DOV, Dover Corp
Dover's five segments are structured around businesses with similar business models, go-to-market strategies, product categories, and manufacturing practices.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that have to be kept working.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). Owner earnings agree: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →46% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States54%$4.4B
- Europe22%$1.8B
- Asia11%$900M
- Americas9%$708M
- Other4%$316M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $6.0B | $6.8B | $7.0B | $7.1B | $6.7B | $7.9B | $7.8B | $7.7B | $7.7B | $8.1B | $8.3B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 11.7% | 11.8% | 12.1% | 13.7% | 14.0% | 16.2% | 16.3% | 15.9% | 15.6% | 17.0% | 16.7% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $509M | $812M | $570M | $678M | $683M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $2.7B | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $3.25 | $5.15 | $3.75 | $4.61 | $4.70 | $7.74 | $7.42 | $7.52 | $19.45 | $7.94 | $8.11 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | — | — | — | $759M | $939M | $944M | $595M | $1.2B | — | — | $1.0B |
| ROICROIC | 8% | 10% | 13% | 14% | 13% | 14% | 14% | 13% | 11% | 10% | 11% |
| CapexCapex | $140M | $170M | $171M | $187M | $166M | $171M | $211M | $183M | $168M | $220M | $232M |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 2.3% | 2.5% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.5% | 2.2% | 2.7% | 2.4% | 2.2% | 2.7% | 2.8% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 0.56× | 0.60× | 0.61× | 0.69× | 0.59× | 0.59× | 0.71× | 0.60× | 0.50× | 0.58× | 0.60× |
| Total debtDebt | $3.2B | $3.3B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.3B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $349M | $754M | $396M | $397M | $513M | — | — | — | — | — | $739M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $2.9B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $2.6B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 12.5×ComfortableOperating income $1.4B ÷ interest expense $110M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- ModerateTotal debt $3.3B ÷ operating income $1.4B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $2.8BMeaningful net debtCash $513M − debt $3.3B
Netting $513M of cash and short-term investments against $3.3B of debt leaves $2.8B owed, about 2.1× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Capital-hungryDSO 62 + DIO 95 − DPO 66 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT $1.1B ÷ invested capital $10.2B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- SolidOwner Earnings $1.1B = operating cash $1.3B − capex $220M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 14% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $44M of SBC) leaves $1.1B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $1.1B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $824M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B
Of $1.1B Owner Earnings, $824M (74%) went back to shareholders, $283M dividends, $541M buybacks. Net of $44M stock comp, the real buyback was about $497M. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.58×HarvestingCapex $220M ÷ depreciation $380M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% (FY2016) → 17% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 0% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 11.7% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.4%/yr
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2019–2023
Over the record, the business generated $5.3B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$918M · 17%
- Dividends$1.4B · 27%
- Buybacks$856M · 16%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.1B · 40%
It reinvested $918M (17%) back into the business and returned $2.3B (43%) to owners, $1.4B in dividends, $856M in buybacks. Total debt rose $360M across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$44M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
4 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $8.1B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.79×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.3B vs $2.0B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +156%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $7.94/share and book value $53.75/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Dover Corp has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $1.0B on 136M diluted shares; net debt $2.6B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationBusiness
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“We serve thousands of customers, none of which accounted for more than 10% of our consolidated revenue in 2025.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$8.3B - Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Our ability to compete effectively depends on how successfully we anticipate and respond to various competitive factors, including new products, digital solutions and support services that may be introduced by competitors, changes in customer preferences, evolving regulations, new business models an…”
From the recordOperating margin16.7% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Supplier & input dependenceBusiness
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“As a result, the loss of any single supplier has not had, and is not likely to have, a material impact on operating profits at the consolidated level.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)40% - Concentrated dependenceBusiness
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“While we expect to generate organic sales growth above that of gross domestic product (4% to 6% annually on average) over a long-term business cycle, absent prolonged adverse economic conditions, our success in consistently growing the portfolio is also dependent on the ability to acquire and integr…”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)13% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“We generate substantial cash from the operations of our businesses and remain in a strong financial position, with sufficient liquidity available for upcoming debt maturities and for reinvestment in existing businesses and strategic acquisitions.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$2.8B meaningful net debt · interest covered 12.5× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“We and certain of our subsidiaries are, and from time to time may become, parties to a number of legal proceedings incidental to our businesses, including alleged injuries arising out of the use of products or exposure to hazardous substances, or claims related to patent infringement, employment mat…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandBusiness
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“We believe this diversity is a strength of our portfolio, providing Dover with multiple avenues for organic and inorganic growth, lower cyclicality, and the ability to extract synergies of common ownership.”
From the recordWorst year on record11.7% operating margin (FY2016)
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Net debt increased $566.6 million during the period primarily due to the issuance of the 2033 Notes and the increase in value of the euro-denominated debt resulting from foreign currency translation adjustments offset by a decrease in cash and cash equivalents from acquisition-related investments an…”
- “The organic revenue decline was primarily due to project timing in retail refrigeration door cases and services, partially offset by continued strong demand for low-GWP CO 2 refrigerant systems and improving demand across beverage can-making and heat exchanger applications.”
- “Earnings from continuing operations decreased primarily due to the after-tax gain on dispositions of De-Sta-Co and a minority owned equity method investment totaling $462.4 million in the prior year, partially offset by higher operating earnings in the current period.”
- “The decrease was primarily due to disposition-related impacts and lower volumes in vehicle service, partially offset by favorable price versus cost dynamics, productivity and cost management initiatives and benefits from restructuring actions.”
- “Emerging and evolving technologies such as artificial intelligence, our use of which we expect to increase over time, are rapidly developing, and our businesses may be adversely affected if we cannot successfully integrate these technologies into our business processes and product and service offeri…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Industrial machinery
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CATCaterpillar Inc | $67.6B | 100% | 16.5% | 20% | 13% |
| BKRBaker Hughes Co | $27.7B | 66% | 11.1% | 16% | 9% |
| DOVDover Corp | $8.1B | 40% | 17.0% | 11% | 14% |