HUM, Humana Inc
Our approach to primary, physician-directed care for our members aims to provide quality care that is consistent, integrated, cost-effective, and member-focused.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested.
- Is it a good business?
- It runs an underwriting loss, about a 103% combined ratio, and must earn the difference back on the float. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 8% a year across the record. The float runs about 0.6× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $54.4B | $53.8B | $56.9B | $64.9B | $77.2B | $83.1B | $92.9B | $106.4B | $117.8B | $129.7B | $137.2B |
| Premiums earnedPremiums | $53.0B | $52.4B | $54.9B | $62.9B | $74.2B | $79.8B | $87.7B | $101.3B | $112.1B | $122.8B | $130.0B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $614M | $2.4B | $1.7B | $2.7B | $3.4B | $2.9B | $2.8B | $2.5B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B |
| Combined ratioCombined | ≈ 99% | ≈ 95% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 97% | ≈ 100% | ≈ 102% | ≈ 101% | ≈ 103% | ≈ 103% | ≈ 104% |
| Loss ratioLoss | — | — | — | — | — | — | 86% | 87% | 90% | 90% | 91% |
| Return on equityROE | 6% | 25% | 17% | 22% | 25% | 18% | 18% | 15% | 7% | 7% | 6% |
| Investment incomeInv. inc. | — | — | — | — | — | — | $382M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.0B |
| Float (reserves)Float | $4.6B | $4.7B | $4.9B | $6.0B | $8.1B | $8.3B | $9.3B | $10.2B | $10.4B | $10.0B | $12.7B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $70.80 | $67.60 | $73.42 | $89.34 | $103.21 | $124.27 | $120.47 | $130.68 | $135.48 | $146.14 | $154.00 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $1.17 | $1.51 | $1.91 | $2.16 | $2.43 | $0.70 | $0.77 | $3.46 | $3.57 | $3.56 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 103%Underwriting lossTotal benefits, losses and expenses $127.0B ÷ premiums earned $122.8B
The heart of an insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Below the cost of equityNet income $1.2B ÷ equity $17.7B
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $10.0B0.6× equityLoss and claim reserves $10.0B, 0.6× equity
Money collected as premiums and held against future claims, invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $1.0B10.1% on the floatNet investment income $1.0B, 10.1% on the float
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio226:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$241M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Humana Inc’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on an insurer.
Tangible book $6.9B on 121M shares, a 34% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We believe that barriers to entry in our markets are not substantial, so the addition of new competitors can occur relatively easily, and customers enjoy significant flexibility in moving between competitors through the Medicare Annual Enrollment Period.”
From the recordOperating margin1.8% now (TTM), off a 7.9% peak (FY2017) - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our business depends significantly on effective information systems and the integrity and timeliness of the data we use to run our business.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)1% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“We believe our cash balances, investment securities, operating cash flows, and funds available under our credit agreement and our commercial paper program or from other public or private financing sources, taken together, provide adequate resources to fund ongoing operating and regulatory requiremen…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$7.5B net cash · interest covered 4.3× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“This comparison was significantly impacted by put/call valuation adjustments associated with non-consolidating minority interest investments, charges associated with value creation initiatives, impairment charges, loss on sale of business and settlement of certain litigation expenses.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Our primary uses of cash historically have included disbursements for claims payments, operating costs, interest on 51 borrowings, taxes, purchases of investment securities, acquisitions, capital expenditures, repayments on borrowings, dividends, and share repurchases.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “We believe our cash balances, investment securities, operating cash flows, and funds available under our credit agreement and our commercial paper program or from other public or private financing sources, taken together, provide adequate resources to fund ongoing operating and regulatory requiremen…”
- “The consolidated operating cost ratio increased 20 basis points from 11.8% in the 2024 period to 12.0% in the 2025 period primarily due to business mix changes, including within the CenterWell segment that runs a significantly higher operating cost ratio than the Insurance segment, the operating lev…”
- “Operating costs The CenterWell segment operating cost ratio increased 90 basis points from 92.2% in the 2024 period to 93.1% in the 2025 period primarily resulting from the continued phase-in of the v28 risk model revision within the primary care business, as well as the uptick of volume within Cent…”
- “Investment Income Investment income decreased $0.2 billion, or 17.9%, from $1.2 billion in the 2024 period to $1.0 billion in the 2025 period primarily due to lower interest income on our debt securities, as well as non-cash impairment charge in the fourth quarter of 2025 related to our minority own…”
- “In addition, changes to laws, regulations and guidance regarding how we may use AI/ML could make 22 it harder for us to conduct our business using AI/ML, require us to retrain our AI/ML, delete data produced by our AI/ML, or prevent or limit our use of AI/ML.”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Health insurance
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNHUnitedhealth Group Incorporated | $447.6B | — | 89% | 12% |
| CIThe Cigna Group | $274.9B | — | 85% | 14% |
| ELVElevance Health, Inc. | $199.1B | 117% | 90% | 13% |
| CNCCentene Corporation | $174.6B | — | 364% | -33% |
| HUMHumana Inc | $129.7B | 103% | 90% | 7% |
| AFLAflac Inc | $17.2B | 93% | 54% | 12% |