SPG, Simon Property Group
Simon Property Group, Inc. is an Indiana corporation that operates as a self-administered and self-managed real estate investment trust, or REIT, under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or the Internal Revenue Code.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have compounded about 7% a year across the record. Debt is 70% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $5.4B | $5.5B | $5.6B | $5.8B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $5.3B | $5.7B | $6.0B | $6.4B | $6.6B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.1B | $1.1B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $4.6B | $4.7B |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $2.4B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $6.1B | $6.2B |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $9.88 | $10.34 | $12.01 | $11.17 | $7.86 | $10.68 | $10.26 | $10.84 | $11.14 | $18.54 | $19.23 |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 74% | 76% | 76% | 77% | 77% | 75% | 76% | 76% | 75% | 70% | 71% |
| Total debtDebt | $23.0B | $24.6B | $23.3B | $24.2B | $26.7B | $25.3B | $25.0B | $26.0B | $24.3B | $28.4B | $28.2B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $13.79 | $11.83 | $10.65 | $8.20 | $9.84 | $10.23 | $9.57 | $9.25 | $9.02 | $15.96 | $14.95 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $18.54 per shareNet income $4.6B + depreciation $1.4B
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Not enough data
FFO or dividends missing.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 70%HeavyTotal debt $28.4B ÷ assets $40.6B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Strong(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $975M
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio148:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $19.23 per share on 325M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our success depends, in part, on our ability to attract, motivate, retain and develop talented employees, and our failure to do so, including the loss of any one of our key personnel, could adversely impact our business.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)49% - Debt terms & refinancingBusiness
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The Credit Facilities and the indentures for the Operating Partnership's debt securities contain covenants that restrict the total amount of debt of the Operating Partnership to 65%, or 60% in relation to certain debt, of total assets, as defined under the related agreements, and secured debt to 50%…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$26.6B heavy net debt · interest covered 3.3× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Available Information Simon is a large accelerated filer (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or the Exchange Act) and is required, pursuant to Item 101 of Regulation S-K, to provide certain information regarding our website and the availability of certain do…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionBusiness
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“If Simon's Board of Directors determines to raise equity capital, it may, without stockholder approval, issue additional shares of common stock or other capital stock.”
From the recordDiluted share count+0.4%/yr (FY2016→TTM) - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“In addition, a 100% excise tax will be imposed on certain transactions between a TRS and its parent REIT that are not conducted on an arm's-length basis.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Interest expense increased $69.0 million primarily related to an increase of $61.0 million due to new USD unsecured bond issuances in 2025 and 2024, an increase of $27.0 million related to the property transactions, and an increase of $8.8 million related to draws on the USD and Euro revolving credi…”
- “Other expenses decreased $7.5 million primarily due to a net $25.3 million decrease in mixed use and franchise operations and a $5.5 million decrease in legal and other professional fees, partially offset by a $23.3 million increase in net other expenses primarily related to the property transaction…”
- “A pre-tax non-cash net loss of $86.1 million was recorded during 2025, included in (Loss) gain due to disposal, exchange, or revaluation of equity interests, net, primarily related to certain restructuring activities within Catalyst and the reduction in the carrying value of certain equity interests…”
- “Penney's acquisition of the retail operations of SPARC Group, an other-than-temporary impairment charge of $57.0 million, representing our pre-development costs associated with an unconsolidated joint venture development project, and a reduction in the carrying value of certain equity interests.”
- “Despite the risks related to AI, many of our competitors, retailers and consumers are increasingly using AI in their decision-making processes.”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PLDPrologis Inc. | $8.8B | 61% | 5.4% | 71% | 35% |
| SPGSimon Property Group | $6.4B | 95% | 14.9% | — | 70% |
| ORealty Income Corp. | $5.7B | 59% | 4.7% | 86% | — |
| PSAPublic Storage | $4.8B | 61% | 14.5% | 33% | 51% |
| AMTAmerican Tower Corp. | $936M | — | 7.2% | 70% | 67% |