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UNH, Unitedhealth Group Incorporated

Health insurance financial

UnitedHealth Group Incorporated is a health care and well-being company with a mission to help people live healthier lives and help make the health system work better for everyone.

Latest filing: FY2025 10-K

Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.

UNH · Unitedhealth Group Incorporated
Revenue · FY2025
$447.6B
+11.8% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Loss ratio 89% 5-yr avg 85%
Return on equity 12% 5-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.

What it is
An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.
What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested.
Is it a good business?
Claims run 89% of premiums, with underwriting costs on top. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 12% a year across the record. The float runs about 0.4× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing, no estimates
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
RevenueRevenue$184.8B$201.2B$226.2B$242.2B$257.1B$287.6B$324.2B$371.6B$400.3B$447.6B$449.7B
Premiums earnedPremiums$144.1B$158.5B$178.1B$189.7B$201.5B$226.2B$257.2B$290.8B$308.8B$352.2B$353.3B
Net incomeNet inc.$7.0B$10.6B$12.0B$13.8B$15.4B$17.3B$20.1B$22.4B$14.4B$12.1B$12.0B
Loss ratioLoss82%83%86%89%89%
Return on equityROE18%21%22%23%23%23%25%24%15%12%12%
Float (reserves)Float$16.4B$17.9B$19.9B$21.7B$21.9B$24.5B$29.1B$32.4B$34.2B$39.3B$39.7B
Book value / shareBVPS$39.44$50.59$55.26$62.56$71.10$78.50$85.74$100.66$105.78$109.87$114.17
Dividends / shareDiv/sh$2.34$2.82$3.38$4.07$4.77$5.52$6.31$7.21$8.11$8.69

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Claims share of premiums
    Claims incurred $314.0B ÷ premiums earned $352.2B

    Claims as a share of premiums (the expense side was not cleanly tagged, so we show the loss ratio alone rather than a full combined ratio). Lower is better; the rest of underwriting cost sits on top of this.

  • Solid
    Net income $12.1B ÷ equity $100.1B

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • 0.4× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $39.3B, 0.4× equity

    Money collected as premiums and held against future claims, invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • Not enough data

    Net investment income wasn't found.

Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.

Management & pay

read the proxy →

Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.

  • CEO pay ratio748:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.

  • Stock-based compensation$971M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

A bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF, its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off). We don't force this lens where it doesn't belong.

What the filing emphasizes, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.

  • Pricing power & competitionBusiness

    Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.

    “As a diversified health care company, we operate in highly competitive markets across the full expanse of health care benefits and services.”
    From the recordOperating margin4.2% now (TTM), off a 8.8% peak (FY2022)
  • Concentrated dependenceBusiness

    What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.

    “We are not substantially dependent on any single patent or group of related patents.”
    From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)4%
  • Debt terms & refinancingMD&A

    The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.

    “For more information on our commercial paper and bank credit facilities, see Note 8 of the Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements included in Part II, Item 8, "Financial Statements and Supplementary Data." As of December 31, 2025, we were in compliance with the various covenants under our ba…”
    From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$50.3B meaningful net debt · interest covered 4.7×
  • Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors

    Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.

    “We also have been and in the future may be a party to class action lawsuits, including those brought by health care professional groups, consumers and investors.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
  • Regulation & policyBusiness

    Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.

    “Our businesses are also subject to laws and regulations relating to consumer protection, anti-fraud and abuse, anti-kickbacks, false claims, prohibited referrals, inappropriate reduction or limitation of health care services, anti-money laundering and securities and antitrust compliance.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.

What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024

read the 10-K →

Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.

MD&A length +10%Readability harderHedging down
  • “Earnings from operations decreased primarily due to the impacts of Medicare Advantage funding reductions, elevated medical cost trend, gains related to business portfolio refinement in 2024, the impacts of market morbidity changes on our individual exchange offerings, other write-offs and settlement…”
  • “The operating cost ratio increased due to gains related to business portfolio refinement in 2024; investments to support future growth and the impacts of restructuring and other actions; partially offset by the revenue impacts of government programs, including the IRA-driven impacts on Medicare Part…”
  • “Earnings from operations of $19.0 billion compared to $32.3 billion last year, impacted by elevated medical cost trend, restructuring and other actions, gains related to business portfolio refinement in 2024, partially offset by net portfolio divestitures in 2025 and decreased impacts related to the…”
  • “Optum Health Revenues at Optum Health decreased primarily due to the conversion of risk-based contracts to fee-based, Medicare Advantage funding reductions and the profile of members served, partially offset by growth in patients served under value-based arrangements.”
  • “However, to the extent an AI system does not operate as intended or produces an inaccurate, incomplete or biased output, the system could impact operations, customer service or other functions and could have an adverse effect on our business, reputation, results of operations, financial position and…”

Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.

Peers, Health insurance

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. marks best in the group.

CompanyRevenueCombined ratioLoss ratioROE
UNHUnitedhealth Group Incorporated$447.6B89%12%
CIThe Cigna Group$274.9B85%14%
ELVElevance Health, Inc.$199.1B117%90%13%
CNCCentene Corporation$174.6B364%-33%
HUMHumana Inc$129.7B103%90%7%
AFLAflac Inc$17.2B93%54%12%