F, Ford Motor Co
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Vehicles Parts and Accessories (89%) and Financing income (4%), with 4 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable growth. no operating profit yet, judge it on revenue growth, gross-margin trajectory, cash burn and runway, never on an earnings multiple. Distress / turnaround. thin interest coverage or cash-burning operations against real debt, the first questions are liquidity and the maturity wall, not growth.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Company excluding Ford Credit is 93% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
- Company excluding Ford Credit93%$174.0B
- Ford Credit7%$13.3B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $151.8B | $156.8B | $160.3B | $155.9B | $127.1B | $136.3B | $158.1B | $176.2B | $185.0B | $187.3B | $189.9B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 3.8% | 3.1% | 2.0% | 0.4% | −3.5% | 3.3% | 4.0% | 3.1% | 2.8% | −4.9% | −3.8% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $4.6B | $7.7B | $3.7B | $47M | ($1.3B) | $17.9B | ($2.0B) | $4.3B | $5.9B | ($8.2B) | ($6.1B) |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $1.15 | $1.93 | $0.92 | $0.01 | $-0.32 | $4.45 | $-0.49 | $1.08 | $1.46 | $-2.06 | $-1.50 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | — | $11.0B | $7.2B | $10.0B | $18.5B | $9.6B | ($13M) | $6.7B | $6.7B | $12.5B | $9.5B |
| ROICROIC | 3% | 3% | 14% | 3% | -59% | 16% | 27% | 30% | 19% | -58% | -28% |
| CapexCapex | $7.0B | $7.0B | $7.8B | $7.6B | $5.7B | $6.2B | $6.9B | $8.2B | $8.7B | $8.8B | $9.4B |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 4.6% | 4.5% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.5% | 4.6% | 4.3% | 4.7% | 4.7% | 4.7% | 4.9% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | — | 0.76× | 0.83× | 0.73× | 0.65× | 0.85× | 0.89× | 1.07× | 1.15× | 0.55× | 0.59× |
| Total debtDebt | $143.0B | $154.3B | $600M | $600M | $471M | — | — | — | — | — | $471M |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $38.8B | $38.9B | $34.0B | $34.7B | $50.0B | $49.6B | $44.1B | $40.2B | $38.3B | $38.5B | $30.5B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $104.1B | $115.4B | ($33.4B) | ($34.1B) | ($49.5B) | ($49.6B) | ($44.1B) | ($40.2B) | ($38.3B) | ($38.5B) | ($30.0B) |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -7.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($9.2B) ÷ interest expense $1.3B
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt against an operating lossTotal debt $471M · operating income ($9.2B)
There's debt but no operating profit to measure it against, understand that combination before anything else about the company.
- Debt, net of cash +$38.0BNet cashCash $23.4B + ST investments $15.1B − debt $471M
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $38.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 30 + DIO 32 − DPO 54 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($7.2B) ÷ invested capital $13.1B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- SolidOwner Earnings $12.5B = operating cash $21.3B − capex $8.8B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 7% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $510M of SBC) leaves $12.0B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Are earnings backed by cash? $21.3BLoss, but cash-generativeNet income ($8.2B) · cash from operations $21.3B
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $3.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $12.5B
Of $12.5B Owner Earnings, $3.0B (24%) went back to shareholders, $3.0B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.55×HarvestingCapex $8.8B ÷ depreciation $16.0B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% (FY2016) → −5% (FY2025)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −4.9% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.1%/yr
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $149.3B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.
- Reinvested$67.0B · 45%
- Dividends$22.0B · 15%
- Buybacks$1.8B · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)$58.5B · 39%
It reinvested $67.0B (45%) back into the business and returned $23.8B (16%) to owners, $22.0B in dividends, $1.8B in buybacks. Total debt fell $153.8B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio295:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$510M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $187.3B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $471M vs $8.6B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −87%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $-2.06/share and book value $9.04/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Ford Motor Co has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $9.5B on 4071M diluted shares; net cash $30.0B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Intense competition and excess capacity are likely to put downward pressure on inflation-adjusted prices, including increased marketing incentives, for similarly contented vehicles and contribute to a challenging pricing environment for the automotive industry in most major markets.”
From the recordOperating margin−3.8% now (TTM), off a 4.0% peak (FY2022) - Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Ford Credit estimates the expected residual value by evaluating recent auction values, return volumes for Ford Credit's leased vehicles, industrywide used vehicle prices, marketing incentive plans, and vehicle quality data and benchmarks to third-party data depending on availability.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)5% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The corporate credit facility contains a liquidity covenant that requires us to maintain a minimum of $4 billion in aggregate of domestic cash, cash equivalents, and loaned and marketable securities and/or availability under the corporate credit facility, supplemental revolving credit facility, and …”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$38.0B net cash · operating profit doesn't cover interest - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Certain of the pending legal actions are, or purport to be, class actions.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandBusiness
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“To be prepared for an economic downturn and other stress scenarios, we target an ongoing Company cash balance at or above $20 billion plus significant additional liquidity above our Company cash target.”
From the recordWorst year on record−4.9% operating margin (FY2025) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The year-over-year decrease of $3,428 million in Company adjusted EBIT primarily reflects lower Ford Blue and Ford Pro EBIT, including the impact of new and revised tariffs, offset partially by higher Ford Credit EBT and improved Model e EBIT. 48 Item 7.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (Continued) Ford and Ford Credit could be affected by the continued development of more stringent privacy, data use, data protection, data access, and artificial intelligence laws and regulations as well as consume…”
- “As a result of the challenges facing the EV market and the decisions we made in response to those challenges, we recorded the following charges as special items: an $8.4 billion pre-tax non-cash impairment charge, including goodwill, for our Model e long-lived assets; $1.1 billion of non-cash asset …”
- “Change in EBIT by Causal Factor (in millions) 2024 Full Year EBIT $ 5,269 Volume / Mix (1,661) Net Pricing 1,487 Cost (1,125) Exchange (778) Other (168) 2025 Full Year EBIT $ 3,024 In 2025, Ford Blue's wholesales decreased 5% from a year ago, primarily driven by lower wholesales in North America inc…”
- “Limit our pension contributions to offset ongoing service cost, ensure our funded plans remain fully funded in aggregate, and to meet regulatory requirements, if any; Ensure sufficient liquid assets to pay plan benefits; and Evaluate strategic actions to reduce pension liabilities, such as plan desi…”
- “Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (Continued) Ford and Ford Credit could be affected by the continued development of more stringent privacy, data use, data protection, data access, and artificial intelligence laws and regulations as well as consume…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Automakers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFord Motor Co | $187.3B | 7% | -4.9% | -55% | 7% |
| GMGeneral Motors Company | $168.0B | 40% | 1.7% | 2% | 10% |
| TSLATesla, Inc. | $94.8B | 18% | 4.6% | 4% | 7% |
| PCARPaccar Inc | $28.4B | 20% | 10.6% | 15% | 13% |
| LEALear Corp | $23.3B | 6% | 3.3% | 9% | 2% |
| APTVAptiv PLC | $20.4B | 19% | 5.8% | 4% | 7% |
| BWABorgwarner Inc | $14.3B | 19% | 3.7% | 4% | 8% |
| RIVNRivian Automotive, Inc. / DE | $5.4B | 3% | -66.5% | -52% | -46% |