REG, Regency Centers Corporation
We do not consider non-GAAP financial measures as an alternative to financial measures determined in accordance with GAAP, rather they supplement GAAP measures by providing additional information we believe to be useful to our shareholders.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, drawn from its own SEC filings. The lens to bring to the numbers below, not the answer.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have shrunk (−14% a year). The dividend takes 56% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 36% of assets, conservative for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
No model wrote a word of this. Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below; the judgment is yours.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $984M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $176M | $249M | $239M | $45M | $361M | $483M | $365M | $400M | $527M | $546M |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $483M | $580M | $589M | $323M | $574M | $694M | $716M | $761M | $908M | $930M |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $3.02 | $3.41 | $3.51 | $1.91 | — | — | — | — | — | $5.49 |
| Dividend payout (FFO)Payout | 67% | 65% | 66% | 93% | 70% | 62% | 63% | 64% | 56% | — |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | — | 34% | 35% | 36% | 34% | 34% | 33% | 36% | 36% | 38% |
| Total debtDebt | $3.6B | $3.7B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $3.7B | $3.7B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $4.7B | $5.0B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $2.02 | $2.21 | $2.33 | $1.77 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $42.09 | $37.61 | $37.03 | $35.32 | — | — | — | — | — | $40.68 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $5.36 per shareNet income $527M + depreciation $405M − gains on sale $24M
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Lightly coveredDividends $512M ÷ FFO $908M
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 36%ConservativeTotal debt $4.7B ÷ assets $13.0B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Strong(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $154M
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$19M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $5.49 per share on 169M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“In the past we have issued equity in the secondary market (including in connection with our At the Market ("ATM") program) and may do so again in the future, depending on the price of our stock and other factors.”
From the recordRevenue (TTM)$1.6B - Debt terms & refinancingBusiness
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Our Line and unsecured debt require that we remain in compliance with various customary financial covenants, which are described in Note 8 of the Consolidated Financial Statements.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$4.7B heavy net debt · interest covered 7.3× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In addition, any failure or perceived failure by us to comply with laws, regulations and other requirements relating to the privacy, security and handling of information could result in legal claims or proceedings (including class actions), regulatory investigations or enforcement actions.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“Additional equity offerings may result in substantial dilution of stockholders' interests and additional debt financing may substantially increase our degree of leverage.”
From the recordDiluted share count+0.6%/yr (FY2017→TTM) - Cyclicality & demandMD&A
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“The impacts of these policies and conditions, which could included an economic downturn or recession, could negatively impact our tenants and their ability to continue to meet their lease obligations.”
From the recordWorst year on record20.0% operating margin (FY2020) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The net proceeds were used (i) to reduce the outstanding balance on the Line, (ii) for the repayment of $250 million of 3.90% unsecured public debt due November 1, 2025, upon its maturity and (iii) for general corporate purposes, which may include the future repayment of other outstanding debt.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Uncollectible lease income decreased by $1.1 million primarily driven by higher collection rates in the current period resulting in reduced levels of uncollectible lease income. 48 Total real estate operating expenses increased by $18.5 million, on a net basis, as follows: Operating and maintenance …”
- “We recognize that current domestic and global economic policies and conditions such as tariffs, trade deal activity, inflation, labor cost and availability, energy prices, interest rate volatility, supply chain disruptions, access to and cost of credit, and tax and regulatory changes, have introduce…”
- “Other operating expenses decreased by $2.0 million, mainly due to the $7.7 million of transition costs recognized in 2024 related to the UBP acquisition, partially offset by $5.7 million increase in environmental reserve costs, development pursuit costs, and other fees.”
- “Net investment income decreased by $2.1 million primarily driven by market volatility during the current period, including a $2.0 million decrease in returns on investments held in the non-qualified deferred compensation plan.”
- “If interest rates are elevated or volatile at the time these obligations are refinanced, the cost of issuing new debt could be materially higher than our maturing debt, which would increase our overall cost of capital and adversely affect our liquidity, results of operations, and cash flows. 9 Prolo…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAAMid-america Apartment Communities, Inc. | $2.2B | 48% | 8.9% | 66% | — |
| KIMKimco Realty Corporation | $2.1B | 52% | 5.7% | 64% | 39% |
| WPCW. P. Carey Inc. | $1.7B | 47% | 4.5% | 98% | 48% |
| GLPIGaming and Leisure Properties, Inc. | $1.6B | 69% | 8.6% | 79% | 56% |
| REGRegency Centers Corporation | $1.6B | 58% | 7.0% | 56% | 36% |
| ELSEquity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. | $1.5B | 40% | 10.6% | 64% | 58% |
| FRTFederal Realty Investment Trust | $1.3B | 54% | 7.5% | — | 54% |
| AMTAmerican Tower Corp. | $936M | — | 7.2% | 70% | 67% |