RJF, Raymond James Financial Inc
Raymond James Financial Inc is a leading diversified financial services company providing private client group, capital markets, asset management, banking and other services to individuals, corporations, and municipalities.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Asset management and related administrative fees (44%) and Securities commissions (11%), with 13 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has run high across the record (median 16%, above 12% in 7 of 10 years). It runs at a 81% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Asset management and related administrative fees at 44%.
- Asset management and related administrative fees44%$7.1B
- Securities commissions11%$1.8B
- Account and service fees8%$1.3B
- Investment banking7%$1.1B
- Equities, ETFs and fixed income products4%$650M
- Merger & acquisition and advisory4%$623M
- Other20%$3.2B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $5.5B | $6.5B | $7.5B | $8.0B | $8.2B | $9.9B | $11.3B | $13.0B | $14.9B | $15.9B | $16.5B |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | $524M | $648M | $842M | $998M | $822M | $673M | $1.2B | $2.4B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.2B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $529M | $636M | $857M | $1.0B | $818M | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.52 | $2.99 | $3.97 | $4.79 | $3.89 | $6.64 | $7.01 | $8.02 | $9.74 | $10.33 | $10.72 |
| Return on equityROE | 11% | 11% | 13% | 16% | 11% | 17% | 16% | 17% | 18% | 17% | 17% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 12% | 13% | 15% | 17% | 13% | 19% | 20% | 21% | 21% | 20% | 20% |
| Efficiency ratioEffic. | 876% | 85% | 82% | 82% | 87% | 1184% | 747% | 80% | 79% | 81% | 81% |
| DepositsDeposits | $14.3B | $17.7B | $19.9B | $22.3B | $26.8B | $32.5B | $51.4B | $54.2B | $56.0B | $58.9B | $62.4B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $23.44 | $26.23 | $29.48 | $30.47 | $33.83 | $39.04 | $43.93 | $47.09 | $54.98 | $60.52 | $62.74 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $21.04 | $23.91 | $26.52 | $27.64 | $30.97 | $34.86 | $34.96 | $38.30 | $46.10 | $51.58 | $53.52 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $0.54 | $0.60 | $0.70 | $0.88 | $0.97 | $1.03 | — | — | — | — | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 17%ExceptionalNet income $2.1B ÷ equity $12.5B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ExceptionalNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $1.5B − intangibles $396M)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 81%BloatedNoninterest expense $11.4B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 14.2%Well capitalizedEquity $12.5B ÷ assets $88.2B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 67%Deposit-fundedDeposits $58.9B ÷ assets $88.2B
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 6%LowProvision for credit losses $122M ÷ net interest income $2.1B
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio153:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$254M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Raymond James Financial Inc’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $10.7B on 200M shares, a 17% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We face intense competition and pricing pressures and may not be able to keep pace with technological change.”
From the recordOperating margin28.1% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Concentrated dependenceBusiness
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our ability to compete effectively is substantially dependent on our continuing ability to develop or attract, retain, and motivate qualified financial advisors, investment bankers, trading professionals, portfolio managers, and other revenue-producing or specialized personnel.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)14% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“We also amended our revolving credit facility to increase our borrowing capacity to $1 billion and reduce our cost of borrowing.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$7.9B net cash · interest covered 3.0× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Non-compensation expenses increased 16%, primarily due to higher provisions for legal and regulatory matters as the current year included a net provision expense for legal and regulatory matters, including a $58 million expense increase associated with the settlement of a legal matter related to bon…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“In addition, we may need to raise capital or borrow funds in order to finance an acquisition, which could result in dilution or increased leverage.”
From the recordDiluted share count+3.3%/yr (FY2016→TTM) - Cyclicality & demandMD&A
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“While our bank loan portfolio is diversified, a significant downturn in the overall economy, deterioration in real estate values or a significant issue within any sector or sectors where we have a concentration will generally result in large provisions for credit losses and/or charge-offs.”
From the recordWorst year on record15.1% operating margin (FY2020) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“These increases were partially offset by a $349 million decrease in other borrowings due to the redemption of our subordinated notes, as well as the maturity and repayment of certain FHLB borrowings.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “To demonstrate the sensitivity of credit loss estimates on our bank loan portfolio to macroeconomic forecasts, we compared our modeled estimates under the base case economic scenario used to estimate the allowance for credit losses as of September 30, 2025 to what our estimate would have been under …”
- “Non-compensation expenses increased 16%, primarily due to higher provisions for legal and regulatory matters as the current year included a net provision expense for legal and regulatory matters, including a $58 million expense increase associated with the settlement of a legal matter related to bon…”
- “The average yield on RJBDP - third-party banks for the year ended September 30, 2025 decreased from the prior year largely as a result of the decreases in the Fed's short-term benchmark interest rate and, to a lesser extent, the impact of growth in RJBDP balances offering enhanced rates to clients w…”
- “During the year ended September 30, 2025, our regulatory-defined daily losses in our trading portfolios exceeded our predicted VaR on three occasions primarily due to heightened market volatility in early April 2025 driven by economic uncertainties surrounding the potential impacts of changes in int…”
- “Any significant reduction in PCG clients' cash balances swept to the RJBDP, a change in the allocation of that cash between our Bank segment and third-party banks within the RJBDP, a movement of cash away from the firm, or an inability to implement new or modified deposit offerings, could significan…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Capital markets
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSMorgan Stanley | $34.3B | 15% | 19% | 68% | 0.7% |
| BLKBlackrock, Inc. | $24.2B | 10% | — | — | — |
| SCHWSchwab Charles Corp | $23.9B | 18% | 29% | 106% | 2.4% |
| RJFRaymond James Financial Inc | $15.9B | 17% | 20% | 81% | 2.4% |
| HOODRobinhood Markets, Inc. | $4.5B | 21% | 22% | — | 4.0% |
| GSThe Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | — | 14% | 15% | 64% | 0.7% |