MRNA, Moderna, Inc.
Moderna is a pioneer and leader in the field of mRNA medicine.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and its hold on the shelf.
- Situation
- Unprofitable growth. no operating profit yet, judge it on revenue growth, gross-margin trajectory, cash burn and runway, never on an earnings multiple. Distress / turnaround. thin interest coverage or cash-burning operations against real debt, the first questions are liquidity and the maturity wall, not growth.
- What moves the needle
- Volume against price, and shelf position. What decides it: whether it can raise prices without losing the customer, and whether the brand still commands its margin.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −35%, above 15% in 2 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →38% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States62%$1.2B
- Rest of world36%$692M
- Europe3%$53M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $108M | $206M | $135M | $60M | $803M | $18.5B | $19.3B | $6.8B | $3.2B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | — | — | 100% | 100% | 99% | 86% | 72% | 31% | 55% | 55% | 22% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | −206.4% | −130.9% | −306.0% | −906.8% | −95.0% | 72.0% | 48.9% | −61.9% | −121.9% | −158.1% | −153.3% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | ($216M) | ($256M) | ($385M) | ($514M) | ($747M) | $12.2B | $8.4B | ($4.7B) | ($3.6B) | ($2.8B) | ($3.2B) |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $-0.87 | $-0.97 | $-1.16 | $-1.55 | $-1.96 | $28.31 | $20.10 | $-12.34 | $-9.27 | $-7.25 | $-8.09 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $34M | ($390M) | ($437M) | ($491M) | $2.0B | $13.3B | $4.6B | ($3.8B) | ($4.1B) | ($2.1B) | ($1.6B) |
| ROICROIC | — | — | -37% | -46% | — | 167% | 52% | -31% | -35% | -37% | -44% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $50M | $135M | $658M | $236M | $2.6B | $6.8B | $3.2B | $2.9B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $1.9B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | ($50M) | ($135M) | ($658M) | ($236M) | ($2.6B) | ($6.8B) | ($3.2B) | ($2.9B) | ($1.9B) | ($2.0B) | ($1.3B) |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $-1.35 | $-2.09 | $4.62 | $3.55 | $6.72 | $32.82 | $45.97 | $36.27 | $28.39 | $22.24 | $18.75 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Debt against an operating lossTotal debt $590M · operating income ($3.1B)
There's debt but no operating profit to measure it against, understand that combination before anything else about the company.
- Debt, net of cash +$2.0BNet cashCash $2.6B − debt $590M
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 35 + DIO 64 − DPO 133 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($2.4B) ÷ invested capital $6.6B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner Earnings ($2.1B) = operating cash ($1.9B) − capex $192M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's -106% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $483M of SBC) leaves ($2.5B). Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($1.9B)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($2.8B) · cash from operations ($1.9B)
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.91×MaintainingCapex $192M ÷ depreciation $211M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 2 of 10
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −206% (FY2016) → −158% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2019 · −906.8% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $11.6B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2.9B · 25%
- Buybacks$5.3B · 46%
- Retained (debt / cash)$3.3B · 29%
It reinvested $2.9B (25%) back into the business and returned $5.3B (46%) to owners, $0 in dividends, $5.3B in buybacks.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$483M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 25% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
2 of 5 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.29×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $590M vs $4.6B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $-7.25/share and book value $22.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“If demand for COVID vaccines continues to decline, we lose significant market share, or our products are subject to significant competitive pricing pressure, our product sales may not materialize consistent with our projections.”
From the recordOperating margin−153.3% now (TTM), off a 72.0% peak (FY2021) - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“We utilize a number of raw materials and excipients that may have a single source of supply, are new to the pharmaceutical industry and are being employed in a novel manner.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)22% - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Completion of our trials and commercialization of our products depend on the availability of facilities capable of manufacturing our vaccines at sufficient yields and at commercial scale.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)−72% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“Investing activities Our primary investing activities consist of purchases, sales, and maturities of our investments, capital expenditures for land, building, leasehold improvements, manufacturing, laboratory, computer equipment and software, and business development.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)+$2.0B net cash · no real interest burden - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“We are, and may in the future become, involved in patent litigation or other proceedings related to a determination of rights, we could incur substantial costs and expenses, substantial liability for damages or be required to stop our product development and commercialization efforts.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Any severe or prolonged economic downturn could create a variety of risks to our business, including weakened demand for our medicines, and negatively impact our ability to raise additional capital or financing if needed on favorable terms, if at all.”
From the recordWorst year on record−906.8% operating margin (FY2019) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“Spikevax (our original COVID vaccine) and mNEXSPIKE. mNEXSPIKE was approved by the FDA in May 2025 for individuals 65 years of age and older, and individuals 12 through 64 years of age who are at high risk for severe COVID-19. mNEXSPIKE focuses immune responses to the domains of the SARS-CoV-2 spike…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of our 2025-2026 formula for mNEXSPIKE, our second COVID vaccine, in all adults aged 65 and older, as well as individuals aged 12 to 64 years with at least one underlying risk factor. mNEXSPIKE is also approved in Europe, Canada and Australia and we have f…”
- “The net change in assets and liabilities was primarily due to a decrease in accounts receivable of $156 million, mainly due to lower invoice volumes and timing of collections, a $153 million decrease in prepaid expenses and other current assets, primarily due to reduced manufacturing and capital spe…”
- “In February 2026, in response to a prior Refusal-to-File letter, we engaged with the FDA in a Type A meeting and submitted an amended biologics license application (BLA) outlining a revised regulatory pathway based on age, seeking full approval for adults 50 to 64 years of age and accelerated approv…”
- “As of December 31, 2025, we have three commercial products, our COVID vaccines, Spikevax and mNEXSPIKE, and our RSV vaccine, mRESVIA. mRESVIA was approved by the FDA in May 2024 for adults aged 60 years and older, and in June 2025, the approved use was expanded to include adults aged 18 through 59 y…”
- “These regulations, which may differ across jurisdictions, could subject us to new or expanded carbon pricing or taxes, increased compliance costs, restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, investment in new technologies, increased carbon disclosure and transparency, investments in data gathering and…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Pharma
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMGNAmgen Inc. | $36.8B | 67% | 24.7% | 14% | 22% |
| GILDGilead Sciences, Inc. | $29.4B | 79% | 34.0% | 17% | 32% |
| REGNRegeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. | $14.3B | 97% | 24.9% | 10% | 28% |
| VRTXVertex Pharmaceuticals Inc / MA | $12.0B | 86% | 34.8% | 26% | 27% |
| BIIBBiogen Inc. | $9.9B | 76% | 28.7% | 11% | 21% |
| ZTSZoetis Inc. | $9.5B | 72% | 37.8% | 26% | 24% |
| IDXXIdexx Laboratories Inc /de | $4.3B | 62% | 31.6% | 51% | 25% |
| MRNAModerna, Inc. | $1.9B | 55% | -158.1% | -37% | -106% |