TROW, Price T Rowe Group Inc
Rowe Price, the firm, we, us, or our) is a financial services holding company that provides global investment advisory services through its subsidiaries to investors worldwide.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Asset Management (90%) and Administrative, distribution, services, and other fees (8%), with 2 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has run high across the record (median 24%, above 12% in 10 of 10 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Asset Management is 90% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- Asset Management90%$6.6B
- Administrative, distribution, services, and other fees8%$594M
- Capital allocation-based income1%$81M
- Performance-based advisory fees1%$37M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $4.3B | $4.9B | $5.4B | $5.6B | $6.2B | $7.7B | $6.5B | $6.5B | $7.1B | $7.3B | $7.4B |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $3.1B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $4.85 | $6.11 | $7.44 | $8.93 | $10.26 | $13.47 | $6.86 | $7.96 | $9.40 | $9.47 | $9.63 |
| Return on equityROE | 24% | 26% | 30% | 30% | 31% | 34% | 18% | 19% | 20% | 19% | 19% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 28% | 29% | 34% | 33% | 34% | 57% | 28% | 28% | 29% | 26% | 27% |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $20.01 | $23.76 | $24.80 | $29.77 | $33.33 | $39.43 | $38.92 | $42.28 | $46.33 | $49.30 | $49.53 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $17.35 | $21.05 | $22.11 | $26.98 | $30.46 | $23.67 | $24.51 | $28.27 | $32.85 | $36.06 | $36.19 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $2.16 | $2.30 | $2.81 | $3.08 | $3.66 | $7.44 | $4.88 | $4.99 | $5.09 | $5.19 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 19%ExceptionalNet income $2.1B ÷ equity $10.9B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ExceptionalNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $2.6B − intangibles $274M)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough data
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 75.7%Well capitalizedEquity $10.9B ÷ assets $14.3B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
Provision or net interest income missing.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$217M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Price T Rowe Group Inc’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $7.9B on 218M shares, a 29% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“We derive a significant portion of our revenues from advisory fees on managed investment products.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)23% - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“There also has been an increase in litigation and in regulatory investigations in the financial services industry in recent years, including client claims, class action suits, and government actions claiming substantial monetary damages and penalties.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Under the 2017 Plan, awards generally vest over one year and, in the case of restricted stock units, are settled upon the non-employee directors' departure from the Board.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “We are subject to various securities/financial services, compliance, corporate governance, disclosure, privacy, cybersecurity, technology and artificial intelligence, anti-bribery and anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, anti-terrorist financing, and economic, trade and sanctions laws and regulat…”
- “After a challenging start to 2025 stemming from new U.S. tariff and trade policies, equities advanced starting in April, as the U.S. and China made efforts to improve their trade relationship, economic growth and corporate earnings remained favorable, investors favored artificial intelligence-relate…”
- “This non-GAAP adjustment removes accelerated depreciation and impairment charges related to certain owned real estate, as well as compensation expenses, primarily severance, resulting from actions taken as part of our broad and ongoing plan to reduce expense growth and realign resources to invest in…”
- “C ertain new regulatory proposals that may impact or relate to our business, include cybersecurity disclosures, sustainability, privacy and data protection, financial products, fiduciary and fund-related reforms, digital assets, tax compliance, and other investment management disclosure and complian…”
- “The weighted average remaining useful life of definite-lived intangibles assets is 2.8 years. 20 Page Definite-lived intangible assets carrying value is tested when there is an indication of impairment.”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Asset management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMPAmeriprise Financial Inc | $18.9B | 54% | 75% | — | — |
| BENFranklin Resources, Inc. | $8.8B | 4% | 31% | — | — |
| TROWPrice T Rowe Group Inc | $7.3B | 19% | 26% | — | 0.0% |