ETR, Entergy Corp /de/
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is Electricity, US Regulated (99%), Natural Gas, US Regulated (1%) and Product and Service, Other (0%).
- Situation
- Capital build-out. capital spending has surged to 59% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. margins collapse repeatedly across the cycle, a single year misleads; look at normalized, through-cycle earnings and the balance sheet at the trough.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one, so weigh the worst year against the median, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Electricity, US Regulated is 99% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- Electricity, US Regulated99%$12.8B
- Natural Gas, US Regulated1%$113M
- Product and Service, Other0%$59M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $10.8B | $11.1B | $11.0B | $10.9B | $10.1B | $11.7B | $13.8B | $12.1B | $11.9B | $12.9B | $13.3B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | −7.5% | 12.3% | 4.3% | 12.8% | 17.5% | 15.7% | 14.9% | 21.6% | 22.3% | 24.7% | 23.1% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($584M) | $412M | $849M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $2.4B | $1.1B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-1.60 | $1.12 | $2.27 | $3.09 | $3.39 | $2.72 | $2.68 | $5.55 | $2.45 | $3.91 | $3.85 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | — | — | — | — | $2.4B | $2.1B | ($2.5B) | ($146M) | ($350M) | ($2.5B) | ($2.8B) |
| ROICROIC | -3% | 3% | 2% | 5% | 6% | 4% | 5% | 7% | 5% | 6% | 5% |
| CapexCapex | — | — | — | — | $247M | $168M | $5.1B | $4.4B | $4.8B | $7.7B | $8.3B |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | — | — | — | — | 2.4% | 1.4% | 36.8% | 36.6% | 40.7% | 59.4% | 62.3% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | — | — | — | — | 0.11× | 0.08× | 2.55× | 2.16× | 2.17× | 3.33× | 3.54× |
| Total debtDebt | $14.8B | $15.1B | $16.2B | $17.9B | $22.4B | $25.9B | $25.9B | $25.1B | $28.0B | $30.3B | $32.7B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $1.2B | $781M | $481M | $426M | $1.8B | $443M | $224M | $133M | $860M | $1.9B | $3.6B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $13.6B | $14.3B | $15.7B | $17.4B | $20.6B | $25.4B | $25.7B | $25.0B | $27.1B | $28.3B | $29.1B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $3.2B ÷ interest expense $1.3B
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- HighTotal debt $30.3B ÷ operating income $3.2B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $28.3BHeavy net debtCash $1.9B − debt $30.3B
Netting $1.9B of cash and short-term investments against $30.3B of debt leaves $28.3B owed, about 8.9× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $2.5B ÷ invested capital $45.3B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner Earnings ($2.5B) = operating cash $5.2B − capex $7.7B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's -20% of revenue. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $5.2B ÷ net income $1.8B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.33×ExpandingCapex $7.7B ÷ depreciation $2.3B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −8% (FY2016) → 25% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 11%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Worst year 2016 · −7.5% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $32.3B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$22.4B · 69%
- Dividends$7.9B · 25%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.0B · 6%
It reinvested $22.4B (69%) back into the business and returned $7.9B (25%) to owners, $7.9B in dividends, $0 in buybacks. Total debt rose $17.8B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $12.9B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.74×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $30.3B vs ($2.0B) WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +664%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $3.91/share and book value $37.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationRisk Factors
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Specifically, 1 % of the annual dividends received by the storm trust I will be distributed to the LURC, for the benefit of customers, and 99 % will be distributed to Entergy Louisiana, net of storm trust expenses.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$13.3B - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“Moreover, Entergy is becoming more dependent on fewer suppliers for key parts of Entergy's nuclear power plants that may need to be replaced or refurbished, and in some cases, parts are no longer available and have to be reverse-engineered for replacement.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The terms of the membership interests included certain financial covenants to which Entergy Holdings Company was subject, including the requirement to maintain a net worth of at least $ 1.75 billion.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$28.3B heavy net debt · interest covered 2.4× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“System Energy had previously recorded a provision and associated liability of $ 37 million for elements of the applicable litigation.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Some of these factors are inherently cyclical or temporary in nature, such as the weather or economic conditions, and typically do not have a long-lasting effect on Entergy's operating results.”
From the recordWorst year on record−7.5% operating margin (FY2016) - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Entergy Louisiana does not apply regulatory accounting standards to the Louisiana retail deregulated portion of River Bend or to the 30 % interest in River Bend formerly owned by Cajun unless specific cost recovery is provided for in tariff rates.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “See Note 2 to the financial statements for discussion of the Entergy Arkansas 2025 formula rate plan filing; regulatory charges of $150 million, recorded by Entergy Louisiana in second quarter 2024, to reflect the effects of an agreement in principle between Entergy Louisiana and the LPSC staff and …”
- “With respect to the obligations of counterparties to large customer electric service agreements, Entergy has heightened exposure to a Part I Item 1A, 1B, and 1C Entergy Corporation, Utility operating companies, and System Energy small number of large-scale data center customers which makes recovery …”
- “Following is a summary of the Utility operating companies' authorized returns on common equity: Company Authorized Return on Common Equity Entergy Arkansas 9.15% - 10.15% Entergy Louisiana 9.3% - 10.1% Entergy Mississippi 10.25% - 12.26% Entergy New Orleans 8.85% - 9.85% Entergy Texas 9.57% Rate reg…”
- “Entergy Texas Securitization Bonds - Hurricane Laura, Hurricane Delta, and Winter Storm Uri In January 2022 the PUCT authorized the issuance of securitization bonds to recover $ 242.9 million of Entergy Texas's Hurricane Laura, Hurricane Delta, and Winter Storm Uri restoration costs, plus carrying c…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EIXEdison International | $19.3B | — | 36.7% | 10% | -4% |
| DDominion Energy, Inc | $16.5B | — | 26.7% | 5% | 2% |
| FEFirstenergy Corp | $15.1B | — | 14.6% | 5% | -7% |
| ESEversource Energy | $13.5B | — | 22.1% | 6% | -0% |
| ETREntergy Corp /de/ | $12.9B | — | 24.7% | 6% | -20% |
| DTEDTE Energy Co | $12.6B | — | 18.8% | 6% | — |
| CNPCenterpoint Energy Inc | $9.3B | 100% | 22.6% | 5% | -26% |
| PPLPPL Corp | $9.2B | — | 23.2% | 5% | -15% |