TRGP, Targa Resources Corp.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that have to be kept working.
- Situation
- Cyclical. margins collapse repeatedly across the cycle, a single year misleads; look at normalized, through-cycle earnings and the balance sheet at the trough.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one, so weigh the worst year against the median, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $6.7B | $7.8B | $9.4B | $7.4B | $6.9B | $16.1B | $19.8B | $13.5B | $14.1B | $17.0B | $16.6B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 0.8% | −1.6% | 2.5% | 2.6% | −19.0% | 5.4% | 8.7% | 19.4% | 19.1% | 19.6% | 21.9% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($187M) | $54M | $2M | ($209M) | ($1.6B) | $71M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.1B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-1.21 | $0.26 | $0.01 | $-0.90 | $-6.69 | $0.31 | $5.17 | $5.96 | $5.93 | $8.87 | $9.89 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $275M | ($358M) | ($2.0B) | ($1.5B) | $793M | $1.8B | $1.0B | $826M | $684M | $584M | $262M |
| ROICROIC | 0% | -1% | 1% | 1% | -10% | 8% | 11% | 13% | 13% | 13% | 13% |
| CapexCapex | $562M | $1.3B | $3.1B | $2.9B | $952M | $505M | $1.3B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.4B |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 8.4% | 16.6% | 33.3% | 38.9% | 13.8% | 3.1% | 6.7% | 17.6% | 21.0% | 19.6% | 20.8% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 0.74× | 1.60× | 3.82× | 2.96× | 1.10× | 0.58× | 1.22× | 1.79× | 2.08× | 2.20× | 2.19× |
| Total debtDebt | $4.6B | $5.1B | $6.7B | $8.2B | $8.1B | $6.7B | $11.5B | $13.0B | $14.2B | $17.4B | $19.3B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $74M | $137M | $232M | $331M | $243M | $159M | $219M | $142M | $157M | $166M | $100M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $4.5B | $4.9B | $6.4B | $7.9B | $7.9B | $6.6B | $11.3B | $12.8B | $14.0B | $17.3B | $19.2B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 329.8×ComfortableOperating income $3.3B ÷ interest expense $10M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- HeavyTotal debt $17.6B ÷ operating income $3.3B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $17.4BHeavy net debtCash $166M − debt $17.6B
Netting $166M of cash and short-term investments against $17.6B of debt leaves $17.4B owed, about 5.2× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 32 + DIO 15 − DPO 65 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT $2.6B ÷ invested capital $20.5B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- ThinOwner Earnings $584M = operating cash $3.9B − capex $3.3B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 3% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $70M of SBC) leaves $515M. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $3.9B ÷ net income $1.9B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $182M ÷ Owner Earnings $584M
Of $584M Owner Earnings, $182M (31%) went back to shareholders, $179M dividends, $3M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($70M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.20×ExpandingCapex $3.3B ÷ depreciation $1.5B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 1% (FY2016) → 20% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 35%
Every extra dollar the company reinvested earned a high return, it is still compounding, not coasting on an old moat.
- Worst year 2020 · −19.0% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.8%/yr
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $21.5B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$19.3B · 90%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.2B · 10%
It reinvested $19.3B (90%) back into the business and returned $0 (0%) to owners, $0 in dividends, $0 in buybacks. Total debt rose $14.7B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio145:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$70M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
1 of 5 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $17.0B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.67×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $17.6B vs ($1.2B) WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $8.87/share and book value $14.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Targa Resources Corp. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $262M on 216M diluted shares; net debt $19.2B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Debt terms & refinancingBusiness
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk—Interest Rate Risk." Compliance with Debt Covenants As of December 31, 2025, both we and the Partnership were in compliance with the covenants contained in our various debt agreements.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$17.4B heavy net debt · interest covered 329.8× - Litigation & contingenciesBusiness
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“On December 9, 2025, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (i) reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Targa and remanded the case to trial court for further proceedings and (ii) upheld the $ 6.9 million jury verdict in favor of MIECO.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The underlying activities performed by us are considered inputs to an integrated service and not separable because such activities in combination are required to successfully transfer the single overall service that the customer has contracted for and expects to receive.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “The increase in operating expenses was predominantly due to system expansions and planned maintenance. 61 Other Year Ended December 31, 2025 2024 2025 vs. 2024 (In millions) Operating margin $ (5.3 ) $ (164.6 ) $ 159.3 Adjusted operating margin $ (5.3 ) $ (164.6 ) $ 159.3 Other contains the results …”
- “The increase in interest expense, net, was primarily due to higher borrowings in 2025, partially offset by the recognition of cumulative interest on a legal ruling associated with the Splitter Agreement in 2024. 59 The increase in income tax (expense) benefit was primarily due to the increase in pre…”
- “The decrease in net income attributable to noncontrolling interests was primarily due to the Badlands Transaction in the first quarter of 2025 and the acquisition of the remaining membership interest in CBF (the "CBF Acquisition") in the fourth quarter of 2024.”
- “Litigation and environmental reserves includes charges related to specific litigation and environmental compliance matters that are nonrecurring in nature and outside the ordinary course of our business and/or not reflective of our ongoing core operations.”
- “The increase in operating expenses was predominantly due to system expansions and planned maintenance. 61 Other Year Ended December 31, 2025 2024 2025 vs. 2024 (In millions) Operating margin $ (5.3 ) $ (164.6 ) $ 159.3 Adjusted operating margin $ (5.3 ) $ (164.6 ) $ 159.3 Other contains the results …”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Gas utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OKEOneok, Inc. | $33.6B | 30% | 17.1% | 8% | 7% |
| LNGCheniere Energy, Inc. | $19.5B | 76% | 46.8% | 23% | 13% |
| TRGPTarga Resources Corp. | $17.0B | 38% | 19.6% | 13% | 3% |
| KMIKinder Morgan, Inc. | $15.2B | 39% | 31.1% | 5% | 19% |
| WMBThe Williams Companies, Inc. | $14.9B | 77% | 28.2% | 8% | 7% |
| ATOAtmos Energy Corp | $4.7B | 69% | 33.2% | 6% | -32% |