VICI, Vici Properties Inc.
We are a Maryland corporation that is primarily engaged in the business of owning and acquiring gaming, hospitality, wellness, entertainment and leisure destinations, subject to long-term triple net leases.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $898M | $895M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.6B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.0B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $524M | $546M | $892M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.1B |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 36% | 36% | 40% | 27% | 37% | 38% | 37% | 36% | 36% |
| Total debtDebt | $4.1B | $4.8B | $6.8B | $4.7B | $13.7B | $16.7B | $16.7B | $16.8B | $16.8B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.47 | $0.75 | $0.79 | $0.86 | $1.39 | $1.56 | $1.67 | $1.74 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $12.18 | $11.90 | $12.09 | $13.76 | $24.93 | $24.86 | $25.33 | $26.16 | $26.38 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Not enough data
Net income or depreciation wasn't found in the filing data.
- Not enough data
FFO or dividends missing.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 36%ConservativeTotal debt $16.8B ÷ assets $46.7B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Not enough data
Operating income or interest missing.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio30:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$16M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF, its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off). We don't force this lens where it doesn't belong.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“The significant complexity and high replacement cost of our assets, combined with the gaming regulatory environment in which certain properties operate, create high barriers to entry that contribute to our current 100% occupancy rate.”
From the recordOperating margin7.9% now (TTM), off a 93.3% peak (FY2021) - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Pursuant to the terms of the respective indentures, in the event that the November 2019 Notes, February 2020 Notes and Exchange Notes (i) are rated investment grade by at least two of S&P, Moody's and Fitch and (ii) no default or event of default has occurred and is continuing under the respective i…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$16.2B heavy net debt · interest covered 0.4× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Sales of common stock, if any, made pursuant to the ATM Program may be sold in negotiated transactions or transactions that are deemed to be "at the market" offerings, as defined in Rule 415 of the Securities Act.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandBusiness
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Our Framework for Exploring Experiential Real Estate Sectors We seek to investigate, validate and potentially invest in sectors that feature these fundamental characteristics: Low cyclicality : Sectors that demonstrate relatively lower cyclicality than other consumer discretionary sectors, with a ba…”
From the recordWorst year on record5.8% operating margin (FY2019) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Our long-term triple-net leases provide our tenants with complete control over management at our leased properties, including sole responsibility for all operations and related expenses, including property taxes, insurance and maintenance, repair, improvement and other capital expenditures, as well …”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “The full extent to which the trends described herein adversely affect our tenants and borrowers, the industries in which they operate, and/or ultimately impact our business depends on future developments that cannot be predicted with confidence, including our tenants' and borrowers' business strateg…”
- “For more information, refer to "Financial difficulties experienced by any of our tenants, borrowers or guarantors, including their potential bankruptcy or insolvency, could result in defaults under, or requests to modify or terminate, their lease agreements, related guarantees or loan agreements, or…”
- “The gaming industry continues to experience intensifying competition from multiple sources, including the expansion of gaming in new jurisdictions, the growth of internet gaming, sports betting and other alternatives and accompanying regulatory developments, and evolving consumer preferences and beh…”
- “Our tenants' and borrowers' business strategies and their ability to execute their business plans effectively, including in response to evolving competitive, regulatory and consumer dynamics, may also impact our performance, especially over the long-term.”
- “The full extent to which the trends described herein adversely affect our tenants and borrowers, the industries in which they operate, and/or ultimately impact our business depends on future developments that cannot be predicted with confidence, including our tenants' and borrowers' business strateg…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ORealty Income Corp. | $5.7B | 59% | 4.7% | 86% | — |
| PSAPublic Storage | $4.8B | 61% | 14.5% | 33% | 51% |
| VICIVici Properties Inc. | $4.0B | — | — | — | 36% |
| BXPBxp, Inc. | $3.5B | 29% | 3.9% | 63% | 37% |
| AREAlexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. | $3.0B | -24% | -2.1% | — | 36% |
| EQREquity Residential | $2.7B | — | — | — | 40% |
| SUISUN Communities, Inc | $2.3B | 83% | 15.3% | — | 59% |
| MAAMid-america Apartment Communities, Inc. | $2.2B | 48% | 8.9% | 66% | — |