BXP, Bxp, Inc.
We assess fair value based on estimated cash flow projections that utilize discount and/or capitalization rates that we deem appropriate, as well as available market information.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have shrunk (−1% a year). The dividend takes 63% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 37% of assets, conservative for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.5B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $513M | $462M | $583M | $522M | $873M | $505M | $849M | $190M | $14M | $277M | $317M |
| Funds from operationsFFO | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.0B | $901M | $1.2B | $1.1B |
| FFO / shareFFO/sh | $7.84 | $7.00 | $7.94 | $7.74 | $10.01 | $7.82 | $10.17 | $6.50 | $5.71 | $7.48 | $6.72 |
| Dividend payout (FFO)Payout | 56% | 49% | 48% | 56% | 44% | 56% | 43% | 67% | 77% | 54% | — |
| Debt / assetsDebt/assets | 38% | 37% | 37% | 39% | 42% | 42% | 42% | 40% | 41% | 37% | 35% |
| Total debtDebt | $7.2B | $7.2B | $7.5B | $8.4B | $9.6B | $9.5B | $10.2B | $10.5B | $10.6B | $9.8B | $8.8B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $4.36 | $3.41 | $3.80 | $4.30 | $4.43 | $4.37 | $4.36 | $4.38 | $4.37 | $4.05 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $37.58 | $37.66 | $38.03 | $36.70 | $38.56 | $37.31 | $39.03 | $37.38 | $34.31 | $32.40 | $32.39 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $6.43 per shareNet income $277M + depreciation $912M − gains on sale $168M
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- CoveredDividends $643M ÷ FFO $1.0B
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 37%ConservativeTotal debt $9.8B ÷ assets $26.2B
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Adequate(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $653M
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$44M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.
FFO about $6.72 per share on 159M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The option counterparties are financial institutions, and we are subject to the risk that any or all of them might default under the capped call transactions.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$8.3B heavy net debt · interest covered 1.4× - Litigation & contingenciesBusiness
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“On December 9, 2024, the court issued a judgment awarding the seller the Fixed Fee (including interest) of approximately $ 2.7 million and the Company paid this fee following the judgment.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“In addition, a significant economic downturn over a period of time could result in an event or change in circumstances that results in an impairment of a long-lived asset or an "other than temporary" impairment in the value of our investments in unconsolidated joint ventures.”
From the recordWorst year on record29.1% operating margin (FY2025) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The repayment resulted in the joint venture recognizing a loss from early extinguishment of debt of approximately $ 0.1 million related to unamortized finance costs.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “During the year ended December 31, 2025, in conjunction with our strategy to sell non-core assets , we evaluated the consolidated properties approved by BXP's Board of Directors (or a committee thereof) for sale to third-parties, which resulted in recognized impairment losses of approximately $85.8 …”
- “Loss on Sales-Type Lease During the year ended December 31, 2025, we recognized approximately $2.5 million in additional costs, which had previously been contingent, related to a ground lease for land at our Reston Next property located in Reston, Virginia.”
- “Such evaluation of key impairment indicators, including a pending offer from a third-party, resulted in our determination that the decline in value for the joint venture that owns Gateway Commons was other-than-temporary.”
- “As a result of the amendment and restatement, during the year ended December 31, 2025, we recognized a loss from early extinguishment of debt of approximately $0.3 million related to unamortized origination costs.”
- “Any such inability to dispose of certain assets on the timelines we anticipate or on terms that are favorable to us, or at all, could negatively impact the proceeds we expect the multi-year asset sales program to generate, and accordingly, could adversely affect our financial condition and results o…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Real estate
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSAPublic Storage | $4.8B | 61% | 14.5% | 33% | 51% |
| VICIVici Properties Inc. | $4.0B | — | — | — | 36% |
| BXPBxp, Inc. | $3.5B | 29% | 3.9% | 63% | 37% |
| AREAlexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. | $3.0B | -24% | -2.1% | — | 36% |
| EQREquity Residential | $2.7B | — | — | — | 40% |
| SUISUN Communities, Inc | $2.3B | 83% | 15.3% | — | 59% |
| MAAMid-america Apartment Communities, Inc. | $2.2B | 48% | 8.9% | 66% | — |
| KIMKimco Realty Corporation | $2.1B | 52% | 5.7% | 64% | 39% |