PLD, Prologis Inc.
We operate Prologis, Inc. and Prologis, L.P. as one enterprise and, therefore, our discussion and analysis refers to Prologis, Inc. and its consolidated subsidiaries, including Prologis, L.P.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have compounded about 8% a year across the record. The dividend takes 71% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 35% of assets, conservative for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $4.4B | $4.8B | $6.0B | $8.0B | $8.2B | $8.8B | $8.9B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.3B | $3.7B |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $4.5B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $6.3B | $6.0B | $5.7B |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $3.06 | $3.38 | $3.32 | $4.14 | $4.03 | $5.91 | $6.38 | $5.82 | $6.62 | $6.22 | $5.99 |
| Dividend payout (FFO)Payout | 53% | 51% | 57% | 50% | 57% | 41% | 48% | 58% | 57% | 63% | — |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 35% | 32% | 29% | 30% | 30% | — | 27% | 31% | 32% | 35% | 35% |
| Total debtDebt | $10.6B | $9.4B | $11.1B | $11.9B | $16.8B | $215M | $23.9B | $29.0B | $30.9B | $35.0B | $34.7B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $1.63 | $1.71 | $1.90 | $2.05 | $2.28 | $2.45 | $3.07 | $3.39 | $3.74 | $3.93 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $27.42 | $28.30 | $37.78 | $34.59 | $42.38 | $43.71 | $65.59 | $55.88 | $56.58 | $55.59 | $55.87 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $5.56 per shareNet income $3.3B + depreciation $2.6B − gains on sale $636M
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- CoveredDividends $3.8B ÷ FFO $5.3B
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 35%ConservativeTotal debt $35.0B ÷ assets $98.7B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Strong(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $1.0B
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio177:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$185M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $5.99 per share on 958M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“These covenants include customary financial covenants, such as maintaining debt service coverage, leverage and fixed charge coverage ratios.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$33.9B heavy net debt · interest covered 4.3× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Our FFO measures begin with NAREIT's definition, with certain adjustments to calculate FFO, as modified by Prologis, and Core FFO, both as defined below, to reflect our business and execution of our management strategy.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Under the IRC, REITs may be subject to certain federal income and excise taxes on undistributed taxable income.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “While we believe we are well-positioned for long-term revenue growth, supported by embedded rent growth in our in-place portfolio and our development pipeline, the potential impact of ongoing economic uncertainty on our business, future financial condition and operating results remains difficult to …”
- “S OVERVIEW Summary of 2025 Our operating results and leasing activity remained resilient in 2025, with performance strengthening as the year progressed, despite economic disruption related to tariff policy proposals announced in April.”
- “Leasing activity in our consolidated portfolio remained healthy, supported by improved customer sentiment and market conditions, with 112 million square feet of new leases signed during the year (228 million square feet on an O&M basis).”
- “G&A expenses increased in 2025 compared to 2024, principally due to inflationary increases and higher compensation expenses including additions in our workforce in growth areas of the business.”
- “The following table details the assumptions used for each POP grant based on the year it was granted, using a Monte Carlo model (dollars in thousands): 2024 2023 Risk-free interest rate 4.2 % 4.2 % Prologis expected volatility 27.0 % 35.0 % Index expected volatility 20.0 % 31.0 % Grant date fair val…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PLDPrologis Inc. | $8.8B | 61% | 5.4% | 71% | 35% |
| SPGSimon Property Group | $6.4B | 95% | 14.9% | — | 70% |
| ORealty Income Corp. | $5.7B | 59% | 4.7% | 86% | — |
| PSAPublic Storage | $4.8B | 61% | 14.5% | 33% | 51% |
| AMTAmerican Tower Corp. | $936M | — | 7.2% | 70% | 67% |