ADI, Analog Devices Inc
Analog Devices Inc is a global semiconductor leader dedicated to solving our customers' most complex engineering challenges.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Industrial (45%) and Automotive (30%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Engagement and pricing power, not factories. What decides it: whether the gross margin holds as the business scales, how much of the profit is paid out to employees as stock, and whether revenue keeps compounding.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 33% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Industrial at 45%.
- Industrial45%$4.9B
- Automotive30%$3.3B
- Consumer13%$1.4B
- Communications13%$1.4B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $3.4B | $5.2B | $6.2B | $6.0B | $5.6B | $7.3B | $12.0B | $12.3B | $9.4B | $11.0B | $12.7B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | 65% | 60% | 68% | 67% | 66% | 62% | 63% | 64% | 57% | 61% | 64% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 30.0% | 22.2% | 30.5% | 28.6% | 26.7% | 23.1% | 27.3% | 31.1% | 21.6% | 26.6% | 32.5% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $862M | $805M | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $1.6B | $2.3B | $3.3B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.76 | $2.30 | $4.02 | $3.66 | $3.28 | $3.46 | $5.25 | $6.55 | $3.28 | $4.56 | $6.75 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $1.2B | $950M | $2.2B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $3.8B | $3.6B | $3.1B | $4.3B | $4.6B |
| Owner earnings marginOE mgn | 34.0% | 18.1% | 35.1% | 33.0% | 32.9% | 32.7% | 31.4% | 28.9% | 33.1% | 38.8% | 35.8% |
| ROICROIC | 22% | 11% | 16% | 14% | 13% | 5% | 7% | 9% | 5% | 6% | 9% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $4.1B | $1.0B | $817M | $648M | $1.1B | $2.0B | $1.5B | $958M | $2.4B | $3.7B | $3.6B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | ($4.1B) | ($1.0B) | ($750M) | ($648M) | ($1.1B) | ($1.5B) | $5.1B | $5.4B | $4.7B | $4.5B | $4.5B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $16.54 | $28.99 | $30.05 | $31.40 | $32.25 | $94.68 | $69.70 | $70.29 | $70.54 | $68.08 | $68.71 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $2.9B ÷ interest expense $318M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- ModerateTotal debt $8.1B ÷ operating income $2.9B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $4.5BModest net debtCash $2.5B + ST investments $1.2B − debt $8.1B
Netting $3.7B of cash and short-term investments against $8.1B of debt leaves $4.5B owed, about 1.5× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Capital-hungryDSO 48 + DIO 142 − DPO 47 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $2.5B ÷ invested capital $39.5B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Cash machineOwner Earnings $4.3B = operating cash $4.8B − capex $534M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 39% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $322M of SBC) leaves $4.0B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $4.8B ÷ net income $2.3B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $4.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.3B
Of $4.3B Owner Earnings, $4.1B (96%) went back to shareholders, $1.9B dividends, $2.2B buybacks. Net of $322M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.8B. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 30% (FY2016) → 27% (FY2025)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 15% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 21.6% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +5.3%/yr
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $29.8B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a mature cash machine, most of what it earns goes straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$4.6B · 15%
- Dividends$11.5B · 39%
- Buybacks$12.4B · 42%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 4%
It reinvested $4.6B (15%) back into the business and returned $24.0B (80%) to owners, $11.5B in dividends, $12.4B in buybacks.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio534:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$322M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
5 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $11.0B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.19×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $8.1B vs $3.9B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +127%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $4.56/share and book value $68.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Analog Devices Inc has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $4.6B on 491M diluted shares; net debt $4.5B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We compete with a number of semiconductor companies in markets that are highly competitive.”
From the recordOperating margin32.5% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“In certain instances, one of our vendors may be the sole source of highly specialized processing services or materials.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)64% - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“A significant portion of our revenue is derived from customers in international markets, and we expect that international sales will continue to account for a significant portion of our revenue in the future.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)36% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The indentures governing certain of our debt instruments contain covenants that may limit our ability to: incur, create, assume or guarantee any debt or borrowed money secured by a lien upon a principal property; enter into sale and lease-back transactions with respect to a principal property; and c…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$4.5B modest net debt · interest covered 9.2× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Our customers have on occasion been sued, and may be sued in the future, by third parties alleging infringement of intellectual property rights, or damages resulting from use of our products.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“The cyclical nature of the semiconductor industry has resulted in periods when demand for our products has increased or decreased rapidly.”
From the recordWorst year on record21.6% operating margin (FY2024) - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“In the United States, for example, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) imposes a 15% book minimum tax on corporations with three-year average annual adjusted financial statement income exceeding $1 billion.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Amortization of Intangibles Fiscal Year 2025 2024 $ Change % Change Amortization expenses $ 749,662 $ 754,784 $ (5,122) (1) % Amortization expenses as a % of revenue 7 % 8 % Amortization expenses decreased in fiscal 2025 as compared to fiscal 2024, primarily as a result of a portion of our acquired …”
- “In addition to increased demand, the increase in the Industrial end market was primarily due to customer inventory balances normalizing and growth in the test equipment and aerospace and defense sub-markets.”
- “We test goodwill on an annual basis on the first day of the fourth quarter (August 3, 2025 in fiscal 2025) or more frequently if indicators of impairment exist or we reorganize our business.”
- “We have determined that the business operates as a single operating segment and has a single reporting unit for the purpose of goodwill impairment testing.”
- “Termination of a significant distributor or a group of distributors, whether at our initiative or the distributor's initiative or through consolidation in the distribution industry, or the inability of a distributor to perform its obligations, could divert management's attention and resources, resul…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated | $17.7B | 57% | 34.1% | 19% | 15% |
| NXPINXP Semiconductors N.v. | $12.3B | 55% | 24.8% | 13% | 20% |
| ADIAnalog Devices Inc | $11.0B | 61% | 26.6% | 6% | 39% |
| MRVLMarvell Technology, Inc | $8.2B | 51% | 16.1% | 7% | 17% |
| ONON Semiconductor Corporation | $6.0B | 33% | 1.4% | 1% | 24% |
| MCHPMicrochip Technology Incorporated | $4.7B | 58% | 10.4% | 4% | 18% |
| SWKSSkyworks Solutions, Inc. | $4.1B | 41% | 12.2% | 8% | 27% |
| MPWRMonolithic Power Systems Inc | $2.8B | 55% | 26.1% | 24% | 24% |