NEE, Nextera Energy, Inc.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that have to be kept working.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2011–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2011’11 | 2012’12 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $15.3B | $14.3B | $15.4B | $17.5B | $17.0B | $18.8B | $23.0B | $24.8B | $23.5B | $25.8B | $25.9B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 21.3% | 23.0% | 27.8% | 30.6% | 30.1% | 15.5% | 17.7% | 41.3% | 31.8% | 32.1% | 31.8% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.9B | $1.9B | $6.6B | $3.8B | $2.9B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $7.3B | $6.9B | $6.8B | $8.2B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $1.01 | $1.00 | $3.48 | $1.94 | $1.48 | $1.81 | $2.10 | $3.60 | $3.37 | $3.30 | $3.91 |
| ROICROIC | 7% | 6% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 3% | 4% | 8% | 6% | 6% | 5% |
| Total debtDebt | $21.6B | $25.9B | $29.5B | $39.7B | $46.1B | $52.7B | $61.9B | $68.3B | $80.4B | $93.1B | $97.8B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $329M | $438M | $638M | $600M | $1.1B | $639M | $1.6B | $2.7B | $1.5B | $2.8B | $2.0B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $21.3B | $25.5B | $28.9B | $39.1B | $45.0B | $52.1B | $60.3B | $65.6B | $79.0B | $90.2B | $95.8B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- How heavy is the debt? 11.2×HighTotal debt $93.1B ÷ operating income $8.3B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $90.2BHeavy net debtCash $2.8B − debt $93.1B
Netting $2.8B of cash and short-term investments against $93.1B of debt leaves $90.2B owed, about 10.9× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $8.3B ÷ invested capital $144.9B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $12.5B ÷ net income $6.8B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Durability & moat, 2011–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 21% (FY2011) → 32% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Worst year 2021 · 15.5% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2011–2025
Over the record, the business generated $83.7B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Dividends$28.2B · 34%
- Buybacks$394M · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)$55.0B · 66%
It reinvested $0 (0%) back into the business and returned $28.6B (34%) to owners, $28.2B in dividends, $394M in buybacks. Total debt rose $76.2B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Graham’s defensive-investor test
4 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $25.8B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.60×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $93.1B vs ($9.2B) WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +101%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $3.30/share and book value $26.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationBusiness
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Retail base revenues increased approximately $222 million during the year ended December 31, 2025 primarily related to an increase of 1.7% in the average number of customer accounts and new retail base rates through its Solar Base Rate Adjustment mechanism under the 2021 rate agreement.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$25.9B - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“For example, the ability of NEE and FPL to develop certain generation and storage facilities is dependent on the international supply chain for generation equipment, batteries and other associated equipment, and governmental or regulatory actions have caused 26 Table of Content s minor, and could in…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Debt terms & refinancingBusiness
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“A change in ratings is not an event of default under applicable debt instruments, and while there are conditions to drawing on the credit facilities noted above, the maintenance of a specific minimum credit rating is not a condition to drawing on these credit facilities.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$90.2B heavy net debt · no real interest burden - Litigation & contingenciesBusiness
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“The original complaint sought damages of $ 350 million, which would be tripled in the event of a finding of monopolization under the Sherman Act, from the defendants for alleged violations of federal and state antitrust laws, as well as Massachusetts state laws.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) modified several pre-existing provisions, including the phase out of these income tax credits, of the Inflation Reduction Act and other laws.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Interest Expense NEER's interest expense for 2025 increased $569 million primarily reflecting approximately $351 million of unfavorable impacts related to changes in the fair value of interest rate derivative instruments as well as higher average debt balances driven by growth in the business. 43 Ta…”
- “Income Taxes FPL's income taxes decreased $251 million during 2025 primarily related to higher clean energy tax credits as compared to the prior year. 42 Table of Content s NEER: Results of Operations NEER owns, develops, constructs, manages and operates a diversified portfolio of electric generatio…”
- “A number of legislative, executive and administrative activities occurred in 2025 that affect NEE and FPL including 1) the enactment of the OBBBA which, among other things, modified tax legislation affecting clean energy tax credits, 2) the issuance of a number of federal executive orders and presid…”
- “Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations OVERVIEW NEE's operating performance is driven primarily by the operations of its two principal businesses, FPL, which serves more than six million customer accounts in Florida and is the largest electric utility i…”
- “A number of regulatory actions occurred in 2025, including, among others, a federal executive order that calls for a pause in federal land leasing, permitting and approvals for wind development facilities pending completion of a review of the federal rules providing for leasing, permitting and appro…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SOSouthern Co | $29.6B | — | 24.7% | 6% | -10% |
| NEENextera Energy, Inc. | $25.8B | — | 32.1% | 6% | — |
| AEPAmerican Electric Power Co Inc. | $21.7B | — | 24.5% | 7% | 16% |
| EIXEdison International | $19.3B | — | 36.7% | 10% | -4% |
| DDominion Energy, Inc | $16.5B | — | 26.7% | 5% | 2% |
| FEFirstenergy Corp | $15.1B | — | 14.6% | 5% | -7% |
| ESEversource Energy | $13.5B | — | 22.1% | 6% | -0% |
| ETREntergy Corp /de/ | $12.9B | — | 24.7% | 6% | -20% |