MU, Micron Technology Inc
We are an industry leader in innovative memory and storage solutions transforming how the world uses information to enrich life for all .
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is DRAM (76%), NAND (23%) and Other Product Sales (1%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. margins collapse repeatedly across the cycle, a single year misleads; look at normalized, through-cycle earnings and the balance sheet at the trough.
- What moves the needle
- Engagement and pricing power, not factories. What decides it: whether the gross margin holds as the business scales, how much of the profit is paid out to employees as stock, and whether revenue keeps compounding.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →DRAM is 76% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- DRAM76%$28.6B
- NAND23%$8.5B
- Other Product Sales1%$297M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMFeb 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $12.4B | $20.3B | $30.4B | $23.4B | $21.4B | $27.7B | $30.8B | $15.5B | $25.1B | $37.4B | $58.1B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | 20% | 42% | 59% | 46% | 31% | 38% | 45% | −9% | 22% | 40% | 58% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 1.4% | 28.9% | 49.3% | 31.5% | 14.0% | 22.7% | 31.5% | −37.0% | 5.2% | 26.1% | 48.3% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($276M) | $5.1B | $14.1B | $6.3B | $2.7B | $5.9B | $8.7B | ($5.8B) | $778M | $8.5B | $24.1B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-0.27 | $4.41 | $11.50 | $5.52 | $2.38 | $5.14 | $7.74 | $-5.34 | $0.70 | $7.59 | $21.15 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | ($2.6B) | $3.4B | $8.5B | $3.4B | $83M | $2.4B | $3.1B | ($6.1B) | $121M | $1.7B | $10.3B |
| Owner earnings marginOE mgn | −21.4% | 16.8% | 28.0% | 14.6% | 0.4% | 8.8% | 10.1% | −39.4% | 0.5% | 4.5% | 17.7% |
| ROICROIC | 1% | 23% | 49% | 19% | 7% | 14% | 18% | -9% | 2% | 15% | 35% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $4.8B | $6.0B | $7.3B | $7.2B | $7.6B | $7.8B | $8.3B | $8.6B | $7.0B | $9.6B | $16.6B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $5.1B | $5.1B | ($2.6B) | ($1.3B) | ($981M) | ($987M) | ($1.4B) | $4.8B | $6.4B | $4.9B | ($6.4B) |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $11.66 | $16.14 | $26.28 | $31.39 | $34.48 | $38.50 | $44.48 | $40.37 | $40.37 | $48.15 | $63.56 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 20.5×ComfortableOperating income $9.8B ÷ interest expense $477M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- ConservativeTotal debt $14.6B ÷ operating income $9.8B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $4.6BModest net debtCash $9.6B + ST investments $296M − debt $14.6B
Netting $9.9B of cash and short-term investments against $14.6B of debt leaves $4.6B owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. It also holds $473M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $4.2B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Capital-hungryDSO 70 + DIO 136 − DPO 51 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT $8.6B ÷ invested capital $59.1B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- ThinOwner Earnings $1.7B = operating cash $17.5B − capex $15.9B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 4% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $972M of SBC) leaves $696M. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $17.5B ÷ net income $8.5B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $522M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.7B
Of $1.7B Owner Earnings, $522M (31%) went back to shareholders, $522M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.90×ExpandingCapex $15.9B ÷ depreciation $8.4B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 1% (FY2016) → 26% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −18%
Reinvested capital earned a negative return, the business spent money to shrink its own economics.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −37.0% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.9%/yr
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $105.5B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$91.4B · 87%
- Dividends$2.0B · 2%
- Buybacks$7.5B · 7%
- Retained (debt / cash)$4.5B · 4%
It reinvested $91.4B (87%) back into the business and returned $9.5B (9%) to owners, $2.0B in dividends, $7.5B in buybacks. Total debt rose $232M across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio529:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$972M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $37.4B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.52×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $14.6B vs $17.4B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −82%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $7.59/share and book value $48.15/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Micron Technology Inc has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $10.3B on 1140M diluted shares; net cash $6.4B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationRisk Factors
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Revenue from one customer was 17 % (primarily included in the CMBU segment) of total revenue for 2025.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$58.1B - Pricing power & competitionMD&A
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“AEBU revenue increased 3% primarily due to increases in DRAM and NAND bit shipments, partially offset by declines in average selling prices for both DRAM and NAND as a result of pricing pressure for certain legacy products.”
From the recordOperating margin48.3% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Supplier & input dependenceBusiness
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“However, only a limited number of suppliers are capable of delivering certain materials, components, and services that meet our standards and, in some cases, materials, components, or services are provided by a single or sole source, and we may be unable to qualify new suppliers on a timely basis.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)58% - Concentrated dependenceBusiness
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Resources Supply Chain, Materials, and Third-Party Service Providers Our supply chain and operations are dependent on the availability of materials that meet exacting standards and the use of third parties to provide us with components and services.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)18% - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The Revolving Credit Facility contains the same net leverage ratio and substantially the same other covenants as the Term Loan Agreement.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$4.6B modest net debt · interest covered 20.5× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“("Netlist") filed two patent infringement actions against Micron, Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“In addition to the CHIPS Act direct funding, we receive a 35% investment tax credit on qualified investments in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing under the CHIPS Act.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Interest Income (Expense), Net: Interest income (expense) improved in 2025 as compared to 2024 primarily due to decreases in interest expense as a result of increased capitalized interest driven by higher levels of building construction, partially offset by decreases in interest income due to lower …”
- “Changes in operating income or loss for each business unit for 2025 as compared to 2024 were as follows: CMBU operating income increased primarily due to higher bit shipments and increases in average selling prices driven by robust AI demand in cloud server markets, particularly for HBM, DIMMs, and …”
- “Increasing demand growth, driven in part by deployment of AI and mostly normal customer inventories, combined with industry-wide supply discipline, resulted in an industry supply and demand balance that substantially improved from downturn conditions in memory and storage markets during 2023.”
- “During 2025, we shifted a portion of our DRAM supply to the data center and hyperscale cloud markets to meet the strong demand fueled by AI, with emphasis on HBM products, resulting in a revenue mix weighted more prominently toward segments experiencing higher growth.”
- “In addition, the agreements include certain events of default and related rights and remedies, including clawbacks related to the failure to complete a project by an agreed upon completion date, violation of CHIPS Act restrictions on certain activities involving foreign countries and entities of con…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTCIntel Corp | $52.9B | 35% | -4.2% | -1% | -9% |
| MUMicron Technology Inc | $37.4B | 40% | 26.1% | 15% | 4% |
| AMDAdvanced Micro Devices | $34.6B | 50% | 10.7% | 6% | 19% |
| AMATApplied Materials Inc /de | $28.4B | 49% | 29.2% | 32% | 20% |
| APHAmphenol Corp /de/ | $23.1B | 37% | 25.4% | 25% | 19% |
| TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated | $17.7B | 57% | 34.1% | 19% | 15% |
| NXPINXP Semiconductors N.v. | $12.3B | 55% | 24.8% | 13% | 20% |
| ADIAnalog Devices Inc | $11.0B | 61% | 26.6% | 6% | 39% |