HOOD, Robinhood Markets, Inc.
We use technology to provide access to the financial system in a way that is simple and convenient for our customers.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -8%, above 12% in only 3 of 7 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $278M | $958M | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $3.0B | $4.5B | $4.6B |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | $71M | $177M | $256M | $424M | $929M | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.6B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($107M) | $7M | ($3.7B) | ($1.0B) | ($541M) | $1.4B | $1.9B | $1.9B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-0.13 | $0.01 | $-4.20 | $-1.17 | $-0.61 | $1.56 | $2.05 | $2.07 |
| Return on equityROE | 110% | -13% | -51% | -15% | -8% | 18% | 21% | 20% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | — | — | -52% | -15% | -8% | 18% | 22% | 21% |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $-0.12 | $-0.06 | $8.30 | $7.92 | $7.52 | $8.80 | $9.96 | $10.59 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $-0.12 | $-0.06 | $8.15 | $7.77 | $7.27 | $8.56 | $9.36 | $9.93 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 21%ExceptionalNet income $1.9B ÷ equity $9.2B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ExceptionalNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $385M − intangibles $168M)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough data
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 24.0%Well capitalizedEquity $9.2B ÷ assets $38.1B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
Provision or net interest income missing.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$305M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Robinhood Markets, Inc.’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $9.1B on 915M shares, a −8% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationRisk Factors
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“We have experienced customer growth in recent years, including a significant fraction of new customers, often more than 50%, who have told us that Robinhood is their first brokerage account.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$4.6B - Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We offer highly competitive compensation for employees and benefits for themselves and their families.”
From the recordOperating margin46.7% (TTM), near a 7-yr high - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our business and revenue growth depends on our efforts to attract new customers, retain existing customers, and increase the amount that our customers use our products and services (including premium services, such as Robinhood Gold).”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)66% - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“These agreements also contain financial covenants, including obligations to maintain certain capitalization amounts and other financial ratios.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$4.3B net cash, debt-free · no real interest burden - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In addition to regulatory proceedings, we are also involved in numerous other litigation matters, including putative class action lawsuits, and we anticipate that we will continue to be a target for litigation in the future.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“If we issue equity or convertible debt securities, our stockholders could suffer significant dilution, and the new shares could have rights, preferences and privileges superior to those of our current stockholders.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“For example, on March 10, 2025 (amid a significant downturn in the equity markets driven by recession concerns and macroeconomic uncertainty), the intra-day trading price of our Class A common stock declined by as much as 20%.”
From the recordWorst year on record−203.0% operating margin (FY2021)
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Provision for credit losses (in millions) 2024 2025 2024 to 2025 % Change Provision for credit losses - credit card related $ 55 $ 86 56 % Provision for credit losses - brokerage related 21 28 33 % Total $ 76 $ 114 50 % Percent of total net revenues: 3 % 3 % Provision for credit losses cost increase…”
- “Operations (in millions) 2024 2025 2024 to 2025 % Change Employee compensation, benefits, and overhead $ 79 $ 83 5 % Customer experience 18 23 28 % Other 15 24 60 % Total $ 112 $ 130 16 % Percent of total net revenues: 4 % 3 % Operations costs increased by $18 million primarily due to an increase of…”
- “For more information about Adjusted EBITDA, including the definition and limitations of such measure, and a reconciliation of net income (loss) to Adjusted EBITDA, please see "—Non-GAAP Financial Measures." (1) Subsequent to the release of our preliminary earnings results for the fourth quarter and …”
- “In recent years, we have continued to build relationships with our customers by introducing new products and diversifying our services that further expand access to the financial system, including focusing on products and tools for more seasoned investors.”
- “Changes in CFTC or other regulatory policy that seek to ban or more heavily regulate event contracts, particularly event contracts that we offer such as those related to sporting events, could also require us to cease offering event contracts or materially impact our ability to offer event contracts…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Capital markets
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSMorgan Stanley | $34.3B | 15% | 19% | 68% | 0.7% |
| BLKBlackrock, Inc. | $24.2B | 10% | — | — | — |
| SCHWSchwab Charles Corp | $23.9B | 18% | 29% | 106% | 2.4% |
| RJFRaymond James Financial Inc | $15.9B | 17% | 20% | 81% | 2.4% |
| HOODRobinhood Markets, Inc. | $4.5B | 21% | 22% | — | 4.0% |
| GSThe Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | — | 14% | 15% | 64% | 0.7% |