not had any known instances of material cybersecurity incidents, including third-party incidents, during any of the last three fiscal years.”
- “The allowance for credit losses, which is recorded as a reduction to Net investments in finance leases and loans receivable on our consolidated balance sheets, is measured on a pool basis by credit ratings ( Note 6 ), using a probability of default method based on the lessees' respective credit rati…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SUISUN Communities, Inc | $2.3B | 83% | 15.3% | — | 59% |
| MAAMid-america Apartment Communities, Inc. | $2.2B | 48% | 8.9% | 66% | — |
| KIMKimco Realty Corporation | $2.1B | 52% | 5.7% | 64% | 39% |
| WPCW. P. Carey Inc. | $1.7B | 47% | 4.5% | 98% | 48% |
| GLPIGaming and Leisure Properties, Inc. | $1.6B | 69% | 8.6% | 79% | 56% |
| REGRegency Centers Corporation | $1.6B | 58% | 7.0% | 56% | 36% |
| ELSEquity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. | $1.5B | 40% | 10.6% | 64% | 58% |
| FRTFederal Realty Investment Trust | $1.3B | 54% | 7.5% | — | 54% |