TMUS — T-Mobile US Inc.
- Net margin
- 12%
- ROIC
- 10%
- Owner Earnings
- $18.0B
Read as a Capital-intensive business — capital spending runs 11% of sales — the model is built on heavy physical assets.
The record — 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing — no estimates| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | TTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $37.5B | $40.6B | $43.3B | $45.0B | $68.4B | $80.1B | $79.6B | $78.6B | $81.4B | $88.3B | $90.5B |
| Operating margin | 10.8% | 12.0% | 12.3% | 12.7% | 9.7% | 8.6% | 8.2% | 18.2% | 22.1% | 20.7% | 19.9% |
| Net income | $1.5B | $4.5B | $2.9B | $3.5B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $2.6B | $8.3B | $11.3B | $11.0B | $10.5B |
| EPS (diluted) | $1.75 | $5.20 | $3.36 | $4.02 | $2.65 | $2.41 | $2.06 | $6.93 | $9.66 | $9.72 | $9.57 |
| Owner earnings | ($1.9B) | ($1.4B) | ($1.6B) | $433M | ($2.4B) | $1.6B | $2.8B | $8.8B | $13.5B | $18.0B | $18.2B |
| ROIC | 7% | 14% | 11% | 11% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 8% | 11% | 10% | 10% |
| Capex | $4.7B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $6.4B | $11.0B | $12.3B | $14.0B | $9.8B | $8.8B | $10.0B | $10.1B |
| Capex / revenue | 12.5% | 12.9% | 12.8% | 14.2% | 16.1% | 15.4% | 17.6% | 12.5% | 10.9% | 11.3% | 11.2% |
| Capex vs depreciation | 0.75× | 0.88× | 0.85× | 0.97× | 0.78× | 0.75× | 1.02× | 0.76× | 0.68× | 0.74× | 0.72× |
| Total debt | $22.2B | $13.7B | $13.0B | $11.0B | $66.4B | $70.5B | $72.0B | $71.4B | $74.2B | $81.1B | $86.3B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 21.9×ComfortableOperating income $18.3B ÷ interest expense $835M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient — it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt? 4.7×HeavyTotal debt $86.3B ÷ operating income $18.3B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- How long is cash tied up? -68dNegative — funded by othersDSO 20 + DIO 76 − DPO 164 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”) — the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Return on invested capital 10%SolidNOPAT $14.1B ÷ invested capital $139.9B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it — Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high — pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner Earnings (free cash) margin 20%Cash machineOwner Earnings $18.0B = operating cash $27.9B − capex $10.0B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 20% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $829M of SBC) leaves $17.2B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Are earnings backed by cash? 2.54×Cash-backedCash from ops $27.9B ÷ net income $11.0B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy — growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Where do the earnings go? 78%Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $14.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $18.0B
Of $18.0B Owner Earnings, $14.1B (78%) went back to shareholders — $4.1B dividends, $10.0B buybacks. Net of $829M stock comp, the real buyback was about $9.1B. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway — or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.74×HarvestingCapex $10.0B ÷ depreciation $13.5B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth — or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency — or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat — 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says — judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record — the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year — not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 11% → 21%
Margins are widening — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment — incremental ROIC 9%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return — growth is getting expensive.
- Worst year 2022 · 8.2% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year — the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +3.5%/yr
The share count is rising — dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record — the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict — the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Peers — Capital-intensive
The same business model, side by side on owner economics — compare, don't rank by a single number. ● marks best in the group.