WTW, Willis Towers Watson PLC
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Broking (46%) and Consulting (35%), with 2 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested.
- Is it a good business?
- The underwriting result is not cleanly tagged in the filings. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 1% a year across the record. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest HWC at 56%.
- HWC56%$5.3B
- R&B44%$4.2B
- Corporate0%$3M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $7.9B | $8.2B | $8.4B | $8.3B | $8.6B | $8.8B | $8.7B | $9.3B | $9.7B | $9.5B | $9.7B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $420M | $568M | $695M | $1.0B | $996M | $4.2B | $1.0B | $1.1B | ($98M) | $1.6B | $1.7B |
| Return on equityROE | 4% | 6% | 7% | 10% | 9% | 32% | 10% | 11% | -1% | 20% | 21% |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $72.93 | $74.46 | $74.64 | $78.84 | $83.23 | $102.79 | $89.43 | $89.81 | $77.84 | $80.57 | $83.09 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $1.44 | $2.04 | $2.32 | $2.53 | $2.66 | $2.90 | $3.29 | $3.32 | $3.47 | $3.62 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Not enough data
Premiums or claims weren't found in the filing data.
- Return on equity 20%StrongNet income $1.6B ÷ equity $8.0B
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float —Not enough data
Loss reserves weren't found.
- Not enough data
Net investment income wasn't found.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$153M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF, its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off). We don't force this lens where it doesn't belong.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Going-concern doubtRisk Factors
The rarest and gravest flag, the company's own auditors questioning whether it survives the year. Graham's first test, failed.
“Management has concluded that there are no conditions or events, considered in the aggregate, that raise substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern within one year after the date of these financial statements.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$3.1B modest net debt · interest covered 8.6× - Customer concentrationRisk Factors
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“Broking — Representing 46 % to 49 % of customer contract revenue each year, in our broking arrangements, we earn revenue by acting as an intermediary in the placement of effective insurance policies.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$9.7B - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The operating restrictions and financial covenants in our current credit facilities do, and any future financing agreements may, limit our ability to finance future operations or capital needs or to engage in other business activities.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$3.1B modest net debt · interest covered 8.6× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“GAAP tax rate 16.3 % 188.8 % Adjusted income tax rate 21.1 % 21.3 % (i) Represents a provision related to litigation arising out of a structured insurance program originally placed for a client over 15 years ago.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandMD&A
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“We have some businesses, such as our health and benefits and administration businesses, which can be counter cyclical during the early period of a significant economic change.”
From the recordWorst year on record4.4% operating margin (FY2016) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Further, in addition to the direct impact of the continuing dynamic tariff environment on our business (which we do not expect to be significant, so long as retaliatory actions do not extend to services), recent U.S. legislation and other U.S. federal government actions continue to create uncertaint…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Our adjusted diluted earnings per share increased for the year ended December 31, 2025 as compared to the year ended December 31, 2024 primarily due to lower marketing expenses, decreased office expenses and lower professional services costs in the current year, partially offset by lower revenue due…”
- “Other indirect impacts from changes in tariffs or from legislative or regulatory developments, such as changes in consumer sentiment, trade relations, economic activity, disruption of U.S. federal government operations, willingness to do business with U.S.-listed firms, inflationary pressures and em…”
- “Further, in addition to the direct impact of the continuing dynamic tariff environment on our business (which we do not expect to be significant, so long as retaliatory actions do not extend to services), recent U.S. legislation and other U.S. federal government actions continue to create uncertaint…”
- “The decrease was primarily due to lower marketing expenses attributable to the sale of our TRANZACT business on December 31, 2024, decreased office expenses, and lower professional services and occupancy costs, partially offset by higher non-income-related tax expense for the current year as compare…”
- “Acquired intangible assets held at December 31, 2025 are being amortized on the basis noted and over the following expected life: Amortization basis Expected life (years) Client relationships In line with underlying cash flows 1 to 21 Software In line with underlying cash flows or straight-line basi…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Insurance brokers
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AONAon PLC | $17.2B | — | — | 40% |
| AJGArthur J. Gallagher & Co. | $13.9B | — | — | 6% |
| WTWWillis Towers Watson PLC | $9.5B | — | — | 20% |
| BROBrown & Brown, Inc. | $5.9B | — | — | 8% |