AMT, American Tower Corp.
Our portfolio primarily consists of towers that we own and towers that we operate pursuant to long-term lease arrangements, as well as distributed antenna system networks, which provide seamless coverage solutions in certain in-building and outdoor wireless environments.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is Non-lease property revenue (64%) and Services revenue (36%).
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have compounded about 6% a year across the record. The dividend takes 70% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 67% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →U.S. & Canada is 68% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
- U.S. & Canada68%$632M
- Data Centers16%$152M
- Latin America13%$118M
- Africa & APAC3%$24M
- Europe1%$10M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $5.8B | $6.7B | $491M | $527M | $496M | $717M | $841M | $747M | $775M | $936M | $926M |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $956M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $2.6B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.9B |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $2.5B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $5.0B |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $5.78 | $6.84 | $7.56 | $8.23 | $8.01 | $10.81 | $10.66 | $9.44 | $9.15 | $9.75 | $10.64 |
| Dividend payout (FFO)Payout | 36% | 36% | 40% | 44% | 54% | 46% | 55% | 68% | 71% | 70% | — |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 60% | 61% | 64% | — | — | 69% | 65% | — | — | — | 71% |
| Total debtDebt | $18.5B | $20.2B | $21.2B | $2.9B | $790M | $48.1B | $43.4B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $45.0B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $2.06 | $2.49 | $2.99 | $3.60 | $4.32 | $5.01 | $5.87 | $6.44 | $6.47 | $6.79 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $15.76 | $14.46 | $12.05 | $11.35 | $9.18 | $11.21 | $12.04 | $8.99 | $7.23 | $7.79 | $7.55 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $9.75 per shareNet income $2.5B + depreciation $2.0B
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- CoveredDividends $3.2B ÷ FFO $4.6B
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 67%HeavyTotal debt $42.3B ÷ assets $63.2B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Strong(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $1.4B
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio164:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$174M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 19% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $10.64 per share on 467M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationMD&A
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“We derive the largest portion of our revenues, corresponding trade receivables and the related deferred rent asset from a small number of customers in the telecommunications industry, with 59% of our revenues derived from four customers.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$926M - Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Our industries are highly competitive and our customers have numerous alternatives in leasing communications infrastructure assets.”
From the recordOperating margin521.7% now (TTM), off a 583.1% peak (FY2024) - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“DISH has failed to meet its payment obligations, and as of January 2026 is in default under the SCA.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$40.8B heavy net debt · interest covered 3.6× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“We filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that DISH has not been excused from its obligations under the SCA, that the SCA remains in full force and effect, and that DISH remains required to perform all of its obligations under the SCA.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“The combination of higher interest rates and high inflation could lead to an extended economic downturn, which could reduce our ability to incur debt or access capital and impact our results of operations and financial condition even after these conditions improve.”
From the recordWorst year on record30.0% operating margin (FY2017) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Per the terms of the agreement, total aggregate consideration represented up to approximately 210 billion Indian Rupees ("INR") (approximately $2.5 billion), including the value of the VIL OCDs and the VIL Shares (each as defined and further discussed below), payments on certain existing customer re…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Per the terms of the agreement, total aggregate consideration represented up to approximately 210 billion Indian Rupees ("INR") (approximately $2.5 billion), including the value of the VIL OCDs and the VIL Shares (each as defined and further discussed below), payments on certain existing customer re…”
- “Other Operating Expense Year Ended December 31, Percent Change 2025 vs 2024 2025 2024 Other operating expense $ 68.4 $ 74.1 (8) % The decrease in other operating expense for the year ended December 31, 2025 was primarily attributable to the gain on the sale of South Africa Fiber of $53.6 million, pa…”
- “During the year ended December 31, 2024, ATC TIPL distributed approximately 29.6 billion INR (approximately $354.1 million) to us, which included the value of the VIL Shares and the VIL OCDs and the satisfaction of the economic benefit associated with the rights to payments on certain existing custo…”
- “Year Ended December 31, 2025 The increase in our U.S. & Canada property segment SG&A was primarily driven by increased personnel and related costs to support our business, increased canceled construction costs and a net increase in bad debt expense, partially offset by decreased professional service…”
- “In addition, many of our customers and potential customers rely on capital raising activities to fund their operations and capital expenditures, which may be more difficult or expensive in the event of downturns in the economy or disruptions in the financial and credit markets, including those cause…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PLDPrologis Inc. | $8.8B | 61% | 5.4% | 71% | 35% |
| SPGSimon Property Group | $6.4B | 95% | 14.9% | — | 70% |
| ORealty Income Corp. | $5.7B | 59% | 4.7% | 86% | — |
| PSAPublic Storage | $4.8B | 61% | 14.5% | 33% | 51% |
| AMTAmerican Tower Corp. | $936M | — | 7.2% | 70% | 67% |