INTC, Intel Corp
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, drawn from its own SEC filings. The lens to bring to the numbers below, not the answer.
- What it is
- A semiconductor business, riding a brutal capacity cycle on the edge of Moore's Law.
- Situation
- Unprofitable growth. no operating profit yet, judge it on revenue growth, gross-margin trajectory, cash burn and runway, never on an earnings multiple. Distress / turnaround. thin interest coverage or cash-burning operations against real debt, the first questions are liquidity and the maturity wall, not growth. Capital build-out. capital spending has surged to 28% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. margins collapse repeatedly across the cycle, a single year misleads; look at normalized, through-cycle earnings and the balance sheet at the trough.
- What moves the needle
- Process leadership and the capex cycle. What decides it: staying ahead on the node, or designing around it as a fabless firm; the pricing power that lead brings; and not overbuilding into the downturn.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one, so weigh the worst year against the median, and read the 10-K.
No model wrote a word of this. Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below; the judgment is yours.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →70% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States30%$15.8B
- China24%$12.7B
- Singapore18%$9.5B
- Taiwan15%$7.7B
- Other regions14%$7.2B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $59.4B | $62.8B | $70.8B | $72.0B | $77.9B | $79.0B | $63.1B | $54.2B | $53.1B | $52.9B | $53.8B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | 61% | 62% | 62% | 59% | 56% | 55% | 43% | 40% | 33% | 35% | 35% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 22.1% | 28.8% | 32.9% | 30.6% | 30.4% | 24.6% | 3.7% | 0.2% | −22.0% | −4.2% | −9.4% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $10.3B | $9.6B | $21.1B | $21.0B | $20.9B | $19.9B | $8.0B | $1.7B | ($18.8B) | ($267M) | ($3.2B) |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.12 | $1.99 | $4.48 | $4.71 | $4.94 | $4.86 | $1.94 | $0.40 | $-4.38 | $-0.06 | $-0.62 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | — | $10.3B | $14.3B | $16.9B | $21.6B | $10.7B | ($9.4B) | ($14.3B) | ($15.7B) | ($4.9B) | ($3.1B) |
| Owner earnings marginOE mgn | — | 16.5% | 20.1% | 23.5% | 27.7% | 13.6% | −14.9% | −26.3% | −29.5% | −9.4% | −5.8% |
| ROICROIC | 12% | 10% | 22% | 18% | 17% | 13% | 2% | 0% | -7% | -1% | -3% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $5.6B | $3.4B | $3.0B | — | — | — | — | — | $8.2B | $14.3B | $17.2B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $19.7B | $23.3B | $22.8B | $29.0B | $36.4B | $38.1B | $38.1B | $49.3B | $41.8B | $32.3B | $27.8B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $13.58 | $14.41 | $15.86 | $17.33 | $19.15 | $23.32 | $24.60 | $25.07 | $23.19 | $25.23 | $21.92 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($2.2B) ÷ interest expense $1.1B
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt against an operating lossTotal debt $46.6B · operating income ($2.2B)
There's debt but no operating profit to measure it against, understand that combination before anything else about the company.
- Debt, net of cash $32.3BNet debtCash $14.3B − debt $46.6B
Netting $14.3B of cash and short-term investments against $46.6B of debt leaves $32.3B owed. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 27 + DIO 123 − DPO 105 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($1.1B) ÷ invested capital $146.6B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner Earnings ($4.9B) = operating cash $9.7B − capex $14.6B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's -9% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2.4B of SBC) leaves ($7.4B). Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($267M) · cash from operations $9.7B
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 73.23×ExpandingCapex $14.6B ÷ depreciation $200M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 22% (FY2016) → −4% (FY2025)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −31%
Reinvested capital earned a negative return, the business spent money to shrink its own economics.
- Worst year 2024 · −22.0% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.8%/yr
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
Paid a dividend in 9 of the years on record.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $194.9B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$165.3B · 85%
- Dividends$38.1B · 20%
- Buybacks$44.6B · 23%
It reinvested $165.3B (85%) back into the business and returned $82.7B (42%) to owners, $38.1B in dividends, $44.6B in buybacks. Total debt rose $18.3B across the span. It returned and reinvested more than it generated, the gap was covered by debt or existing cash.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$2.4B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
2 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $52.9B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.02×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $46.6B vs $32.1B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record NearUninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −142%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $-0.06/share and book value $25.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVGOBroadcom Inc. | $63.9B | 68% | 39.9% | 19% | 42% |
| INTCIntel Corp | $52.9B | 35% | -4.2% | -1% | -9% |
| MUMicron Technology Inc | $37.4B | 40% | 26.1% | 15% | 4% |
| AMDAdvanced Micro Devices | $34.6B | 50% | 10.7% | 6% | 19% |
| AMATApplied Materials Inc /de | $28.4B | 49% | 29.2% | 32% | 20% |
| APHAmphenol Corp /de/ | $23.1B | 37% | 25.4% | 25% | 19% |
| TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated | $17.7B | 57% | 34.1% | 19% | 15% |
| NXPINXP Semiconductors N.v. | $12.3B | 55% | 24.8% | 13% | 20% |