Owner Scorecard


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RF, Regions Financial Corporation

Banks financial
Latest filing: FY2025 10-K

Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.

RF · Regions Financial Corporation
Revenue · FY2025
$104M
+23.8% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Return on equity 12% 5-yr avg 10%
Return on tangible equity 17% 5-yr avg 14%
Efficiency ratio 57% 5-yr avg 60%
Equity / assets 11.7% 5-yr avg 12.3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.

What it is
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 8%, above 12% in only 1 of 6 years). It runs at a 57% efficiency ratio, lean. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.

The record, 2016–2021

realized figures from each filing, no estimates
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’21TTMTTMDec 2021
RevenueRevenue$58M$60M$71M$79M$84M$104M$104M
Net interest incomeNet int.$3.4B$3.5B$3.7B$3.7B$3.9B$3.9B$5.0B
Net incomeNet inc.$1.2B$1.3B$1.8B$1.6B$1.1B$2.5B$2.2B
EPS (diluted)EPS$0.92$1.05$1.60$1.58$1.14$2.62$2.56
Return on equityROE7%8%12%10%6%14%12%
Return on tangible equityROTCE10%11%17%14%9%21%17%
Efficiency ratioEffic.64%63%62%60%58%58%57%
DepositsDeposits$99.0B$96.9B$94.5B$97.5B$122.5B$139.1B$131.9B
Book value / shareBVPS$13.21$13.52$13.69$16.31$18.83$19.03$21.63
Tangible book / shareTBVPS$9.15$9.27$9.21$11.36$13.30$12.75$14.88
Dividends / shareDiv/sh$0.25$0.29$0.41$0.58$0.62$0.63

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Adequate
    Net income $2.2B ÷ equity $19.0B

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Strong
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $5.7B − intangibles $140M)

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Lean
    Noninterest expense $4.3B ÷ (net interest income + fees)

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 12.0%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $19.0B ÷ assets $158.8B

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $131.1B ÷ assets $158.8B

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 9%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $470M ÷ net interest income $5.0B

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.

Management & pay

read the proxy →

Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.

  • CEO pay ratio118:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.

  • Stock-based compensation$30M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 29% of revenue, equal to 57% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Regions Financial Corporation’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.

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Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity11%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E
The assumptions, turn the dials

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.

Tangible book $12.9B on 868M shares, a 11% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

What the filing emphasizes, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.

  • Pricing power & competitionBusiness

    Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.

    “Regions employs various means to meet those needs and enhance competitiveness, such as providing a high level of customer service, competitive pricing and convenient branch locations for its customers.”
    From the recordOperating margin51.0% now (TTM), off a 3870.4% peak (FY2018)
  • Concentrated dependenceBusiness

    What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.

    “Regions' ability to compete in the deposit market depends heavily on the pricing of its deposits and how effectively the Company meets customers' needs.”
    From the recordRevenue (TTM)$104M
  • Debt terms & refinancingBusiness

    The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.

    “Commercial and industrial loans decreased $881 million since year-end 2024 due to strategic runoff in leveraged lending, continued portfolio resolutions, and loans refinancing off the balance sheet through the debt capital markets.”
    From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$1.3B heavy net debt · interest covered 0.0×
  • Litigation & contingenciesBusiness

    Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.

    “Litigation matters range from individual actions involving a single plaintiff to class action lawsuits and can involve claims for substantial or indeterminate alleged damages or for injunctive or other relief.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
  • DilutionRisk Factors

    Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.

    “Future acquisitions may also result in dilution of our current shareholders' ownership interests or may require we incur additional indebtedness or use a substantial amount of our available cash and other liquid assets.”
    From the recordDiluted share count−7.2%/yr (FY2016→TTM)
  • Cyclicality & demandBusiness

    How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.

    “The trucking portfolio remains a portfolio of interest as trucking companies have been working through one of the most prolonged downturns in the U.S. domestic freight market.”
    From the recordWorst year on record44.2% operating margin (FY2021)
  • Regulation & policyBusiness

    Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.

    “In the first half of 2025, the Company reclassified debt securities with an amortized cost, excluding items recognized in OCI, of $2.0 billion from available for sale into held to maturity to reduce the volatility in AOCI in preparation for potential, upcoming changes to regulatory guidance as discu…”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.

What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024

read the 10-K →

Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.

MD&A length −4%Readability harderHedging down
  • “The economic environment faces challenges such as lingering trade policy uncertainty, a weaker pace of hiring, and persistent inflation pressures; however, the economy is supported by ample liquidity in the household and corporate sectors, elevated profit margins, expansionary fiscal policy, accommo…”
  • “Allowance decreases resulting from overall credit quality improvement in the portfolio, including declines in criticized and non-performing loans, and continued resolutions of loans within previously identified portfolios of interest, were partially offset by an allowance increase resulting from cha…”
  • “While there was reduced risk in certain investor real estate portfolios which favorably impacted qualitative adjustments, this favorability was overshadowed by general uncertainty increasing during the year as a result of tariff and trade policy changes and the residual effects from the temporary go…”
  • “Portfolios that are experiencing higher risk due to conditions such as inflationary pressures, higher interest rates, and adverse underlying market fundamentals (identified as portfolios of interest) include business offices and trucking (included within transportation and warehousing) at December 3…”
  • “The guidance sets forth the following three key principles with respect to incentive compensation arrangements: (i) the arrangements should provide employees with incentives that appropriately balance risk and financial results in a manner that does not encourage employees to expose their organizati…”

Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. marks best in the group.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNet int. margin
KEYKeycorp /new/$1.7B9%10%63%2.5%
MTBM&T Bank Corporation$1.7B10%14%57%3.3%
CFGCitizens Financial Group Inc/ri$1.6B7%10%64%2.6%
HBANHuntington Bancshares Incorporated$1.6B9%12%61%2.7%
ALLYAlly Financial Inc.$1.2B5%6%310%
FITBFifth Third Bancorp$577M12%15%57%2.8%
RFRegions Financial Corporation$104M11%16%57%3.1%
TFCTruist Financial Corp8%11%59%2.6%