KEY, Keycorp /new/
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Trust and Investment Services (32%) and Investment Banking and Debt Placement (32%), with 3 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 9%, above 12% in only 2 of 10 years). It runs at a 63% efficiency ratio, about average. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Trust And Investment Services at 32%.
- Trust And Investment Services32%$558M
- Investment Banking And Debt Placement32%$551M
- Cards And Payments19%$337M
- Service Charges On Deposit Accounts17%$295M
- Other noninterest income0%$8M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $5.0B | $6.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | $2.9B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.5B | $3.9B | $3.8B | $4.6B | $4.8B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $791M | $1.3B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $2.6B | $1.9B | $967M | ($161M) | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $0.84 | $1.19 | $1.77 | $1.71 | $1.38 | $2.74 | $2.05 | $1.04 | $-0.17 | $1.65 | $1.78 |
| Return on equityROE | 5% | 9% | 12% | 10% | 7% | 15% | 14% | 7% | -1% | 9% | 10% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 6% | 11% | 15% | 12% | 9% | 18% | 18% | 8% | -1% | 10% | 11% |
| Efficiency ratioEffic. | 75% | 66% | 62% | 61% | 61% | 61% | 61% | 74% | 99% | 63% | 62% |
| DepositsDeposits | $104.1B | $105.2B | $107.3B | $111.9B | $135.3B | $152.6B | $142.6B | $145.6B | $149.8B | $148.7B | $147.8B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $16.24 | $13.80 | $14.79 | $17.00 | $18.45 | $18.20 | $14.42 | $15.69 | $19.14 | $18.39 | $18.26 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $13.22 | $11.09 | $12.10 | $14.09 | $15.52 | $15.25 | $11.37 | $12.68 | $16.21 | $15.90 | $15.74 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.36 | $0.44 | $0.62 | $0.80 | $0.85 | $0.86 | $0.92 | $0.98 | $0.98 | $0.95 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Below the cost of equityNet income $1.8B ÷ equity $20.4B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $2.8B − intangibles $8M)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 63%EfficientNoninterest expense $4.7B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 11.1%Well capitalizedEquity $20.4B ÷ assets $184.4B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 81%Deposit-fundedDeposits $148.7B ÷ assets $184.4B
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 10%ModerateProvision for credit losses $471M ÷ net interest income $4.6B
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio127:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$132M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Keycorp /new/’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $17.2B on 1094M shares, a 10% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“In addition, technology has lowered barriers to entry and made it possible for nonbanks, including large technology companies, to offer products and services traditionally provided by banks.”
From the recordOperating margin383.1% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Additionally, a significant portion of our business activities are concentrated within the commercial real estate, healthcare, finance, and utilities market segments.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)121% - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“An inability to grow cash flow or pressure on expenses created by supply chain, insurance, or interest rate increases would result in an increase in the level of payment defaults within the sector, as well as limiting refinance options.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$246M net cash · interest covered 1.6× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Further, KeyCorp is currently named, and KeyCorp and certain of its officers and directors have in the past been named, and may in the future be named, as defendants in various class actions, mass arbitrations, and other litigation relating to our business and activities.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“They could also result in our taking steps to increase our capital that may be dilutive to shareholders or limit our ability to pay dividends or otherwise return capital to shareholders.”
From the recordDiluted share count+1.5%/yr (FY2016→TTM) - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“As a standardized approach banking organization, KeyCorp is not subject to the countercyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5% imposed upon an advanced approaches banking organization under the Regulatory Capital Rules.”
From the recordWorst year on record−18.5% operating margin (FY2024) - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve to implement enhanced prudential standards under the Dodd-Frank Act and EGRRCPA require a BHC with $100 billion or more in total consolidated assets to have a risk committee of its board of directors that oversees the BHC's risk management framework.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Consumer Bank Segment imperatives Execute a relationship-oriented growth strategy, which will enable us to grow (i) stable, low-cost deposits and (ii) valuable fee income streams, including wealth management and cards and payments Simplify our business to improve execution and efficiency while manag…”
- “Assessing, identifying, and managing cybersecurity risk across the organization in support of the IS Program is a cross-functional effort that requires collaboration and direction from all lines of defense the lines of business and support functions (First Line of Defense), Risk Management (Second L…”
- “Our liquidity position and recent activity Our liquid asset portfolio, which includes overnight and short-term investments, as well as unencumbered, high quality liquid securities held as protection against a range of potential liquidity stress scenarios, continues to exceed the amount that we estim…”
- “Key's CISO oversees the IS Program and its related policies and is responsible for determining whether relevant security risk information is properly integrated into strategic and business decisions, overseeing the appropriate identification and ownership of security risks, monitoring critical risks…”
- “The OCC said that if the recovery planning guidelines are rescinded, it would still expect all institutions that it regulates to have appropriate risk management processes in place to address all material risks in their operating environment and to maintain a formal contingency funding plan that con…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEYKeycorp /new/ | $1.7B | 9% | 10% | 63% | 2.5% |
| MTBM&T Bank Corporation | $1.7B | 10% | 14% | 57% | 3.3% |
| CFGCitizens Financial Group Inc/ri | $1.6B | 7% | 10% | 64% | 2.6% |
| HBANHuntington Bancshares Incorporated | $1.6B | 9% | 12% | 61% | 2.7% |
| ALLYAlly Financial Inc. | $1.2B | 5% | 6% | 310% | — |
| FITBFifth Third Bancorp | $577M | 12% | 15% | 57% | 2.8% |
| RFRegions Financial Corporation | $104M | 11% | 16% | 57% | 3.1% |
| TFCTruist Financial Corp | — | 8% | 11% | 59% | 2.6% |