PINS, Pinterest, Inc.
Pinterest is an AI-powered visual search and discovery platform, positioned at the intersection of search, social, and commerce.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, drawn from its own SEC filings. The lens to bring to the numbers below, not the answer.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- What moves the needle
- Retention and the cost of growth. What decides it: whether customers expand rather than churn, how much of revenue is spent winning the next one, and whether software's gross margin holds as it scales. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −5%, above 15% in 1 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
No model wrote a word of this. Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below; the judgment is yours.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →U.S. and Canada is 72% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
- U.S. and Canada72%$3.1B
- Europe18%$779M
- Rest of World9%$390M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $473M | $756M | $1.1B | $1.7B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $4.2B | $4.4B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | 62% | 68% | 69% | 73% | 79% | 76% | 77% | 79% | 80% | 80% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | −29.2% | −9.9% | −121.5% | −8.4% | 12.7% | −3.6% | −4.1% | 4.9% | 7.6% | 6.3% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($130M) | ($63M) | ($1.4B) | ($128M) | $316M | ($96M) | ($36M) | $1.9B | $417M | $334M |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-0.22 | $-0.11 | $-2.28 | $-0.22 | $0.46 | $-0.14 | $-0.05 | $2.67 | $0.61 | $0.53 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | ($144M) | ($83M) | ($33M) | $11M | $744M | $440M | $605M | $940M | $1.3B | $1.2B |
| Owner earnings marginOE mgn | −30.5% | −10.9% | −2.9% | 0.7% | 28.9% | 15.7% | 19.8% | 25.8% | 29.7% | 27.6% |
| ROICROIC | — | — | -80% | -7% | 20% | -5% | -6% | 5% | 8% | 10% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $71M | $123M | $650M | $669M | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $969M | $378M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | ($71M) | ($123M) | ($650M) | ($669M) | ($1.4B) | ($1.6B) | ($1.4B) | ($1.1B) | ($969M) | ($378M) |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $-0.92 | $-1.00 | $3.39 | $3.76 | $4.39 | $4.93 | $4.58 | $6.80 | $6.90 | $4.48 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Debt, net of cash +$969MNet cash, debt-freeCash $969M − debt $0
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $969M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 86 + DIO 0 − DPO 56 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash machineOwner Earnings $1.3B = operating cash $1.3B − capex $32M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 30% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $880M of SBC) leaves $371M. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $417M
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $927M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.3B
Of $1.3B Owner Earnings, $927M (74%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $927M buybacks. Net of $880M stock comp, the real buyback was about $47M. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.29×ExpandingCapex $32M ÷ depreciation $25M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 3 of 9
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −29% (FY2017) → 8% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2019 · −121.5% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $4.0B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$218M · 6%
- Buybacks$2.0B · 51%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.7B · 43%
It reinvested $218M (6%) back into the business and returned $2.0B (51%) to owners, $0 in dividends, $2.0B in buybacks.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$880M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 21% of revenue, equal to 275% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
2 of 4 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.2B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 7.64×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 6 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $0.61/share and book value $6.90/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Pinterest, Inc. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $1.2B on 637M diluted shares; net cash $378M. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Barriers to entry in our industry are low and may be further lowered by commercial AI tools, and our intellectual property rights may not be sufficient to prevent competitors from launching comparable products or services.”
From the recordOperating margin6.3% now (TTM), off a 12.7% peak (FY2021) - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our growth strategy depends on, among other things, attracting more advertisers (including expanding our sales efforts to reach advertisers in international markets), retaining and scaling our business with existing advertisers and expanding our advertising product offerings.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)28% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The 2022 revolving credit facility also contains a financial maintenance covenant: a maximum net leverage ratio of consolidated debt to consolidated EBITDA no greater than 3.50 to 1.00, subject to an increase up to 4.00 to 1.00 for a certain period following an acquisition.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$969M net cash, debt-free · no real interest burden - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Following periods of volatility in the overall market and the market price of a particular company's securities, securities class action and derivative litigation has often been instituted against these companies, including against us.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“The issuance of equity to finance any such acquisitions could result in dilution to our stockholders.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“During the year ended December 31, 2025, we repurchased and retired 30,108,015 shares of our Class A common stock for an aggregate purchase price of $927.0 million at an average price per share of $30.79, including $3.3 million excise tax resulting from the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Operating activities Cash flows from operating activities consist of our net income (loss) adjusted for certain non-cash reconciling items, such as share-based compensation expense, depreciation and amortization, deferred income taxes, net amortization of investment premium and discount, non-cash ch…”
- “The increase was primarily due to a 10% increase in personnel expenses due to higher headcount, $13.5 million in non-cash charitable contributions and a $12.4 million increase in share-based compensation expense, offset by a $34.7 million legal settlement, net of insurance proceeds, in 2024 and a de…”
- “We may not be able to successfully complete announced transactions on a timely basis or at all, and our acquisitions are subject to scrutiny from regulators, which could block, delay or impose conditions (such as divestitures, ownership or operational restrictions or other structural or behavioral r…”
- “Certain legal, regulatory, and policy developments, such as changes to policies and requirements regarding immigration and visas, may also negatively impact our ability to attract, hire and retain highly talented personnel, or may lead to public scrutiny, investigations, litigation, and regulatory o…”
- “AI technologies are complex and rapidly evolving, and we face significant potential disruption from other companies, particularly as internet companies utilize AI to introduce new methods of search and discovery for consumers and AI reduces barriers to entry to compete with our products and services…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Internet platforms
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CDNSCadence Design Systems, Inc. | $5.3B | 99% | 28.2% | 44% | 30% |
| RBLXRoblox Corporation | $4.9B | 78% | -25.2% | -534% | 28% |
| CRWDCrowdstrike Holdings, Inc. | $4.8B | 75% | -6.1% | — | 27% |
| PINSPinterest, Inc. | $4.2B | 80% | 7.6% | 8% | 30% |
| MTCHMatch Group, Inc. | $3.5B | 73% | 25.0% | 27% | 29% |
| DDOGDatadog, Inc. | $3.4B | 80% | -1.3% | -1% | 29% |
| TTDTrade Desk, Inc. | $2.9B | 79% | 20.3% | 22% | 27% |
| ZSZscaler, Inc. | $2.7B | 77% | -4.8% | -18% | 30% |