UBER, Uber Technologies, Inc.
Uber Technologies, Inc. is a technology platform that uses a massive network, leading technology, operational excellence and product expertise to power movement from point A to point B.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, drawn from its own SEC filings. The lens to bring to the numbers below, not the answer.
- What it is
- A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and the pricing power it commands.
- What moves the needle
- Pricing power, the surest mark of a moat. What decides it: whether it can raise prices with inflation and not lose the customer, whether the brand still earns its place on the shelf, and whether volume holds when a cheaper rival appears. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −12%, above 15% in 1 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
No model wrote a word of this. Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below; the judgment is yours.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $7.9B | $10.4B | $13.0B | $11.1B | $17.5B | $31.9B | $37.3B | $44.0B | $52.0B | $53.7B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | −51.4% | −29.1% | −66.1% | −43.7% | −22.0% | −5.7% | 3.0% | 6.4% | 10.7% | 11.7% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($4.0B) | $997M | ($8.5B) | ($6.8B) | ($496M) | ($9.1B) | $1.9B | $9.9B | $10.1B | $8.5B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-2.58 | $0.57 | $-4.85 | $-3.86 | $-0.26 | $-4.63 | $0.90 | $4.58 | $4.74 | $4.12 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | ($2.2B) | ($2.1B) | ($4.9B) | ($3.4B) | ($743M) | $390M | $3.4B | $6.9B | $9.8B | $9.8B |
| ROICROIC | — | — | -75% | -27% | -16% | -12% | 6% | 11% | 18% | 21% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $4.4B | $6.4B | $11.3B | $6.8B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $5.4B | $7.0B | $7.6B | $16.5B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | ($4.4B) | $490M | ($5.6B) | $760M | $5.0B | $5.0B | $4.1B | $2.5B | $2.9B | ($6.0B) |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $-5.48 | $-4.21 | $8.09 | $7.00 | $7.63 | $3.72 | $5.38 | $10.02 | $12.76 | $11.95 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 12.6×ComfortableOperating income $5.6B ÷ interest expense $440M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- ConservativeTotal debt $10.5B ÷ operating income $5.6B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $2.9BModest net debtCash $7.1B + ST investments $528M − debt $10.5B
Netting $7.6B of cash and short-term investments against $10.5B of debt leaves $2.9B owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- HighNOPAT $5.6B ÷ invested capital $30.5B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Cash machineOwner Earnings $9.8B = operating cash $10.1B − capex $336M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 19% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.8B of SBC) leaves $7.9B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $10.1B ÷ net income $10.1B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $6.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.8B
Of $9.8B Owner Earnings, $6.5B (67%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $6.5B buybacks. Net of $1.8B stock comp, the real buyback was about $4.7B. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.47×HarvestingCapex $336M ÷ depreciation $719M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 4 of 9
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −51% (FY2017) → 11% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 75%
Every extra dollar the company reinvested earned a high return, it is still compounding, not coasting on an old moat.
- Worst year 2019 · −66.1% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $11.0B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a mature cash machine, most of what it earns goes straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$3.9B · 36%
- Buybacks$7.8B · 71%
It reinvested $3.9B (36%) back into the business and returned $7.8B (71%) to owners, $0 in dividends, $7.8B in buybacks. It returned and reinvested more than it generated, the gap was covered by debt or existing cash.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio360:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$1.8B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 33% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
1 of 5 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $52.0B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $10.5B vs $1.7B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $4.74/share and book value $12.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Uber Technologies, Inc. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $9.8B on 2071M diluted shares; net cash $6.0B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“The mobility, delivery, and logistics industries are highly competitive, with well-established and low-cost alternatives that have been available for decades, low barriers to entry, low switching costs, and well-capitalized competitors in nearly every major geographic region.”
From the recordOperating margin11.7% (TTM), near a 9-yr high - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“Furthermore, we rely on a single background-check provider in certain jurisdictions, and we may not be able to arrange for adequate background checks from a different provider on commercially reasonable terms or at all.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Concentrated dependenceBusiness
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Because the industries in which we compete are characterized by rapid technological advances, our ability to compete successfully depends heavily upon our ability to ensure a continual and timely flow of competitive new offerings and technologies.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)18% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“In June 2025, we established a commercial paper program (the "Program") under which we may issue unsecured commercial paper notes, not to exceed $2.0 billion outstanding at any time, with maturities of up to 397 days.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$2.9B modest net debt · interest covered 12.6× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“For example, complaints have been filed in several jurisdictions, including in the United States and Brazil, alleging that our business practices violate applicable antitrust and/or competition laws.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“Such issuances, including the issuance of additional shares of our common stock upon exercise of equity awards or conversion of our convertible notes, could result in substantial dilution to our existing stockholders and cause the trading price of our common stock to decline.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“An economic downturn, increased competition, or regulatory obstacles in any of these key metropolitan areas would adversely affect our business, financial condition, and operating results to a much greater degree than would the occurrence of such events in other areas.”
From the recordWorst year on record−66.1% operating margin (FY2019)
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Loss from Equity Method Investments Year Ended December 31, % Change (In millions, except percentages) 2024 2025 Loss from equity method investments $ (38) $ (53) (39) % Percentage of revenue — % — % 2025 Compared to 2024 The change in loss from equity method investments was not material. 56 Segment…”
- “In 2025, net unrealized loss on debt and equity securities, net, includes: a $802 million net unrealized loss on our Aurora investment, a $155 million net unrealized loss on our Lucid investment, partially offset by a $409 million net unrealized gain on our Didi investment, a $179 million net unreal…”
- “Any remaining decline in fair value that is non-credit related is recognized in other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax. 64 Improvements in expected cash flows due to improvements in credit are recognized through reversal of the credit loss and a corresponding reduction in the allowance for cr…”
- “The Inflation Reduction Act Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax ("CAMT"), which is a minimum tax calculated by reference to financial statement income, does not apply to the Company in 2025.”
- “In addition, changes in or increased enforcement efforts pursuant to certain laws and regulations, including immigration and labor and employment laws, or laws that require us to make changes to our platform that decrease accessibility, including removing access to our platform, or flexibility provi…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Business services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UBERUber Technologies, Inc. | $52.0B | — | 10.7% | 18% | 19% |
| VVisa Inc. | $40.0B | — | 60.0% | 43% | 54% |
| PYPLPaypal Holdings, Inc. | $33.2B | — | 18.3% | 23% | 17% |
| MAMastercard Inc | $32.8B | — | 57.6% | 94% | 52% |
| DASHDoordash, Inc. | $13.7B | — | 5.3% | 13% | 16% |
| EBAYEbay Inc. | $11.1B | 71% | 20.5% | 19% | 13% |
| GPNGlobal Payments Inc. | $7.7B | 73% | 22.8% | 4% | 26% |
| MSCIMsci Inc. | $3.1B | 91% | 54.7% | 45% | 49% |