DTE, DTE Energy Co
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, drawn from its own SEC filings. The lens to bring to the numbers below, not the answer.
- What it is
- A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.
- What moves the needle
- Rate base and the allowed return. What decides it: the capital plan the regulator approves, the return allowed on that base, and the cost of the debt that funds it. Growth is the rate base; the risk is the regulatory compact and rising rates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
No model wrote a word of this. Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below; the judgment is yours.
The record, 2011–2017
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2011’11 | 2012’12 | 2013’13 | 2014’14 | 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | TTMTTMMar 2018 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $8.9B | $8.8B | $9.7B | $12.3B | $10.3B | $10.6B | $12.6B | $13.1B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 16.0% | 14.5% | 12.5% | 12.9% | 12.0% | 14.0% | 13.6% | 16.5% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $711M | $610M | $661M | $905M | $727M | $868M | $1.1B | $1.3B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $4.21 | $3.57 | $3.78 | $5.11 | $4.06 | $4.85 | $6.34 | $6.08 |
| ROICROIC | 7% | 6% | 6% | 7% | 5% | 6% | 7% | 6% |
| Total debtDebt | $7.2B | $7.0B | $7.3B | $8.3B | $8.8B | $11.3B | $12.2B | $25.8B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $68M | $65M | $52M | $48M | $37M | $92M | $66M | $1.3B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $7.1B | $6.9B | $7.3B | $8.3B | $8.7B | $11.2B | $12.1B | $24.4B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $2.4B ÷ interest expense $1.1B
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt? 10.9×HighTotal debt $25.8B ÷ operating income $2.4B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $25.6BHeavy net debtCash $208M − debt $25.8B
Netting $208M of cash and short-term investments against $25.8B of debt leaves $25.6B owed, about 10.8× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $2.2B ÷ invested capital $37.9B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $3.4B ÷ net income $1.5B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Durability & moat, 2011–2017
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 7 of 7
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 16% (FY2011) → 14% (FY2017)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Worst year 2015 · 12.0% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +1.0%/yr
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2011–2017
Over the record, the business generated $14.3B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Dividends$3.3B · 23%
- Buybacks$154M · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)$10.8B · 76%
It reinvested $0 (0%) back into the business and returned $3.5B (24%) to owners, $3.3B in dividends, $154M in buybacks. Total debt rose $18.6B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Graham’s defensive-investor test
4 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $12.6B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $25.8B vs ($1.1B) WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (7)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +38%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $7.06/share and book value $59.43/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationRisk Factors
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Customers with retail access to alternative electric suppliers consist primarily of industrial and commercial customers and represented approximately 10% of retail sales in 2025, 2024, and 2023.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$13.1B - Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“DTE Gas competes against alternative fuel sources by providing competitive pricing and reliable service, supported by its storage capacity.”
From the recordOperating margin16.5% (TTM), near a 7-yr high - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“The Registrants are dependent on supplies of certain commodities, such as copper and limestone, among others, and industrial materials, and services in order to maintain day-to-day operations and maintenance of their facilities.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“DTE Electric's generating capability is largely dependent upon the availability of coal and natural gas.”
From the recordRevenue (TTM)$13.1B - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The amount of such collateral which could be requested fluctuates based on commodity prices (primarily natural gas, power, and environmental) and the provisions and maturities of the underlying transactions.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$25.6B heavy net debt · interest covered 2.2× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“See Note 20 to the Consolidated Financial Statements, "Retirement Benefits and Trusteed Assets." Legal Reserves The Registrants are involved in various legal proceedings, claims, and litigation arising in the ordinary course of business.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The disallowance reduced the amount of power supply costs recoverable from customers, which had a flow-through impact of approximately $5 million higher interest expense recorded separately to Other (Income) and Deductions.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “In 2025, the funded status of the pension plans decreased slightly due to a combination of negative plan experience and lower discount rates offset partially by higher than expected asset returns, and the funded status of the other postretirement benefit plans improved due to a combination of lower …”
- “The decrease in 2024 was primarily due to MPSC disallowances of previously recorded capital expenditures of $25 million from the December 2023 rate order written off in 2023 that did not repeat, partially offset by the $12 million noted above from the January 2025 rate order written off in 2024.”
- “The increase in 2025 was primarily due to a $113 million increase from a higher depreciable base, including the 15-year amortization of the undepreciated Monroe plant balance which began in February 2025, partially offset by a decrease of $7 million associated with the TRM.”
- “The requested net increase in base rates was primarily due to continued infrastructure investment and increasing operations and maintenance costs needed to ensure the continued safe and reliable delivery of natural gas to customers.”
- “Clair and Trenton Channel generation plants and to recover debt service costs from DTE Electric customers DTE Sustainable Generation DTE Sustainable Generation Holdings, LLC (an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of DTE Energy) and subsidiary companies EGLE Michigan Department of Environment, Great La…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EIXEdison International | $19.3B | — | 36.7% | 10% | -4% |
| DDominion Energy, Inc | $16.5B | — | 26.7% | 5% | 2% |
| FEFirstenergy Corp | $15.1B | — | 14.6% | 5% | -7% |
| ESEversource Energy | $13.5B | — | 22.1% | 6% | -0% |
| ETREntergy Corp /de/ | $12.9B | — | 24.7% | 6% | -20% |
| DTEDTE Energy Co | $12.6B | — | 18.8% | 6% | — |
| CNPCenterpoint Energy Inc | $9.3B | 100% | 22.6% | 5% | -26% |
| PPLPPL Corp | $9.2B | — | 23.2% | 5% | -15% |