DPZ, Domino's Pizza Inc.
Domino's is the largest pizza company in the world with more than 22,100 locations in over 90 markets around the world as of December 28, 2025, and operates two distinct service models within its stores, with a significant business in both delivery and carryout.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and its hold on the shelf.
- What moves the needle
- Volume against price, and shelf position. What decides it: whether it can raise prices without losing the customer, and whether the brand still commands its margin.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 99%, above 15% in 9 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. High, durable returns can mark a moat, but whether this one is real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2014–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2014’14 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $4.4B | $4.5B | $4.7B | $4.9B | $5.0B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | 30% | 31% | 31% | 38% | 39% | 39% | 39% | 39% | 39% | 40% | 40% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 17.3% | 18.3% | 18.7% | 16.7% | 17.4% | 17.6% | 17.6% | 18.3% | 18.7% | 19.3% | 19.6% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $163M | $193M | $278M | $362M | $401M | $491M | $510M | $519M | $584M | $602M | $592M |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.86 | $3.47 | $5.83 | $8.35 | $9.56 | $12.39 | $13.54 | $14.66 | $16.69 | $17.57 | $17.50 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | — | — | $251M | $274M | $411M | $504M | $560M | $485M | $512M | $672M | $654M |
| ROICROIC | 87% | 103% | 103% | 112% | 112% | 99% | 95% | 81% | — | 95% | 103% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $35M | $140M | $44M | $34M | $203M | $182M | $164M | $77M | $207M | $151M | $259M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $1.5B | $2.0B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $3.6B | $4.7B | $4.6B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.93 | $1.45 | $1.77 | $2.13 | $2.52 | $3.08 | $3.70 | $4.80 | $6.00 | $6.92 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $-21.42 | $-32.42 | $-57.37 | $-70.16 | $-81.48 | $-83.26 | $-111.68 | $-114.98 | $-113.24 | $-113.94 | $-115.53 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $954M ÷ interest expense $196M
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- HeavyTotal debt $4.8B ÷ operating income $954M
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $4.7BHeavy net debtCash $126M − debt $4.8B
Netting $126M of cash and short-term investments against $4.8B of debt leaves $4.7B owed, about 4.9× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. It also holds $25M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $4.7B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 23 + DIO 10 − DPO 17 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- ExceptionalNOPAT $745M ÷ invested capital $784M (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- SolidOwner Earnings $672M = operating cash $792M − capex $121M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 14% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves $627M. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $792M ÷ net income $602M
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $595M ÷ Owner Earnings $672M
Of $672M Owner Earnings, $595M (89%) went back to shareholders, $237M dividends, $358M buybacks. Net of $45M stock comp, the real buyback was about $313M. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.36×ExpandingCapex $121M ÷ depreciation $89M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2014–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 9 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 17% (FY2014) → 19% (FY2025)
Margins held roughly steady across the record.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 91%
Every extra dollar the company reinvested earned a high return, it is still compounding, not coasting on an old moat.
- Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 16.7% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −4.5%/yr
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $4.5B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a mature cash machine, most of what it earns goes straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$817M · 18%
- Dividends$1.2B · 26%
- Buybacks$4.9B · 110%
It reinvested $817M (18%) back into the business and returned $6.1B (136%) to owners, $1.2B in dividends, $4.9B in buybacks. Total debt rose $1.8B across the span. It returned and reinvested more than it generated, the gap was covered by debt or existing cash.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$45M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
4 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.9B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.65×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.8B vs $353M WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +169%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $17.57/share and book value $-113.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Domino's Pizza Inc. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $654M on 34M diluted shares; net debt $4.6B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We are committed to continuing to offer competitive pricing and personalized value for our customers that is innovative and memorable.”
From the recordOperating margin19.6% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Supplier & input dependenceBusiness
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“The majority of our meat toppings in the U.S. come from a single supplier under a contract which was renegotiated in December 2025 and expires at the end of December 2027, subject to a one-year optional extension.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)40% - Concentrated dependenceBusiness
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our business is not dependent upon a single retail customer or small group of customers, including franchisees.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)13% - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“If the Company has not repaid or refinanced the respective note series prior to the applicable anticipated repayment dates, additional interest of at least 5 % per annum will accrue, and the Company's cash flows other than a weekly management fee to cover certain operating expenses would be directed…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$4.7B heavy net debt · interest covered 4.9× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Additional information related to the 2017 Recapitalization is included in Note 3 to our consolidated financial statements. 2025 Variable Funding Notes In connection with the 2025 Refinancing, certain of our subsidiaries issued the 2025 Variable Funding Notes.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“We repurchased and retired $354.7 million in shares of our common stock under our Board of Directors-approved share repurchase program, as well as made $3.0 million in excise tax payments related to our share repurchase programs.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Higher insurance costs partially offset these improvements in supply chain gross margin as a percentage of revenues in 2025. 42 General and Administrative Expenses General and administrative expenses increased $4.6 million, or 1.0%, in 2025, primarily due to approximately $5 million in severance exp…”
- “Additionally, net income increased $17.5 million and non-cash adjustments increased $33.8 million (primarily representing the changes in the total net realized and unrealized losses and gains associated with the remeasurement of the Company's investment in DPC Dash and changes in deferred income tax…”
- “As of December 29, 2024, current portion of long-term debt included the outstanding principal amounts under the 2015 Ten-Year Notes and the 2018 7.5-Year Notes for which the anticipated repayment date was October 2025. 46 The Notes are subject to certain financial and non-financial covenants, includ…”
- “The increase in supply chain revenues was primarily attributable to higher order volumes and an increase in our food basket pricing to stores, but these increases were partially offset by a shift in the relative mix of products we sell and the transition of our equipment and supplies business to a t…”
- “If the Company has not repaid or refinanced the respective note series prior to the applicable anticipated repayment dates, additional interest of at least 5 % per annum will accrue, and the Company's cash flows other than a weekly management fee to cover certain operating expenses would be directed…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Groceries & Related Products
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KDPKeurig Dr Pepper Inc. | $16.6B | 54% | 21.5% | 7% | 9% |
| KMBKimberly-Clark Corp. | $16.4B | 36% | 14.3% | 23% | 10% |
| STZConstellation Brands Inc. | $9.1B | 52% | 29.8% | 11% | 20% |
| MNSTMonster Beverage Corp. | $8.3B | 56% | 29.2% | 28% | 24% |
| CLXClorox Co. | $7.1B | 45% | — | — | 11% |
| DPZDomino's Pizza Inc. | $4.9B | 40% | 19.3% | 95% | 14% |
| MZTIMarzetti Co. | $1.9B | 24% | 11.5% | — | 11% |
| WDFCWD-40 Co. | $620M | 55% | 16.7% | 31% | 13% |