MTB, M&T Bank Corporation
The banks collectively offer a wide range of retail and commercial banking, wealth management, trust and institutional services to their customers.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Trust income (44%) and Deposit Account (33%), with 3 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 9%, above 12% in only 2 of 10 years). It runs at a 57% efficiency ratio, lean. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Institutional Services and Wealth Management at 52%.
- Institutional Services and Wealth Management52%$854M
- Retail Bank30%$501M
- Commercial Bank18%$302M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $5.3B | $5.6B | $5.9B | $6.2B | $6.0B | $6.0B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $3.9B | $3.8B | $5.8B | $7.1B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $7.0B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $2.9B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $8.36 | $9.23 | $13.31 | $14.35 | $10.51 | $14.43 | $12.14 | $16.41 | $15.47 | $17.95 | $19.53 |
| Return on equityROE | 8% | 9% | 12% | 12% | 8% | 10% | 8% | 10% | 9% | 10% | 10% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 11% | 12% | 18% | 17% | 12% | 14% | 12% | 15% | 13% | 14% | 15% |
| Efficiency ratioEffic. | 58% | 56% | 55% | 56% | 57% | 60% | 62% | 56% | 58% | 57% | 56% |
| DepositsDeposits | $95.5B | $92.4B | $90.2B | $94.8B | $119.8B | $131.5B | $163.5B | $163.3B | $161.1B | $166.9B | $163.7B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $104.81 | $106.53 | $107.25 | $116.89 | $125.77 | $138.99 | $154.35 | $161.42 | $173.48 | $183.74 | $186.34 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $74.99 | $75.95 | $75.06 | $82.51 | $89.97 | $103.30 | $101.32 | $109.85 | $122.33 | $130.03 | $129.59 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $2.81 | $3.00 | $3.54 | $4.11 | $4.41 | $4.50 | $4.78 | $5.20 | $5.35 | $5.66 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 10%Below the cost of equityNet income $2.9B ÷ equity $29.2B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- StrongNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $8.5B − intangibles $64M)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 57%LeanNoninterest expense $5.5B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 13.7%Well capitalizedEquity $29.2B ÷ assets $213.5B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 78%Deposit-fundedDeposits $166.9B ÷ assets $213.5B
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 9%LowProvision for credit losses $645M ÷ net interest income $6.9B
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what M&T Bank Corporation’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $19.5B on 150M shares, a 13% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“The Company has and may continue to experience pricing pressures as a result of these factors and as some of its competitors seek to increase market share.”
From the recordOperating margin465.6% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“As a result of the purchases of higher-yielding securities and paydowns and maturities of lower-yielding securities, the weighted-average current yield for total investment securities available for sale increased to 4.64% at December 31, 2025 compared with 4.30% at December 31, 2024, while the weigh…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$9.5B modest net debt · interest covered 2.2× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In August 2025, a district court ruled against the Federal Reserve and vacated the regulation, but its order is stayed pending appeal to the circuit court.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“It could also result in M&T being required to take steps to increase its regulatory capital that may be dilutive to shareholders or limit its ability to pay dividends or otherwise return capital to shareholders, or sell or refrain from acquiring assets.”
From the recordDiluted share count−0.5%/yr (FY2016→TTM) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The Dodd-Frank Act requires the federal bank regulatory agencies and the SEC to establish joint regulations or guidelines prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements at specified regulated entities having at least $1 billion in total assets, such as M&T and M&T Bank.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Information about the notional amount of interest rate, foreign exchange and other non-hedging contracts entered into by the Company is included in note 17 of Notes to Financial Statements and herein under the heading "Market Risk and Interest Rate Sensitivity." The $19 million increase in income fr…”
- “The increase in gains on commercial mortgage loans originated for sale during 2025 as compared with 2024 reflects an increased volume of and higher margins on new commitments to originate commercial real estate loans for sale. 80 Service charges on deposit accounts Service charges on deposit account…”
- “Should Fannie Mae determine that loans originated through its DUS program were not originated or serviced in accordance with the terms and conditions of the program, M&T Realty Capital may be required to repurchase such loans or may incur credit losses that exceed the stated recourse amount of the p…”
- “A sensitivity analysis of forward-looking estimates of macroeconomic variables on modeled credit losses used in the determination of the allowance for loan losses is provided herein under the heading "Provision for Credit Losses." Fair value measurement As described in note 19 of Notes to Financial …”
- “The long-term debt proposal, if adopted, would require the Company to maintain more long-term debt than it does currently, which would likely adversely affect interest expense, net interest income and net interest margin. 28 M&T's ability to return capital to shareholders and to pay dividends on com…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEYKeycorp /new/ | $1.7B | 9% | 10% | 63% | 2.5% |
| MTBM&T Bank Corporation | $1.7B | 10% | 14% | 57% | 3.3% |
| CFGCitizens Financial Group Inc/ri | $1.6B | 7% | 10% | 64% | 2.6% |
| HBANHuntington Bancshares Incorporated | $1.6B | 9% | 12% | 61% | 2.7% |
| ALLYAlly Financial Inc. | $1.2B | 5% | 6% | 310% | — |
| FITBFifth Third Bancorp | $577M | 12% | 15% | 57% | 2.8% |
| RFRegions Financial Corporation | $104M | 11% | 16% | 57% | 3.1% |
| TFCTruist Financial Corp | — | 8% | 11% | 59% | 2.6% |