BG, Bunge Global SA
We will provide information that is responsive to this Item 11 in our definitive proxy statement for our 2026 Annual Meeting under the captions "Executive Compensation Highlights," "Director Compensation," "Human Resources and Compensation Committee Report," and possibly elsewhere therein.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and its hold on the shelf.
- What moves the needle
- Volume against price, and shelf position. What decides it: whether it can raise prices without losing the customer, and whether the brand still commands its margin.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 3 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $16.8B | $21.1B | $17.8B | $15.6B | $16.9B | $17.9B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | −232% | −202% | −207% | −220% | −295% | −329% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 16.2% | 11.4% | 19.5% | 12.5% | 10.2% | 8.8% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $2.1B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $1.1B | $816M | $683M |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $13.64 | $10.51 | $14.88 | $7.99 | $4.90 | $3.49 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | ($3.3B) | ($6.1B) | $2.2B | $524M | ($879M) | ($1.2B) |
| ROICROIC | 33% | 16% | 20% | 12% | 4% | 4% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $902M | $1.2B | $2.7B | $3.8B | $2.0B | $1.6B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | ($902M) | $2.9B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $12.1B | $13.0B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $1.90 | $2.28 | $2.54 | $2.66 | $2.76 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $51.36 | $60.23 | $71.96 | $69.70 | $95.54 | $81.97 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $1.7B ÷ interest expense $628M
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- HighTotal debt $14.1B ÷ operating income $1.7B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $12.1BHeavy net debtCash $1.1B + ST investments $861M − debt $14.1B
Netting $2.0B of cash and short-term investments against $14.1B of debt leaves $12.1B owed, about 7.0× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Capital-hungryDSO 83 + DIO 72 − DPO 27 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $1.3B ÷ invested capital $28.8B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner Earnings ($879M) = operating cash $844M − capex $1.7B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's -5% of revenue. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $844M ÷ net income $816M
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.45×ExpandingCapex $1.7B ÷ depreciation $703M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 5 of 5
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 4 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 16% (FY2021) → 10% (FY2025)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −9%
Reinvested capital earned a negative return, the business spent money to shrink its own economics.
- Worst year 2025 · 10.2% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +2.2%/yr
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 5 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $16.9B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.61×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $14.1B vs $9.3B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (5-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (5)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $4.90/share and book value $95.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Competition Due to the commodity nature, markets for our soybeans, soybean meal, and crude soybean oil are highly competitive and subject to product substitution.”
From the recordOperating margin8.8% now (TTM), off a 19.5% peak (FY2023) - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our business is seasonal, and our results may fluctuate depending on the harvest cycle of the crops upon which we rely and seasonal fluctuations related to the sale of our consumer products.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)−6% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Our credit facilities and certain senior notes require us to comply with specified financial covenants, including minimum current ratio, maximum debt to capitalization ratio, and limitations on secured indebtedness.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$12.1B heavy net debt · interest covered 2.8× - Litigation & contingenciesBusiness
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“An enterprise is determined to be the primary beneficiary if it has a controlling financial interest, defined as (a) the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the economics of the VIE and (b) the obligation to absorb losses of or the right to receive benefits from th…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Historically, the market for some agricultural commodities and fertilizer products has been cyclical, with periods of high demand and capacity utilization stimulating new plant investment and the addition of incremental processing or production capacity by industry participants to meet the demand.”
From the recordWorst year on record10.2% operating margin (FY2025) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“In addition, increased short-term debt levels resulted from an increase in the Current portion of long-term debt associated with two tranches of senior notes maturing in 2026, partially offset by the repayment of $600 million senior notes which matured in the current period.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Soybean Processing and Refining volumes represent (1) oilseed volumes processed (crushed) during a period, which approximate sales volumes to third parties during the same reporting period (2) merchandised volumes, which represent sales volumes of soybeans to third-party customers during a reporting…”
- “EBIT attributable to noncontrolling interests, an expense when subsidiaries with noncontrolling interests generate earnings before interest and tax, versus income when subsidiaries with noncontrolling interests generate loss before interest and tax, decreased 61% to expense of $13 million resulting …”
- “As described above, Softseed Processing and Refining volumes represent (1) oilseed volumes processed (crushed) during a period, which approximate sales volumes to third parties during the same reporting period (2) merchandised volumes, which represent sales volumes of softseeds to third-party custom…”
- “Noncontrolling interests increased to $1,465 million at December 31, 2025 from $1,032 million at December 31, 2024 primarily due to acquired Noncontrolling interests of $441 million from the Acquisition of Viterra, $34 million of income from favorable foreign exchange translations adjustments in Acc…”
- “Key Commodities Canola/Rapeseed, Sunflower Seed, Canola/Rapeseed Meal, Sunflower Meal, Canola/Rapeseed Oil, Sunflower Oil Key Regions and Processing Capacity 53% in Europe, 30% in North America, 13% in South America, and 4% in Asia-Pacific Customers Animal feed manufacturers, Livestock producers, Bi…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Packaged food
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GISGeneral Mills Inc | $19.5B | 35% | 17.0% | 11% | 12% |
| BGBunge Global SA | $16.9B | -295% | 10.2% | 4% | -5% |
| KDPKeurig Dr Pepper Inc. | $16.6B | 54% | 21.5% | 7% | 9% |
| HRLHormel Foods Corporation | $12.1B | 16% | 5.9% | 5% | 4% |
| HSYHershey Co | $11.7B | 34% | 12.3% | 11% | 16% |
| CAGConagra Brands, Inc. | $11.6B | 26% | 11.8% | 8% | 11% |
| CPBTHE Campbell's Company | $10.3B | 30% | 11.0% | 7% | 7% |
| STZConstellation Brands Inc. | $9.1B | 52% | 29.8% | 11% | 20% |