ALL, Allstate Corp.
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Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested.
- Is it a good business?
- It underwrites at a profit, about a 91% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 9% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 9% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.3× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $37.4B | $39.4B | $39.8B | $41.5B | $41.9B | $50.6B | $51.4B | $57.1B | $64.1B | $67.7B | $68.2B |
| Premiums earnedPremiums | $33.6B | $34.7B | $36.5B | $37.2B | $38.2B | $44.1B | $47.7B | $52.5B | $58.3B | $61.4B | $61.4B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.9B | $3.6B | $2.2B | $4.8B | $5.6B | $1.6B | ($1.3B) | ($188M) | $4.7B | $10.3B | $12.1B |
| Combined ratioCombined | ≈ 103% | ≈ 101% | ≈ 102% | ≈ 97% | ≈ 92% | ≈ 100% | ≈ 112% | ≈ 109% | ≈ 100% | ≈ 91% | ≈ 88% |
| Loss ratioLoss | 66% | 63% | 62% | 64% | 58% | 67% | 78% | 78% | — | — | 65% |
| Return on equityROE | 9% | 16% | 10% | 19% | 18% | 6% | -7% | -1% | 22% | 34% | 38% |
| Investment incomeInv. inc. | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.2B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $3.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.5B |
| Float (reserves)Float | $25.3B | $26.3B | $27.4B | $27.7B | $27.6B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $39.9B | $41.9B | $41.1B | $41.3B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $54.53 | $61.31 | $60.34 | $77.96 | $95.77 | $83.40 | $64.48 | $67.70 | $80.07 | $114.60 | $120.36 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $1.29 | $1.43 | $1.74 | $1.96 | $2.12 | $2.96 | $3.41 | $3.52 | $3.59 | $3.88 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 91%Underwriting profitTotal benefits, losses and expenses $56.1B ÷ premiums earned $61.4B
The heart of an insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Return on equity 34%StrongNet income $10.3B ÷ equity $30.6B
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $41.1B1.3× equityLoss and claim reserves $41.1B, 1.3× equity
Money collected as premiums and held against future claims, invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $3.4B8.4% on the floatNet investment income $3.4B, 8.4% on the float
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Allstate Corp.’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on an insurer.
Tangible book $27.9B on 263M shares, a 12% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Evaluation of both the insureds' estimated liabilities and our exposure to the insureds depends heavily on an analysis of the relevant legal issues and litigation environment.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)17% - Debt terms & refinancingBusiness
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“This facility has a financial covenant requiring that we not exceed a 37.5% debt to capitalization ratio as defined in the agreement.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$2.9B net debt - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Our reserves for asbestos, environmental and other run-off exposures could be affected by tort reform, class action litigation, and other potential legislation and judicial decisions.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“One contract provides combined $ 405 million of placed limit with one automatic reinstatement of limits with premium due, while a separate contract provides coverage to partially offset these reinstatement premiums.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “If a change in economic conditions, including the impacts from existing or future U.S. tariffs, is expected to affect the cost of repairs or replacement of damaged autos or property for a particular line, coverage, or state, actuarial judgment is applied to determine appropriate development factors …”
- “Net losses on investments and derivatives in 2025 related primarily to losses on sales of fixed income securities, credit losses primarily related to variable interests in Reciprocal Exchanges and certain real estate-related investments and losses on valuation change and settlements of derivatives, …”
- “For additional information on fair value measurements, see Note 7 of the consolidated financial statements and the risk factor titled " Determination of the fair value and amount of credit losses for investments includes subjective judgments and could materially impact the results of operations and …”
- “Commercial lines loss ratio decreased 71.2 points in 2025 compared to 2024, primarily due to the benefit of prior year reserve releases and lower losses, partially offset by a decrease in premiums earned driven by the strategic decision for the Allstate brand to stop writing new business and non-ren…”
- “If the debt service coverage ratio is below 1.0 and the borrower has the financial capacity to fund the revenue shortfalls from the properties for the foreseeable term, the decrease in cash flows from the properties is considered temporary, or there are other risk mitigating circumstances such as ad…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Insurance
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGRProgressive Corp. | $87.7B | 90% | 66% | 37% |
| ALLAllstate Corp. | $67.7B | 91% | 67% | 34% |
| CBChubb Ltd. | $59.4B | 87% | 50% | 14% |
| TRVTravelers Companies | $48.8B | 93% | 62% | 19% |
| AIGAmerican International Group | $26.8B | 96% | 60% | 8% |