V, Visa Inc.
Visa is one of the world's leaders in digital payments.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, drawn from its own SEC filings. The lens to bring to the numbers below, not the answer.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Data processing revenue (50%) and Services (44%), with 3 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Pricing power, the surest mark of a moat. What decides it: whether it can raise prices with inflation and not lose the customer, whether the brand still earns its place on the shelf, and whether volume holds when a cheaper rival appears. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 28%, above 15% in 9 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 52% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. High, durable returns can mark a moat, but whether this one is real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
No model wrote a word of this. Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below; the judgment is yours.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Data processing revenue at 50%.
- Data processing revenue50%$20.0B
- Services44%$17.5B
- International transaction revenue35%$14.2B
- Other revenue10%$4.1B
- Client incentives-39%($15.8B)
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $15.1B | $18.4B | $20.6B | $23.0B | $21.8B | $24.1B | $29.3B | $32.7B | $35.9B | $40.0B | $43.0B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 52.3% | 66.2% | 62.9% | 65.3% | 64.5% | 65.6% | 64.2% | 64.3% | 65.7% | 60.0% | 61.1% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $6.0B | $6.7B | $10.3B | $12.1B | $10.9B | $12.3B | $15.0B | $17.3B | $19.7B | $20.1B | $22.2B |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $5.1B | $8.6B | $12.2B | $12.0B | $9.7B | $14.5B | $17.9B | $19.7B | $18.7B | $21.6B | $21.2B |
| ROICROIC | 14% | 17% | 25% | 28% | 25% | 29% | 37% | 40% | 41% | 43% | 47% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $12.8B | $15.3B | $15.7B | $7.8B | $16.3B | $16.5B | $15.7B | $16.3B | $12.0B | $17.2B | $18.8B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $3.1B | $3.1B | $937M | $8.9B | $7.8B | $4.5B | $6.8B | $4.2B | $8.9B | $8.0B | $5.2B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 40.7×ComfortableOperating income $24.0B ÷ interest expense $589M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- ConservativeTotal debt $25.2B ÷ operating income $24.0B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $4.6BModest net debtCash $17.2B + ST investments $3.4B − debt $25.2B
Netting $20.6B of cash and short-term investments against $25.2B of debt leaves $4.6B owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. It also holds $4.1B in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $476M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- ExceptionalNOPAT $19.9B ÷ invested capital $45.9B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Cash machineOwner Earnings $21.6B = operating cash $23.1B − capex $1.5B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 54% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $897M of SBC) leaves $20.7B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $23.1B ÷ net income $20.1B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $22.9B ÷ Owner Earnings $21.6B
Of $21.6B Owner Earnings, $22.9B (106%) went back to shareholders, $4.6B dividends, $18.3B buybacks. Net of $897M stock comp, the real buyback was about $17.4B. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.21×ExpandingCapex $1.5B ÷ depreciation $1.2B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 52% (FY2016) → 60% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 13% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 52.3% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $148.9B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a mature cash machine, most of what it earns goes straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$8.9B · 6%
- Dividends$28.4B · 19%
- Buybacks$98.2B · 66%
- Retained (debt / cash)$13.4B · 9%
It reinvested $8.9B (6%) back into the business and returned $126.6B (85%) to owners, $28.4B in dividends, $98.2B in buybacks. Total debt rose $8.1B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$897M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
4 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $40.0B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.08×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $25.2B vs $2.7B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +148%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. . Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA reverse-DCF needs positive owner earnings, or at least revenue, to anchor to, there's no clean base here. Judge this one on assets or normalized earnings, not a growth model.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“In addition, we face intense competitive pressure on the prices we charge our financial institution clients.”
From the recordOperating margin61.1% now (TTM), off a 66.2% peak (FY2017) - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“For instance, we depend significantly on relationships with our financial institution clients and on their relationships with account holders and sellers to provide our products and services, and thereby compete effectively in the marketplace.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)49% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The remaining non-current investments have stated maturities of more than one year from the balance sheet date; however, they are also generally available to meet short-term liquidity needs.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$4.6B modest net debt · interest covered 40.7× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In the event we are found liable or reach a settlement in any action, particularly in a large class action lawsuit, such as one involving an antitrust claim entitling the plaintiff to treble damages in the U.S., or we incur liability arising from a government investigation, we may be required to pay…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“As discussed above, the IFR regulates interchange rates within the EEA, requires Visa Europe to separate its payment card scheme activities from processing activities for accounting, organization and decision-making purposes within the EEA, and imposes limitations on network exclusivity and routing.…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “In December 2024, we acquired Featurespace Limited (Featurespace), a developer of real-time artificial intelligence payments protection technology that helps prevent and mitigate payments fraud and financial crime risks, for a purchase consideration of $946 million.”
- “Cash used in financing activities decreased in fiscal 2025 over the prior year primarily due to proceeds received from the issuance of senior notes, partially offset by higher share repurchases and higher dividends paid.”
- “Continued resolution in the interchange multidistrict litigation will be considered by our board of directors with regards to successive exchange offers for class B common stock.”
- “We expect to face more competition as AI continues to advance and GenAI and agentic AI capabilities become integrated into payments and related services in two main ways: first, by competitors successfully enhancing their products, services and external offerings with AI to achieve greater and faste…”
- “For example, certain regulators have proposed or adopted, or plan to propose or adopt, rules or standards related to these matters that would apply to our business, including the EU's Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and the State of C…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Business services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UBERUber Technologies, Inc. | $52.0B | — | 10.7% | 18% | 19% |
| VVisa Inc. | $40.0B | — | 60.0% | 43% | 54% |
| PYPLPaypal Holdings, Inc. | $33.2B | — | 18.3% | 23% | 17% |
| MAMastercard Inc | $32.8B | — | 57.6% | 94% | 52% |
| DASHDoordash, Inc. | $13.7B | — | 5.3% | 13% | 16% |
| EBAYEbay Inc. | $11.1B | 71% | 20.5% | 19% | 13% |
| GPNGlobal Payments Inc. | $7.7B | 73% | 22.8% | 4% | 26% |
| MSCIMsci Inc. | $3.1B | 91% | 54.7% | 45% | 49% |