PGR, Progressive Corp.
We ranked second in market share in the U.S. private passenger auto insurance market, based on 2024 premiums written, and we believe we continue to hold that position for 2025.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested.
- Is it a good business?
- It underwrites at a profit, about a 90% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 10% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 16% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.4× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $23.4B | $26.8B | $32.0B | $39.0B | $42.7B | $47.7B | $49.6B | $62.1B | $75.4B | $87.7B | $89.5B |
| Premiums earnedPremiums | $22.5B | $25.7B | $30.9B | $36.2B | $39.3B | $44.4B | $49.2B | $58.7B | $70.8B | $81.7B | $83.2B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.0B | $1.6B | $2.6B | $4.0B | $5.7B | $3.4B | $722M | $3.9B | $8.5B | $11.3B | $11.6B |
| Combined ratioCombined | ≈ 98% | ≈ 96% | ≈ 93% | ≈ 94% | ≈ 90% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 99% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 91% | ≈ 90% | ≈ 90% |
| Loss ratioLoss | 75% | 73% | 70% | 70% | 64% | 76% | 77% | 78% | 69% | 66% | 66% |
| Return on equityROE | 13% | 17% | 24% | 29% | 33% | 18% | 5% | 19% | 33% | 37% | 36% |
| Investment incomeInv. inc. | $457M | $539M | $796M | $1.0B | $917M | $835M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $3.5B | $3.7B |
| Float (reserves)Float | $11.4B | $13.1B | $15.4B | $18.1B | $20.3B | $26.2B | $30.4B | $34.4B | $39.1B | $43.3B | $44.4B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $13.60 | $15.85 | $18.45 | $23.29 | $29.00 | $31.05 | $27.07 | $34.51 | $43.54 | $51.56 | $54.59 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.89 | $0.68 | $1.12 | $2.80 | $2.64 | $6.38 | $0.40 | $0.40 | $1.15 | $4.88 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 90%Underwriting profitTotal benefits, losses and expenses $73.4B ÷ premiums earned $81.7B
The heart of an insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Return on equity 37%StrongNet income $11.3B ÷ equity $30.3B
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $43.3B1.4× equityLoss and claim reserves $43.3B, 1.4× equity
Money collected as premiums and held against future claims, invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $3.5B8.2% on the floatNet investment income $3.5B, 8.2% on the float
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio204:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Progressive Corp.’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on an insurer.
Tangible book $31.7B on 587M shares, a 19% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationBusiness
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“The total net premiums written by the direct personal property business represented 28% of our total personal property volume in 2025, 26% in 2024, and 23% in 2023. - 2 - We continue to provide personal auto customers in both the agency and direct channels the opportunity to improve their auto insur…”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$89.5B - Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“The highly competitive nature of the insurance marketplace could result in consolidation within the industry, or in the failure of one or more competitors.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our success depends on our ability to attract, develop, compensate, motivate, and retain talented employees, including executives, other key managers, and employees with strong technical, analytical, and other skills and know-how necessary for us to run our insurance businesses, investment operation…”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)18% - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In addition, The Progressive Corporation and its subsidiaries could face individual and class action lawsuits by insureds and other parties for alleged violations of certain of these laws or regulations.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Historically, the auto and property insurance markets have been described as cyclical, with periods of relatively strong profitability being followed by increased pricing competition among insurers.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Certain jurisdictions also prohibit an insurer from withdrawing one or more lines of business from the jurisdiction, except pursuant to a plan that is approved by the jurisdiction's insurance department.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Moreover, inconsistencies in requirements among the various states, or between state and federal requirements, or changes in regulatory priorities or funding, may further complicate our compliance efforts, potentially damage our reputation in the marketplace or our brand, potentially resulting in ad…”
- “In addition, laws in certain jurisdictions mandate that insurance companies pay assessments in a number of circumstances, including potentially material assessments to pay claims upon the insolvency of other insurance companies or to cover losses in government-provided insurance programs for high-ri…”
- “In such cases, we would be selling products or services that are new to us, while our competitors could include large, well-financed companies with significant product and marketing experience in such businesses.”
- “Historically, the auto and property insurance markets have been described as cyclical, with periods of relatively strong profitability being followed by increased pricing competition among insurers.”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Insurance
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGRProgressive Corp. | $87.7B | 90% | 66% | 37% |
| ALLAllstate Corp. | $67.7B | 91% | 67% | 34% |
| CBChubb Ltd. | $59.4B | 87% | 50% | 14% |
| TRVTravelers Companies | $48.8B | 93% | 62% | 19% |
| AIGAmerican International Group | $26.8B | 96% | 60% | 8% |