CNP, Centerpoint Energy Inc
Our Businesses and Industry Trends We are an energy delivery company with electric transmission, distribution and generation operations and natural gas distribution operations that serve more than seven million metered customers across four states.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Retail gas sales (46%) and Electric delivery (44%), with 4 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. capital spending has surged to 52% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Electric at 52%.
- Electric52%$4.8B
- Natural Gas48%$4.5B
- Corporate and Other0%$5M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $5.7B | $6.1B | $6.3B | $7.5B | $7.3B | $8.3B | $9.3B | $8.6B | $8.6B | $9.3B | $9.4B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 17.9% | 18.5% | 13.8% | 14.3% | 14.1% | 16.5% | 16.8% | 20.4% | 23.3% | 22.6% | 22.6% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $432M | $1.8B | $368M | $791M | ($773M) | $1.5B | $1.1B | $917M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $1.00 | $4.13 | $0.81 | $1.57 | $-1.46 | $2.44 | $1.67 | $1.45 | $1.58 | $1.60 | $1.62 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $509M | ($9M) | $485M | ($868M) | ($601M) | ($3.1B) | ($2.6B) | ($524M) | ($2.4B) | ($2.4B) | ($2.7B) |
| ROICROIC | 6% | 9% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% |
| CapexCapex | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $5.0B |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 24.8% | 23.3% | 26.3% | 33.4% | 35.3% | 38.3% | 47.4% | 51.1% | 52.8% | 52.2% | 53.8% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 1.26× | 1.38× | 1.34× | 2.05× | 2.18× | 2.40× | 3.43× | 3.14× | 3.14× | 3.18× | 3.16× |
| Total debtDebt | $8.6B | $8.8B | $9.2B | $15.1B | $13.4B | $16.1B | $16.9B | $18.6B | $21.0B | $23.0B | $24.9B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $1.3B | $1.2B | $4.8B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.7B | $584M | $631M | $585M | $548M | $1.2B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $7.3B | $7.6B | $4.4B | $14.0B | $12.4B | $14.4B | $16.3B | $18.0B | $20.4B | $22.4B | $23.7B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $2.1B ÷ interest expense $903M
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt? 10.9×HighTotal debt $23.0B ÷ operating income $2.1B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $22.4BHeavy net debtCash $38M + ST investments $510M − debt $23.0B
Netting $548M of cash and short-term investments against $23.0B of debt leaves $22.4B owed, about 10.6× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -92587dNegative, funded by othersDSO 32 + DIO 26006 − DPO 118625 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $1.8B ÷ invested capital $34.1B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner Earnings ($2.4B) = operating cash $2.5B − capex $4.9B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's -26% of revenue. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $2.5B ÷ net income $1.1B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.18×ExpandingCapex $4.9B ÷ depreciation $1.5B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 18% (FY2016) → 23% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Worst year 2018 · 13.8% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +4.7%/yr
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $19.4B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$31.0B · 159%
- Dividends$4.8B · 25%
It reinvested $31.0B (159%) back into the business and returned $4.8B (25%) to owners, $4.8B in dividends, $0 in buybacks. Total debt rose $16.3B across the span. It returned and reinvested more than it generated, the gap was covered by debt or existing cash.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Graham’s defensive-investor test
2 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $9.3B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.91×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $23.0B vs ($559M) WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +15%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $1.60/share and book value $17.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationBusiness
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Indiana Electric received a final order on February 3, 2025 approving the settlement with one modification that effectively capped the residential increase to 1.15% of the total increase, allocating the difference to other commercial and industrial customers.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$9.4B - Debt terms & refinancingBusiness
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Cross Defaults Under the Registrants' respective revolving credit facilities, a payment default on, or a non-payment default, event or condition that permits acceleration of, any indebtedness for borrowed money and certain other specified types of obligations (including guarantees) exceeding $125 mi…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$22.4B heavy net debt · interest covered 2.3× - Litigation & contingenciesBusiness
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In addition, the plaintiffs in the other two putative class actions have amended their petitions to remove all class action allegations and assert claims of negligence, gross negligence, nuisance and/or intentional misconduct.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Declines in demand for electricity and natural gas in our service territories due to pipeline incidents of other utilities, increased electricity and natural gas prices as experienced during the February 2021 Winter Storm Event and during periods of persisting high inflation or economic downturns, a…”
From the recordWorst year on record13.8% operating margin (FY2018) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“In addition to the Minnesota and Indiana sites, the EPA and other regulators have investigated MGP sites that were owned or operated by CenterPoint Energy or CERC or may have been owned by one of their former affiliates.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “A final order was issued on July 30, 2025, with rates effective August 1, 2025. 77 Mechanism Annual Increase (Decrease) (1) (in millions) Filing Date Effective Date Approval Date Additional Information CSIA $ 8 October 2025 February 2026 January 2026 Requested an increase of $90.8 million to rate ba…”
- “In connection with the securitization of transition property or system restoration property or to facilitate the securitization financing of qualified costs, CenterPoint Energy, Houston Electric and SIGECO evaluate the wholly-owned, bankruptcy-remote, special purpose entities, which are VIEs, for po…”
- “Indiana Electric 2025 IRP (CenterPoint Energy) On December 5, 2025, Indiana Electric submitted its 2025 IRP with the IURC pursuant to applicable Indiana law requiring electric utilities to develop and submit to the IURC every three years (unless extended) an IRP that uses economic modeling to consid…”
- “Additionally, it is unclear whether, and if so how, the new domestic energy policy, including the potential suspension, revision or rescission of regulations restricting emissions (including methane emissions) and the repeal of the Endangerment Finding, will affect consumers' and companies' energy u…”
- “The regional and other markets in which we purchase natural gas are competitive and can be subject to significant pricing volatility as a result of many factors, including inflation, adverse weather conditions, supply and demand changes, availability of competitively priced alternative energy source…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EIXEdison International | $19.3B | — | 36.7% | 10% | -4% |
| DDominion Energy, Inc | $16.5B | — | 26.7% | 5% | 2% |
| FEFirstenergy Corp | $15.1B | — | 14.6% | 5% | -7% |
| ESEversource Energy | $13.5B | — | 22.1% | 6% | -0% |
| ETREntergy Corp /de/ | $12.9B | — | 24.7% | 6% | -20% |
| DTEDTE Energy Co | $12.6B | — | 18.8% | 6% | — |
| CNPCenterpoint Energy Inc | $9.3B | 100% | 22.6% | 5% | -26% |
| PPLPPL Corp | $9.2B | — | 23.2% | 5% | -15% |