CAG, Conagra Brands, Inc.
We compete throughout the food industry and focus on adding value for our customers who operate in the retail food and foodservice channels.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Frozen (34%) and Other Shelf-stable (24%), with 4 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Volume against price, and shelf position. What decides it: whether it can raise prices without losing the customer, and whether the brand still commands its margin.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Frozen at 34%.
- Frozen34%$3.9B
- Other Shelf-stable24%$2.8B
- Snacks18%$2.1B
- Food service9%$1.1B
- International8%$957M
- Refrigerated6%$717M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMFeb 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $1.5B | $7.8B | $7.9B | $9.5B | $11.1B | $11.2B | $11.5B | $12.3B | $12.1B | $11.6B | $11.2B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | −316% | 30% | 30% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 25% | 27% | 28% | 26% | 24% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 81.5% | 15.8% | 17.8% | 17.2% | 16.4% | 19.1% | 13.8% | 8.8% | 7.1% | 11.8% | 3.1% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($677M) | $639M | $808M | $678M | $840M | $1.3B | $888M | $684M | $347M | $1.2B | ($43M) |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-1.54 | $1.47 | $1.98 | $1.52 | $1.72 | $2.66 | $1.84 | $1.42 | $0.72 | $2.40 | $-0.09 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $982M | $928M | $703M | $772M | $1.5B | $962M | $713M | $633M | $1.6B | $1.3B | $842M |
| ROICROIC | 12% | 13% | 16% | 7% | 9% | 11% | 7% | 5% | 3% | 8% | 1% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $798M | $251M | $128M | $237M | $553M | $79M | $83M | $93M | $78M | $68M | $55M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $4.6B | $2.7B | $3.4B | $10.4B | $9.2B | $8.2B | $8.7B | $8.5B | $7.4B | $7.2B | $8.2B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.99 | $0.95 | $0.84 | $0.80 | $0.85 | $0.97 | $1.21 | $1.30 | $1.37 | $1.40 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $8.47 | $9.15 | $9.02 | $16.57 | $16.12 | $17.53 | $18.22 | $18.18 | $17.58 | $18.62 | $17.05 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $1.4B ÷ interest expense $298M
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- HeavyTotal debt $7.3B ÷ operating income $1.4B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $7.2BHeavy net debtCash $68M − debt $7.3B
Netting $68M of cash and short-term investments against $7.3B of debt leaves $7.2B owed, about 5.3× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT $1.4B ÷ invested capital $16.1B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- SolidOwner Earnings $1.3B = operating cash $1.7B − capex $389M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 11% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $42M of SBC) leaves $1.3B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.7B ÷ net income $1.2B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $733M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.3B
Of $1.3B Owner Earnings, $733M (56%) went back to shareholders, $669M dividends, $64M buybacks. Net of $42M stock comp, the real buyback was about $23M. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.00×MaintainingCapex $389M ÷ depreciation $390M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 82% (FY2016) → 12% (FY2025)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
Reinvested capital earned a negative return, the business spent money to shrink its own economics.
- Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 7.1% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +1.0%/yr
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $13.7B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$3.6B · 26%
- Dividends$5.0B · 36%
- Buybacks$2.5B · 18%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.6B · 19%
It reinvested $3.6B (26%) back into the business and returned $7.5B (55%) to owners, $5.0B in dividends, $2.5B in buybacks. Total debt rose $2.8B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio203:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$42M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $11.6B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.71×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $7.3B vs ($1.2B) WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +183%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $2.40/share and book value $18.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Conagra Brands, Inc. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $842M on 479M diluted shares; net debt $8.2B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationBusiness
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Our largest customer, Walmart, Inc. and its affiliates, accounted for approximately 29% of consolidated net sales for fiscal 2025 and 28% for fiscal 2024 and 2023.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$11.2B - Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“In addition, substantial growth in e-commerce has encouraged the entry of new competitors and business models, intensifying competition by simplifying distribution and lowering barriers to entry.”
From the recordOperating margin3.1% now (TTM), off a 81.5% peak (FY2016) - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“Failure to take adequate steps to mitigate the likelihood or potential impact of such events, or to effectively manage such events if they occur, particularly when a product is sourced from a single supplier or location, could adversely affect our business or financial results.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)24% - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“A significant product liability judgment or a widespread product recall may negatively impact our sales and profitability for a period of time depending on the costs of the recall, the destruction of product inventory, product availability, competitive reaction, customer reaction, and consumer attit…”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)8% - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Additionally, any failure to meet required payments on our debt, or failure to comply with any covenants in the instruments governing our debt, could result in an event of default under the terms of those instruments and a downgrade to our credit ratings.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$7.2B heavy net debt · interest covered 4.6× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“SG&A expenses for fiscal 2025 reflected the following: Items impacting comparability of earnings net charges of $91.1 million in connection with our restructuring plans and net charges totaling $88.7 million related to legacy legal matters.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Continued inflation, rising interest rates, decreased availability of capital, volatility in financial markets, declining consumer spending rates, recessions, decreased energy availability and increased energy costs (including fuel surcharges) have in the past caused and could continue to cause chal…”
From the recordWorst year on record7.1% operating margin (FY2024)
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Although rapidly changing trade policies and announcements of potential tariff increases caused increased uncertainty in the second half of fiscal 2025, we saw little impact to our results in fiscal 2025 due to delayed implementation or effect of the announced tariffs.”
- “The decrease in operating cash flows for fiscal 2025 compared to fiscal 2024 was primarily driven by lower operating profits, lower dividend payments received from one of our equity method investments, and higher inventory balances.”
- “Net sales for fiscal 2025 in our Foodservice segment included a decrease in organic volume of 8.1% compared to fiscal 2024, driven by the ongoing softness in restaurant traffic and the impact of lost business from the prior year.”
- “These decreases were partially offset by the accelerated receipt of our outstanding receivables in exchange for a slightly higher prompt pay discount, which increased our cash flow from operations by approximately $140 million.”
- “Additionally, we have in the past, and may in the future, incur increased costs or periods of decreased production relating to upgrading facilities, equipment and technologies, transferring production among our facilities, utilizing third-party contract manufacturers, closing existing facilities, ex…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Packaged food
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MDLZMondelez International, Inc. | $38.5B | 28% | 9.2% | 7% | 8% |
| CAGConagra Brands, Inc. | $11.6B | 26% | 11.8% | 8% | 11% |
| CPBTHE Campbell's Company | $10.3B | 30% | 11.0% | 7% | 7% |