ALLY, Ally Financial Inc.
Ally is a Delaware corporation and is registered as a BHC under the BHC Act and an FHC under the GLB Act.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Noninsurance contracts (78%) and Remarketing fee income (9%), with 4 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 7%, above 12% in only 2 of 10 years). It runs at a 310% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Noninsurance contracts is 78% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- Noninsurance contracts78%$966M
- Remarketing fee income9%$116M
- Brokerage Commissions and Other7%$82M
- Banking fees and interchange income3%$39M
- Other2%$27M
- Brokered/agent commissions1%$14M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $5.4B | $5.8B | $689M | $727M | $753M | $852M | $908M | $968M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.1B | $929M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.1B | $3.1B | $1.7B | $957M | $668M | $852M | $1.4B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.21 | $2.04 | $2.95 | $4.34 | $2.88 | $8.38 | $5.38 | $3.14 | $2.15 | $2.72 | $4.46 |
| Return on equityROE | 8% | 7% | 10% | 12% | 7% | 18% | 13% | 7% | 5% | 5% | 9% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 8% | 7% | 10% | 12% | 8% | 19% | 14% | 7% | 5% | 6% | 9% |
| Efficiency ratioEffic. | 192% | 201% | 231% | 195% | 193% | 202% | 297% | 256% | 239% | 310% | 228% |
| DepositsDeposits | $79.0B | $93.3B | $106.2B | $120.8B | $137.0B | $141.6B | $152.3B | $154.7B | $151.6B | $151.6B | $153.2B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $27.62 | $29.63 | $31.02 | $36.46 | $38.99 | $46.69 | $40.36 | $44.91 | $44.83 | $49.51 | $49.83 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $27.12 | $29.11 | $30.32 | $35.29 | $37.95 | $44.09 | $37.47 | $42.48 | $42.87 | $48.90 | $49.23 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.22 | $0.40 | $0.57 | $0.69 | $0.77 | $0.89 | $1.21 | $1.21 | $1.20 | $1.21 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Below the cost of equityNet income $852M ÷ equity $15.5B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $190M − intangibles $0)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 310%BloatedNoninterest expense $5.4B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 7.9%ModestEquity $15.5B ÷ assets $196.0B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 77%Deposit-fundedDeposits $151.6B ÷ assets $196.0B
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
Provision or net interest income missing.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio106:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Ally Financial Inc.’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $15.4B on 313M shares, a 8% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationMD&A
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“According to a 2025 American Bankers Association survey, 87% of customers prefer to do their banking most often via digital and other direct channels (internet, mobile, telephone, and mail).”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$1.2B - Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“The markets for automotive financing, insurance, banking, brokerage, and investment advisory services are highly competitive, and we expect competitive pressures only to remain intense in the future, especially in light of the regulatory and supervisory environments in which we operate, innovations …”
From the recordOperating margin740.7% now (TTM), off a 853.4% peak (FY2019) - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our business and financial results depend significantly on household, business, economic, and market conditions.”
From the recordRevenue (TTM)$1.2B - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The Guarantors are primary obligors with respect to payment when due, whether at maturity, by acceleration or otherwise, of all payment obligations of the Parent in respect of the Guaranteed Notes pursuant to the terms of the applicable indenture.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$20.7B meaningful net debt · interest covered 1.2× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“These legal matters may be formal or informal and include litigation and arbitration with one or more identified claimants, certified or purported class actions with yet-to-be-identified claimants, and regulatory or other governmental information-gathering requests, examinations, investigations, and…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionBusiness
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“In addition, to satisfy the FRB in its review of our capital plan, we may be required to further cease or limit these capital distributions or to issue capital instruments that could be dilutive to shareholders.”
From the recordDiluted share count−4.2%/yr (FY2016→TTM) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The SEC, FINRA, the Department of Justice, state attorneys general, and other domestic or foreign governmental authorities also have an array of means at their disposal to regulate and enforce matters within their jurisdiction that could impact Ally's businesses and operations.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Risks related to the continuation or escalation of tariffs and other trading restrictions, particularly to the extent impacting the automobile industry and related sectors, and the potential impact on inflation, global trade, new and used automobile prices and sales, consumer purchasing power, custo…”
- “Our automotive finance services include purchasing retail installment sales contracts and operating leases from dealers and automotive retailers, extending automotive loans directly to consumers, offering term loans to dealers, financing dealer floorplans and providing other lines of credit to deale…”
- “Uncertainty around the scope and timing of changes to fiscal, regulatory, and trade policies, as well as impacts from recent legislative action (such as "H.R. 1", commonly referred to as the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act") could act as a source of volatility in our baseline forecasts, particularly wit…”
- “We recognize (1) the importance of understanding, preparing for and taking timely preventive action against potentially material climate-change impacts, (2) investor demand for consistent and comparable climate and environmental risk data, and (3) shifting federal and state policy focus and an incre…”
- “Compliance with such laws, regulations or policies, including any that may be adopted in the future, could, among other things, increase the costs of operating our businesses, reduce the demand for our products and services, impact our ability to meet or maintain current or future goals or targets o…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEYKeycorp /new/ | $1.7B | 9% | 10% | 63% | 2.5% |
| MTBM&T Bank Corporation | $1.7B | 10% | 14% | 57% | 3.3% |
| CFGCitizens Financial Group Inc/ri | $1.6B | 7% | 10% | 64% | 2.6% |
| HBANHuntington Bancshares Incorporated | $1.6B | 9% | 12% | 61% | 2.7% |
| ALLYAlly Financial Inc. | $1.2B | 5% | 6% | 310% | — |
| FITBFifth Third Bancorp | $577M | 12% | 15% | 57% | 2.8% |
| RFRegions Financial Corporation | $104M | 11% | 16% | 57% | 3.1% |
| TFCTruist Financial Corp | — | 8% | 11% | 59% | 2.6% |