CI, The Cigna Group
The Cigna Group , together with its subsidiaries, is a global health company.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Products (79%) and Services (6%), with 2 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested.
- Is it a good business?
- Claims run 85% of premiums, with underwriting costs on top. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 13% a year across the record. The float runs about 0.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Products is 79% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- Products79%$216.7B
- Services6%$16.9B
- Service, Fees And Other Revenues6%$16.9B
- Other revenue0%$696M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $39.8B | $41.8B | $48.6B | $153.6B | $160.4B | $174.1B | $180.5B | $195.3B | $247.1B | $274.9B | $277.9B |
| Premiums earnedPremiums | $30.8B | $32.5B | $36.1B | $39.7B | $42.6B | $41.2B | $39.9B | $44.2B | $46.0B | $40.3B | $37.3B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $5.1B | $8.5B | $5.4B | $6.7B | $5.2B | $3.4B | $6.0B | $6.3B |
| Combined ratioCombined | ≈ 119% | ≈ 117% | ≈ 123% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Loss ratioLoss | 79% | 78% | 76% | 78% | 77% | 82% | 81% | 82% | 84% | 85% | 85% |
| Return on equityROE | 14% | 16% | 6% | 11% | 17% | 11% | 15% | 11% | 8% | 14% | 15% |
| Investment incomeInv. inc. | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $973M | $1.0B | $1.0B |
| Float (reserves)Float | — | $10.0B | $9.7B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $9.8B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $34.77 | $35.41 | $108.02 | $119.37 | $136.60 | $138.17 | $142.70 | $155.69 | $144.88 | $155.32 | $159.88 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | — | — | — | $0.04 | $0.04 | $3.93 | $4.42 | $4.88 | $5.53 | $6.00 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Loss ratio 85%Claims share of premiumsClaims incurred $34.3B ÷ premiums earned $40.3B
Claims as a share of premiums (the expense side was not cleanly tagged, so we show the loss ratio alone rather than a full combined ratio). Lower is better; the rest of underwriting cost sits on top of this.
- Return on equity 14%SolidNet income $6.0B ÷ equity $41.7B
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $9.7B0.2× equityLoss and claim reserves $9.7B, 0.2× equity
Money collected as premiums and held against future claims, invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $1.0B10.8% on the floatNet investment income $1.0B, 10.8% on the float
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio310:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF, its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off). We don't force this lens where it doesn't belong.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationBusiness
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“ASO arrangements represent approximately 32% of 2025 segment revenues and 79% of Cigna Healthcare medical customers as of December 31, 2025.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$277.9B - Pricing power & competitionMD&A
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We face price competition and other pressures that could compress our margins or result in premiums that are insufficient to cover the cost of services delivered to our customers.”
From the recordOperating margin3.4% now (TTM), off a 9.4% peak (FY2017) - Concentrated dependenceBusiness
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“We are not substantially dependent on any single patent or group of related patents.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)3% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Total scheduled payments on long-term debt are $49.9 billion through January 2056 (of which $2.0 billion relate to the fiscal year ending December 31, 2026), which include scheduled interest payments and maturities of long-term debt.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$22.1B meaningful net debt · no real interest burden - Litigation & contingenciesBusiness
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Additionally, private individuals have brought and may bring qui tam , or "whistleblower," suits under the False Claims Act, which authorizes the payment of a portion of any recovery to the individual bringing suit.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandMD&A
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Many factors, including geopolitical issues, future economic downturns, man-made disasters, natural disasters (including those as a result of climate change) and pandemics, availability and cost of credit, and other capital and consumer spending, can negatively impact the U.S. and global economies.”
From the recordWorst year on record3.3% operating margin (FY2025) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The proceeds from this debt issuance were used to repay the $2.0 billion of loans outstanding under the Term Loan Facility, dated August 2025, the proceeds of which were used to partially fund an investment in Shields Health Solutions, a leading specialty pharmacy management company.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “If we are unable to prevent or contain the effects of any such attacks, or fail to ensure vendors do the same, we may suffer exposure to substantial liability, reputational harm, loss of revenue or other damages." Cybersecurity Governance Our Board of Directors (the "Board") has ultimate oversight o…”
- “The FTC and state attorneys general are also increasingly exercising their regulatory and enforcement authorities in the areas of consumer privacy, including with respect to drug pricing, rebate, formulary or contracting practices, and data security. 15 State and federal policymakers have taken acti…”
- “Environmental, social and governance-related laws and regulations, including those aimed at restricting the consideration of these factors by companies and requiring climate- and sustainability-related disclosures, and related stakeholder expectations have resulted, and may in the future result, in …”
- “Laws and Regulations Affecting Pharmacy Benefit Plan Design, Administration and Pharmacy Network Access The federal government and states have laws, regulations and guidance that affect our ability, or our clients' ability, to limit access to pharmacy provider networks or that prohibit plan sponsors…”
- “The FTC and state attorneys general are also increasingly exercising their regulatory and enforcement authorities in the areas of consumer privacy, including with respect to drug pricing, rebate, formulary or contracting practices, and data security. 15 State and federal policymakers have taken acti…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Health insurance
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNHUnitedhealth Group Incorporated | $447.6B | — | 89% | 12% |
| CIThe Cigna Group | $274.9B | — | 85% | 14% |
| ELVElevance Health, Inc. | $199.1B | 117% | 90% | 13% |
| CNCCentene Corporation | $174.6B | — | 364% | -33% |
| HUMHumana Inc | $129.7B | 103% | 90% | 7% |
| AFLAflac Inc | $17.2B | 93% | 54% | 12% |