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SBAC, SBA Communications Corporation

Real estate REIT

We are a leading independent owner and operator of wireless communications infrastructure, including tower structures, rooftops, and other structures that support antennas used for wireless communications, which we collectively refer to as "towers" or "sites." Our principal operations are in the…

Latest filing: FY2025 10-K

Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.

SBAC · SBA Communications Corporation
Revenue · FY2025
$244M
+59.9% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Debt / assets 111% 5-yr avg 120%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.

What it is
A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
What moves the needle
Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings.
Is it a good business?
Funds from operations per share have compounded about 7% a year across the record. The dividend takes 42% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 111% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.

Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing, no estimates
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
RevenueRevenue$1.6B$105M$125M$154M$129M$205M$297M$195M$153M$244M$244M
Net incomeNet inc.$76M$104M$47M$147M$24M$238M$461M$502M$750M$1.1B$1.0B
Funds from operationsFFO$714M$747M$720M$844M$746M$938M$1.2B$1.2B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B
FFO / shareFFO/sh$5.71$6.17$6.18$7.36$6.58$8.44$10.69$11.25$9.44$10.58$10.36
Dividend payout (FFO)Payout10%28%27%26%30%42%42%
Debt / assetsDebt/assets119%127%138%106%121%126%122%121%119%111%111%
Total debtDebt$8.8B$9.3B$9.9B$10.3B$11.1B$12.3B$12.9B$12.3B$13.6B$12.9B$13.0B
Dividends / shareDiv/sh$0.73$1.83$2.28$2.80$3.40$3.92$4.45
Book value / shareBVPS$-15.95$-21.48$-28.98$-31.97$-42.52$-47.52$-48.24$-47.48$-47.28$-45.14$-44.78

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • about $10.58 per share
    Net income $1.1B + depreciation $292M − gains on sale $208M

    GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.

  • Lightly covered
    Dividends $479M ÷ FFO $1.1B

    A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.

Is it sound?

  • Heavy
    Total debt $12.9B ÷ assets $11.6B

    Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.

  • Strong
    (operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $196M

    How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.

Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.

Management & pay

read the proxy →

Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.

  • CEO pay ratio131:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.

  • Stock-based compensation$76M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 31% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What the price implies

price / FFO

A REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies. Nothing is stored.

$

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / FFO
Justified by growth
Dividend yield
The assumptions, turn the dials

The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (discount rate − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% discount and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO. Raise the discount rate and the multiple falls: the same interest-rate gravity that pulls on every yield asset.

FFO about $10.36 per share on 106M shares. A lens, not a target. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.

What the filing emphasizes, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.

  • Customer concentrationRisk Factors

    Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.

    “The following is a list of significant customers (representing at least 10% of revenue for any period reported) and the percentage of total revenue for the specified time periods derived from such customers: For the year ended December 31, Percentage of Total Revenues 2025 2024 2023 T-Mobile 31.1 % …”
    From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$244M
  • Pricing power & competitionBusiness

    Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.

    “We believe that the worldwide wireless industry will continue to grow and is reasonably well-capitalized, highly competitive and focused on quality and advanced services; therefore, we expect that we will see a multi-year trend of additional demand for tower space from our customers, which we believ…”
    From the recordOperating margin554.1% now (TTM), off a 939.2% peak (FY2024)
  • Debt terms & refinancingMD&A

    The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.

    “In addition, Adjusted EBITDA is similar to the measure of current financial performance generally used by our lenders to determine compliance with certain covenants under our Senior Credit Agreement and the indentures relating to the 2020 Senior Notes and 2021 Senior Notes.”
    From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$12.6B heavy net debt · interest covered 6.8×
  • Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors

    Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.

    “SBA Senior Finance is a holding company that holds, directly or indirectly, the equity interest in certain subsidiaries that issued the Tower Securities (see Note 11) and certain subsidiaries that were not involved in the issuance of the Tower Securities.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
  • Cyclicality & demandBusiness

    How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.

    “We believe that the long-term and repetitive nature of our site leasing business will permit us to maintain a stable, recurring cash flow stream and reduce our exposure to cyclical changes in customer spending which arises in our site development business.”
    From the recordWorst year on record23.7% operating margin (FY2016)
  • Regulation & policyBusiness

    Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.

    “Wireless communications equipment and radio or television stations antennas operating on towers are separately regulated and may require independent customer licensing depending upon the particular frequency or frequency band used.”
    A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.

What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024

read the 10-K →

Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.

MD&A length −6%Readability easierHedging down
  • “The decrease was partially offset by (1) increases in international site leasing segment operating profit and site development segment operating profit and (2) decreases in tower and equipment decommission costs .”
  • “Operating Profit Domestic site leasing segment operating profit decreased $5.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the prior year, primarily due to Sprint and other lease non-renewals.”
  • “International acquisition and new business initiatives related adjustments and expenses decreased $4.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the prior year.”
  • “All other material terms of the Employment Agreement, including the definitions of Cause, Change in Control and Good Reason and the provisions for non-competition, non-interference, non-disparagement, and non-disclosure during his employment and for a period after termination remained the same.”
  • “The Company recorded a $ 208.4 million gain on the sale of these towers which is included in Other income (expense), net on the Consolidated Statements of Operations and in (Gain) loss on sale of assets on the Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows. 8.”

Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.

Peers, Real estate

The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens, compare, don't rank by a single number. marks best in the group.

CompanyRevenueFFO marginFFO / assetsPayout (FFO)Debt / assets
ELSEquity Lifestyle Properties, Inc.$1.5B40%10.6%64%58%
FRTFederal Realty Investment Trust$1.3B54%7.5%54%
AMTAmerican Tower Corp.$936M7.2%70%67%
SBACSBA Communications Corporation$244M9.8%42%111%
CCICrown Castle Inc.$215M3.6%183%86%
CPTCamden Property Trust$13M8.1%63%43%
ESSEssex Property Trust, Inc.$9M7.4%
AVBAvalonbay Communities Inc$7M42%