DD, Dupont DE Nemours, Inc.
DuPont is a leading provider of advanced solutions that improve everyday life across healthcare, water, construction and industrial markets.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is Diversified Industrials (53%) and Healthcare & Water Technologies (47%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable growth. no operating profit yet, judge it on revenue growth, gross-margin trajectory, cash burn and runway, never on an earnings multiple. Distress / turnaround. thin interest coverage or cash-burning operations against real debt, the first questions are liquidity and the maturity wall, not growth. Cyclical. margins collapse repeatedly across the cycle, a single year misleads; look at normalized, through-cycle earnings and the balance sheet at the trough.
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one, so weigh the worst year against the median, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Diversified Industrials at 53%.
- Diversified Industrials53%$3.6B
- Healthcare & Water Technologies47%$3.2B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $48.2B | $11.7B | $22.6B | $15.4B | $11.1B | $12.6B | $13.0B | $6.6B | $6.7B | $6.8B | $6.9B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 10.8% | −5.1% | 18.1% | 7.5% | −19.7% | 57.5% | 51.8% | 9.1% | 19.1% | −5.3% | 5.2% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $4.3B | $1.2B | $3.8B | $498M | ($3.0B) | $6.5B | $5.9B | $423M | $703M | ($779M) | ($29M) |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $5.59 | $1.50 | $4.98 | $0.67 | $-4.01 | $11.88 | $11.75 | $0.94 | $1.68 | $-1.86 | $-0.07 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | ($6.8B) | ($1.3B) | $3.5B | ($1.1B) | $2.9B | $1.5B | ($74M) | — | — | — | $409M |
| ROICROIC | 13% | -0% | 4% | 2% | -3% | 20% | 20% | 2% | 4% | -2% | 1% |
| CapexCapex | $3.8B | $551M | $1.2B | $2.5B | $1.2B | $788M | $662M | $302M | $285M | $333M | $313M |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 7.9% | 4.7% | 5.5% | 16.0% | 10.7% | 6.3% | 5.1% | 4.6% | 4.2% | 4.9% | 4.5% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 1.33× | 0.52× | 0.57× | 0.77× | 0.39× | 0.71× | 0.58× | 0.52× | 0.45× | 0.51× | 0.49× |
| Total debtDebt | $21.1B | $32.1B | $12.6B | $13.6B | $15.6B | $10.8B | $8.4B | $7.9B | $5.3B | $3.1B | $7.2B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $6.6B | $14.4B | $8.6B | $1.5B | $2.5B | $2.0B | $5.0B | $2.4B | $1.8B | $715M | $710M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $14.5B | $17.7B | $4.0B | $12.1B | $13.1B | $8.8B | $3.5B | $5.5B | $3.5B | $2.4B | $6.5B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1.2×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($364M) ÷ interest expense $313M
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt against an operating lossTotal debt $7.9B · operating income ($364M)
There's debt but no operating profit to measure it against, understand that combination before anything else about the company.
- Debt, net of cash $7.1BNet debtCash $715M − debt $7.9B
Netting $715M of cash and short-term investments against $7.9B of debt leaves $7.1B owed. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Capital-hungryDSO 48 + DIO 95 − DPO 81 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($288M) ÷ invested capital $21.1B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- ThinOwner Earnings $255M = operating cash $588M − capex $333M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 4% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves $217M. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($779M) · cash from operations $588M
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $2.7B ÷ Owner Earnings $255M
Of $255M Owner Earnings, $2.7B (1075%) went back to shareholders, $597M dividends, $2.1B buybacks. Net of $38M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.1B. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.51×HarvestingCapex $333M ÷ depreciation $647M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 11% (FY2016) → −5% (FY2025)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −19.7% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2022
Over the record, the business generated $9.4B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a mature cash machine, most of what it earns goes straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$10.7B · 114%
- Dividends$13.1B · 140%
- Buybacks$11.0B · 118%
It reinvested $10.7B (114%) back into the business and returned $24.2B (258%) to owners, $13.1B in dividends, $11.0B in buybacks. Total debt fell $13.9B across the span. It returned and reinvested more than it generated, the gap was covered by debt or existing cash.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$38M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.8B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.42×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $7.9B vs $3.3B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −96%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $-1.86/share and book value $33.20/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Dupont DE Nemours, Inc. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $409M on 413M diluted shares; net debt $6.5B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Supplier & input dependenceMD&A
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“To address this risk, generally, the Company seeks to have many sources of supply for key raw materials in order to avoid significant dependence on any one or a few suppliers.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)35% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“DuPont solicited consents from eligible holders of each series of Existing Notes (collectively, the "Consent Solicitations") to adopt certain proposed amendments to the indenture governing the Existing Notes to eliminate substantially all of the restrictive covenants and amend certain other provisio…”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$7.1B net debt · operating profit doesn't cover interest - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“The Company and its subsidiaries are subject to various litigation matters, including, but not limited to, product liability, patent infringement, antitrust claims, and claims for third-party property damage or personal injury stemming from alleged environmental torts.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“For the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, DuPont recorded a pre-tax charge related to the Transformational Separation-Related Restructuring Program in the amount of $69 million .”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “The resulting impact on general economic conditions and on DuPont's business are uncertain and depend on various factors, such as negotiations between the U.S. and affected countries, the responses of other countries or regions, exemptions or exclusions that may be granted, availability and cost of …”
- “As a result, DuPont may be subject to legal claims or proceedings, reporting errors, processing inefficiencies, negative media attention, loss of sales, interference with regulatory compliance which could result in sanctions or penalties, liability or penalties under privacy laws, disruption in the …”
- “There can be no guarantee that such actions would significantly mitigate the impact on the company's business, results of operations, access to sources of liquidity or financial condition and the Company may experience materially adverse impacts to its business, results of operations, financial cond…”
- “The decrease in cash and cash equivalents at December 31, 2025 compared to December 31, 2024 was due to cash balance transferred to Qnity at separation, cash used to fund the $500 million ASR entered in the fourth quarter 2025, transaction costs related to the Electronics Separation, fees paid on th…”
- “The resulting impact on general economic conditions and on DuPont's business are uncertain and depend on various factors, such as negotiations between the U.S. and affected countries, the responses of other countries or regions, exemptions or exclusions that may be granted, availability and cost of …”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Chemicals
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOWDow Inc. | $40.0B | 6% | -6.7% | -7% | -4% |
| DDDupont DE Nemours, Inc. | $6.8B | 35% | -5.3% | -1% | 4% |
| ALBAlbemarle Corporation | $5.1B | 13% | -7.1% | -2% | 13% |