RIVN, Rivian Automotive, Inc. / DE
Rivian is an American automotive technology company that develops and manufactures category-defining electric vehicles as well as vertically integrated technologies and services.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is Automotive (71%) and Software and Services (29%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable growth. no operating profit yet, judge it on revenue growth, gross-margin trajectory, cash burn and runway, never on an earnings multiple. Distress / turnaround. thin interest coverage or cash-burning operations against real debt, the first questions are liquidity and the maturity wall, not growth.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −79%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Automotive is 71% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
- Automotive71%$3.8B
- Software and Services29%$1.6B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $0 | $0 | $55M | $1.7B | $4.4B | $5.0B | $5.4B | $5.5B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | — | — | −7672.7% | −413.5% | −129.4% | −94.3% | −66.5% | −68.9% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($426M) | ($1.0B) | ($4.7B) | ($6.8B) | ($5.4B) | ($4.7B) | ($3.6B) | ($3.5B) |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-0.48 | $-1.12 | $-5.13 | $-7.40 | $-5.74 | $-4.69 | $-3.07 | $-2.82 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | ($552M) | ($1.8B) | ($4.4B) | ($6.4B) | ($5.9B) | ($2.9B) | ($2.5B) | ($3.0B) |
| ROICROIC | — | — | -128% | -156% | -79% | -65% | -52% | -50% |
| CapexCapex | $199M | $914M | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | — | — | 3261.8% | 82.6% | 23.1% | 23.0% | 31.7% | 31.5% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 28.43× | 31.52× | 9.11× | 2.10× | 1.09× | 1.11× | 2.18× | 2.24× |
| Total debtDebt | — | $75M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.4B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | — | $3.0B | $18.1B | $11.6B | $9.4B | $7.7B | $6.1B | $4.8B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | — | ($2.9B) | ($16.9B) | ($10.3B) | ($4.9B) | ($3.3B) | ($1.6B) | ($388M) |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -13.1×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($3.6B) ÷ interest expense $274M
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt against an operating lossTotal debt $4.4B · operating income ($3.6B)
There's debt but no operating profit to measure it against, understand that combination before anything else about the company.
- Debt, net of cash +$1.6BNet cashCash $3.6B + ST investments $2.5B − debt $4.4B
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.6B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Capital-hungryDSO 38 + DIO 111 − DPO 41 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($2.8B) ÷ invested capital $5.5B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner Earnings ($2.5B) = operating cash ($779M) − capex $1.7B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's -46% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $741M of SBC) leaves ($3.2B). Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($779M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($3.6B) · cash from operations ($779M)
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.18×ExpandingCapex $1.7B ÷ depreciation $784M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 0 of 7
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −7673% (FY2021) → −67% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −130%
Reinvested capital earned a negative return, the business spent money to shrink its own economics.
- Worst year 2021 · −7672.7% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$741M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 14% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 5 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.4B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.33×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $4.4B vs $4.9B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $-3.07/share and book value $3.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“The market for new alternative energy vehicles is still rapidly evolving, characterized by rapidly changing technologies, competitive pricing and competitive factors, evolving government regulation and industry standards, and changing consumer demands and behaviors.”
From the recordOperating margin−68.9% now (TTM), off a −66.5% peak (FY2025) - Supplier & input dependenceMD&A
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“Our ability to manufacture vehicles and develop future solutions is dependent on the continued supply of raw materials and product components from our suppliers, the majority of which are single-source providers.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)1% - Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our growth will depend in large part on our ability to attract new customers in the consumer and commercial vehicle markets.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)−55% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The incurrence of additional debt would result in debt service obligations, and the instruments governing such debt could provide for operational and/or financial covenants that restrict our operations.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$1.6B net cash · operating profit doesn't cover interest - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Other expense, net increased for the year ended December 31, 2025 primarily due to $186 million of expense recorded for the settlement of securities class action litigation, net of expected insurance recoveries, which was partially offset by the cumulative gain on our equity method investment in Als…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“The sale of additional equity or equity-linked securities would result in dilution for our stockholders.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“In addition, the tariffs by the United States government and environment of retaliatory tariffs and other trade barriers, the resulting economic uncertainty, and any subsequent global or domestic recession, would have a negative impact on our business, prospects, financial condition, results of oper…”
From the recordWorst year on record−7672.7% operating margin (FY2021)
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “ABL Facility On April 8, 2025, we entered into an amendment of the credit agreement governing the senior secured asset-based revolving credit facility ("ABL Facility") to (i) extend the maturity date to April 8, 2030 (subject to earlier maturity if certain other debt remains outstanding at a specifi…”
- “While in the long term we expect these factors to result in continued increases in software and services gross profit, we may experience a reduction during 2028 upon the expected satisfaction of the Joint Venture's combined performance obligation to further develop, customize, and enhance Rivian's v…”
- “Investing Activities Net cash used in investing activities decreased during the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily driven by lower purchases of short-term investments, partially offset by lower maturities of short-term investments and higher capital …”
- “The year-over-year decrease in Automotive cost of revenues was primarily due to fewer vehicles being produced and delivered, as well as reductions in the cost of raw materials, product components, and conversion costs, resulting in part from the cost of revenue efficiency initiatives and accelerated…”
- “In addition, the transportation and effective storage of lithium-ion batteries is also tightly regulated by the United States Department of Transportation and other regulatory bodies, and any failure to comply with such regulation could result in fines, loss of permits and licenses or other regulato…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Automakers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFord Motor Co | $187.3B | 7% | -4.9% | -55% | 7% |
| GMGeneral Motors Company | $168.0B | 40% | 1.7% | 2% | 10% |
| TSLATesla, Inc. | $94.8B | 18% | 4.6% | 4% | 7% |
| PCARPaccar Inc | $28.4B | 20% | 10.6% | 15% | 13% |
| LEALear Corp | $23.3B | 6% | 3.3% | 9% | 2% |
| APTVAptiv PLC | $20.4B | 19% | 5.8% | 4% | 7% |
| BWABorgwarner Inc | $14.3B | 19% | 3.7% | 4% | 8% |
| RIVNRivian Automotive, Inc. / DE | $5.4B | 3% | -66.5% | -52% | -46% |