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CB, Chubb Ltd.

Insurance financial

Chubb Limited is the Swiss-incorporated holding company of the Chubb Group of Companies.

Latest filing: FY2025 10-K

Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.

CB · Chubb Ltd.
Revenue · FY2025
$59.4B
+6.5% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Combined ratio 85% 5-yr avg 88%
Loss ratio 48% 5-yr avg 54%
Return on equity 15% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.

What it is
An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.
What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested.
Is it a good business?
It underwrites at a profit, about a 87% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 13% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 7% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing, no estimates
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
RevenueRevenue$31.5B$32.2B$32.7B$34.2B$36.0B$40.9B$43.1B$49.7B$55.8B$59.4B$60.8B
Premiums earnedPremiums$28.7B$29.0B$30.1B$31.3B$33.1B$36.3B$40.4B$45.7B$49.8B$53.0B$54.5B
Net incomeNet inc.$4.1B$3.9B$4.0B$4.5B$3.5B$8.5B$5.2B$9.0B$9.3B$10.3B$11.3B
Combined ratioCombined≈ 92%≈ 98%≈ 93%≈ 92%≈ 96%≈ 86%≈ 91%≈ 88%≈ 89%≈ 87%≈ 85%
Loss ratioLoss56%64%60%60%66%58%56%53%52%50%48%
Return on equityROE9%8%8%8%6%15%10%15%14%14%15%
Investment incomeInv. inc.$2.9B$3.1B$3.3B$3.4B$3.4B$3.5B$3.7B$4.9B$5.9B$6.5B$6.6B
Float (reserves)Float$60.5B$63.2B$63.0B$62.7B$67.2B$72.3B$75.7B$80.1B$84.0B$88.0B$88.9B
Book value / shareBVPS$103.61$108.60$107.78$120.57$131.09$131.61$119.28$143.67$156.73$183.70$186.99
Dividends / shareDiv/sh$2.52$2.78$2.86$2.95$3.06$3.16$3.25$3.37$3.52$3.75

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Combined ratio ≈ 87%
    Underwriting profit
    Total benefits, losses and expenses $46.4B ÷ premiums earned $53.0B

    The heart of an insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.

  • Solid
    Net income $10.3B ÷ equity $73.8B

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • 1.2× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $88.0B, 1.2× equity

    Money collected as premiums and held against future claims, invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • 7.3% on the float
    Net investment income $6.5B, 7.3% on the float

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Chubb Ltd.’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.

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Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity16%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E
The assumptions, turn the dials

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on an insurer.

Tangible book $47.2B on 395M shares, a 16% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

What the filing emphasizes, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.

  • Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors

    Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.

    “The insurance and reinsurance markets have historically been cyclical, characterized by periods of intense price competition due to excessive underwriting capacity as well as periods when shortages of capacity permitted favorable premium levels.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
  • Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors

    What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.

    “Accordingly, our business is dependent on the willingness of these agents and brokers to recommend our products to their customers, and our agents and brokers may also promote and distribute the products of our competitors.”
    From the recordRevenue (TTM)$60.8B
  • Debt terms & refinancingMD&A

    The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.

    “Our failure to comply with the covenants under any credit facility would, subject to grace periods in the case of certain covenants, result in an event of default.”
    From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$10.2B net debt
  • Litigation & contingenciesBusiness

    Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.

    “Huatai P&C provides a range of commercial and personal P&C products in China, including automobile, homeowners, property, professional liability, product liability, employer liability, business interruption, marine cargo, personal accident, supplemental health, and specialty risk.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
  • DilutionRisk Factors

    Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.

    “In the case of equity financings, dilution to our shareholders could result, and in any case, such securities may have rights, preferences, and privileges that are senior to those of our Common Shares.”
    From the recordDiluted share count−1.6%/yr (FY2016→TTM)
  • Cyclicality & demandBusiness

    How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.

    “This, coupled with writing a number of less cyclical product lines, has helped us develop flexibility and stability of our business, and has allowed us to maintain a profitable book of business throughout market cycles.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
  • Regulation & policyBusiness

    Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.

    “In addition, certain transactions may not be consummated without the prior approval of one or more such insurance departments.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.

What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024

read the 10-K →

Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.

MD&A length −6%Readability harderHedging up
  • “The CAY combined ratio excluding catastrophe losses was relatively flat in 2025, reflecting a change in the mix of business and earned rate exceeding loss trends in certain P&C lines, partially offset by higher loss trends relative to earned rate growth in financial lines, and an increase in the exp…”
  • “Total North America P&C Insurance catastrophe losses were $1.4 billion Total Overseas General catastrophe losses were $403 million Pre-tax net favorable PPD for 2025 was $1,439 million in our active companies, including favorable development of $1,329 million in short-tail lines and favorable develo…”
  • “The CAY combined ratio excluding catastrophe losses decreased in 2025, primarily due to an improvement in homeowners and auto from higher rates and lower underlying losses, and a lower administrative expense ratio resulting from the impact of higher net premiums earned and expense management.”
  • “The decrease of $0.3 billion is primarily from higher repurchase agreement borrowings (net of repayments) of $921 million, higher net CIP-related investments received from third-parties of $810 million, and lower repayments of long-term debt of $653 million.”
  • “The extent of regulation on our insurance business varies across the jurisdictions where we operate, but generally is governed by laws that delegate regulatory, supervisory and administrative authority to insurance departments and similar regulatory agencies.”

Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.

Peers, Insurance

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. marks best in the group.

CompanyRevenueCombined ratioLoss ratioROE
PGRProgressive Corp.$87.7B90%66%37%
ALLAllstate Corp.$67.7B91%67%34%
CBChubb Ltd.$59.4B87%50%14%
TRVTravelers Companies$48.8B93%62%19%
AIGAmerican International Group$26.8B96%60%8%