FITB, Fifth Third Bancorp
The Bancorp is a diversified financial services company headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio and is the indirect holding company of Fifth Third Bank, National Association.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 12%, above 12% in 5 of 8 years). It runs at a 57% efficiency ratio, lean. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2023
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | TTMTTMSep 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $558M | $554M | $549M | $565M | $559M | $600M | $589M | $577M | $613M |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | $3.6B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.8B | $4.8B | $4.8B | $5.6B | $5.8B | $6.5B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.5B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $1.4B | $2.8B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.2B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.02 | $2.94 | $3.20 | $3.49 | $1.98 | $3.89 | $3.52 | $3.42 | $2.62 |
| Return on equityROE | 10% | 13% | 13% | 12% | 6% | 12% | 14% | 12% | 6% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 11% | 16% | 16% | 15% | 8% | 16% | 20% | 17% | 9% |
| Efficiency ratioEffic. | 60% | 54% | 57% | 56% | 62% | 60% | 56% | 60% | 64% |
| DepositsDeposits | $103.8B | $103.2B | $108.8B | $127.1B | $159.1B | $169.3B | $163.7B | $168.9B | $233.6B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $21.20 | $21.87 | $23.71 | $29.45 | $32.11 | $31.23 | $24.93 | $27.88 | $41.08 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $18.02 | $18.53 | $20.03 | $23.26 | $26.00 | $24.66 | $17.62 | $20.54 | $27.59 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.53 | $0.58 | $0.68 | $0.92 | $1.19 | $1.26 | $1.33 | $1.54 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 12%AdequateNet income $2.5B ÷ equity $21.7B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- StrongNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $4.9B − intangibles $69M)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 57%LeanNoninterest expense $5.1B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 10.1%Well capitalizedEquity $21.7B ÷ assets $214.4B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 80%Deposit-fundedDeposits $171.8B ÷ assets $214.4B
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 11%ModerateProvision for credit losses $662M ÷ net interest income $6.0B
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio146:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$163M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 28% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Fifth Third Bancorp’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $22.9B on 830M shares, a 16% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationMD&A
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Money market deposits increased $2.7 billion, or 7%, from December 31, 2024 primarily as a result of higher offering rates from promotional offers leading to higher balances per consumer customer account as well as growth in the number of consumer customer accounts.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$613M - Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Fifth Third is subject to rapid changes in technology, regulation and product innovation, and faces intense competition for customers, sources of revenue, capital, services, qualified employees and other essential business resources.”
From the recordOperating margin1092.8% now (TTM), off a 1199.5% peak (FY2023) - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Long-term debt decreased $748 million from December 31, 2024 primarily due to redemptions or maturities of $1.5 billion of notes and $396 million of paydowns associated with loan securitizations.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$5.3B net cash · interest covered 1.8× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Furthermore, Fifth Third and certain of its directors and officers have been named from time to time as defendants in various class actions and other litigation relating to Fifth Third's business and activities, as well as regulatory or other enforcement proceedings.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“Future business acquisitions could be material to Fifth Third and it may issue additional shares of stock to pay for those acquisitions, which would dilute current shareholders' ownership interests.”
From the recordDiluted share count+1.0%/yr (FY2016→TTM) - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“In those events, Fifth Third could become more susceptible to economic downturns, dislocations in capital markets and competitive pressures.”
From the recordWorst year on record462.8% operating margin (FY2020) - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The Bancorp is a separate and distinct legal entity from its subsidiaries and typically receives substantially all of its revenue from dividends from its subsidiaries.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Noninterest expense increased $46 million from the year ended December 31, 2024 primarily driven by an increase in other noninterest expense, which increased $47 million compared to the same period in the prior year primarily driven by increases in allocated expenses, card and processing expense, cr…”
- “The following table summarizes the components of average borrowings: TABLE 28: Components of Average Borrowings For the years ended December 31 ($ in millions) 2025 2024 Short-term borrowings $ 4,930 3,231 Long-term debt 14,218 15,835 Total average borrowings $ 19,148 19,066 Total average borrowings…”
- “Interest income on an FTE basis (non-GAAP) from loans and leases decreased $14 million from the year ended December 31, 2024 primarily driven by a decrease in yields on average commercial loans and leases associated with lower short-term market rates, partially offset by an increase in the average b…”
- “Provision for credit losses increased $147 million from the year ended December 31, 2024 primarily driven by an increase net charge-offs on commercial loans and leases, which included $178 million resulting from the fraud-related impairment of an asset-backed finance commercial loan, partially offse…”
- “Third-party service providers with which Fifth Third does business, as well as vendors and other third parties with which Fifth Third's customers do business, can also be sources of operational risk to Fifth Third, particularly where processes are highly concentrated or customer activities are beyon…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEYKeycorp /new/ | $1.7B | 9% | 10% | 63% | 2.5% |
| MTBM&T Bank Corporation | $1.7B | 10% | 14% | 57% | 3.3% |
| CFGCitizens Financial Group Inc/ri | $1.6B | 7% | 10% | 64% | 2.6% |
| HBANHuntington Bancshares Incorporated | $1.6B | 9% | 12% | 61% | 2.7% |
| ALLYAlly Financial Inc. | $1.2B | 5% | 6% | 310% | — |
| FITBFifth Third Bancorp | $577M | 12% | 15% | 57% | 2.8% |
| RFRegions Financial Corporation | $104M | 11% | 16% | 57% | 3.1% |
| TFCTruist Financial Corp | — | 8% | 11% | 59% | 2.6% |