BMY, Bristol-myers Squibb Company
We operate in a single segment engaged in the discovery, development, licensing, manufacturing, marketing, distribution and sale of innovative medicines that help patients prevail over serious diseases.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and its hold on the shelf.
- Situation
- Cyclical. margins collapse repeatedly across the cycle, a single year misleads; look at normalized, through-cycle earnings and the balance sheet at the trough.
- What moves the needle
- Volume against price, and shelf position. What decides it: whether it can raise prices without losing the customer, and whether the brand still commands its margin.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings agree: roughly 27% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one, so weigh the worst year against the median, and read the 10-K.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →31% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States69%$33.3B
- International29%$13.8B
- Other2%$1.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $19.4B | $20.8B | $22.6B | $26.1B | $42.5B | $46.4B | $46.2B | $45.0B | $48.3B | $48.2B | $48.5B |
| Gross marginGross mgn | 74% | 71% | 71% | 69% | 72% | 79% | 78% | 76% | 71% | 71% | 70% |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 30.4% | 24.7% | 26.5% | 19.0% | −16.2% | 17.5% | 16.7% | 18.8% | −17.3% | 19.4% | 19.8% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $4.5B | $1.0B | $4.9B | $3.4B | ($9.0B) | $7.0B | $6.3B | $8.0B | ($8.9B) | $7.1B | $7.3B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.65 | $0.61 | $3.01 | $2.01 | $-3.99 | $3.12 | $2.95 | $3.86 | $-4.41 | $3.46 | $3.55 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $1.8B | $4.2B | $6.1B | $7.4B | $13.3B | $15.2B | $11.9B | $12.7B | $13.9B | $12.8B | $11.9B |
| ROICROIC | 24% | 17% | 32% | 4% | -7% | 11% | 10% | 14% | -12% | 13% | 13% |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $9.1B | $7.8B | $9.0B | $11.1B | $16.3B | $17.0B | $9.3B | $11.5B | $10.3B | $10.2B | $9.7B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | ($2.6B) | ($806M) | ($2.1B) | $35.0B | $34.1B | $27.4B | $29.7B | $28.1B | $39.1B | $34.6B | $34.4B |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $1.52 | $1.56 | $1.60 | $1.56 | $1.80 | $1.96 | $2.16 | $2.28 | $2.40 | $2.47 | — |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $9.63 | $7.11 | $8.57 | $30.14 | $16.75 | $16.01 | $14.47 | $14.16 | $8.06 | $9.06 | $9.80 |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $9.3B ÷ interest expense $1.9B
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- HeavyTotal debt $44.8B ÷ operating income $9.3B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $34.5BMeaningful net debtCash $10.2B + ST investments $130M − debt $44.8B
Netting $10.3B of cash and short-term investments against $44.8B of debt leaves $34.5B owed, about 3.7× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 73 + DIO 70 − DPO 94 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT $7.1B ÷ invested capital $53.1B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Cash machineOwner Earnings $12.8B = operating cash $14.2B − capex $1.3B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 27% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $553M of SBC) leaves $12.3B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $14.2B ÷ net income $7.1B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $5.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $12.8B
Of $12.8B Owner Earnings, $5.0B (39%) went back to shareholders, $5.0B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.33×HarvestingCapex $1.3B ÷ depreciation $4.0B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 30% (FY2016) → 19% (FY2025)
Margins slipped over the record, competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
Reinvested capital earned a negative return, the business spent money to shrink its own economics.
- Owner earnings growth +18%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 18% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −17.3% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.2%/yr
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $110.1B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a mature cash machine, most of what it earns goes straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$10.7B · 10%
- Dividends$38.2B · 35%
- Buybacks$31.3B · 28%
- Retained (debt / cash)$30.0B · 27%
It reinvested $10.7B (10%) back into the business and returned $69.5B (63%) to owners, $38.2B in dividends, $31.3B in buybacks. Total debt rose $37.7B across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio131:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$553M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
2 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $48.2B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.26×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $44.8B vs $6.0B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −41%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $3.46/share and book value $9.06/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Bristol-myers Squibb Company has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $11.9B on 2047M diluted shares; net debt $34.4B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationRisk Factors
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“In the U.S. and some other countries, customers are offered cash discounts as an incentive for prompt payment on certain products, approximating 2% of the invoiced sales price.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$48.5B - Pricing power & competitionMD&A
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We expect that consolidation and integration of pharmacy chains, wholesalers and pharmacy benefit managers will increase competitive and pricing pressures on pharmaceutical manufacturers, including us.”
From the recordOperating margin19.8% now (TTM), off a 30.4% peak (FY2016) - Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“The scope of our patent rights, if any, varies from country to country and may also be dependent on the availability of meaningful legal remedies in a country.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)25% - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“The facilities provide for customary terms and conditions with no financial covenants and are used to provide backup liquidity for our commercial paper borrowings.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$34.5B meaningful net debt · interest covered 4.9× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“SECURITIES LITIGATION Celgene Securities Litigations Beginning in March 2018, two putative class actions were filed against Celgene and certain of its officers and employees in the U.S.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandMD&A
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“As such, a global economic downturn could create or amplify a variety of risks to our business and could negatively affect our growth.”
From the recordWorst year on record−17.3% operating margin (FY2024) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“A company may also earn six months of additional exclusivity for a drug where specific clinical studies are conducted at the written request of the FDA to study the use of the medicine to treat pediatric patients, and submission to the FDA is made prior to the loss of basic exclusivity.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “For a discussion of these risks, see "Item 1A—Risk Factors— Information Technology and Cybersecurity Risks —We are dependent on information technology and our systems and infrastructure face certain risks, including from cybersecurity incidents and data leakage." Governance The Company's cybersecuri…”
- “Significant changes to our sales or pricing practices with regard to the distribution of drugs under the 340B program, an inability to procure data sufficient to identify duplicate claims associated with the increasing volume of 340B program utilization or any material changes in our U.S. payer chan…”
- “Business—Pricing, Price Constraints and Market Access." At the state level, multiple states have passed, are pursuing or are considering government action via legislation or regulations to change drug pricing and reimbursement (e.g., establishing prescription drug affordability boards, implementing …”
- “In addition, manufacturing processes for novel cell-based therapies, such as CAR-T cell therapies, and radiopharmaceutical therapeutics in development are still evolving, and our processes may be more complicated or more expensive than the approaches taken by our current and future competitors.”
- “In November 2025, BMS and Apotex entered into a settlement agreement for this matter and the case was dismissed. 117 PRICING, SALES AND PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES LITIGATION Plavix* Texas Litigation In November 2025, BMS and certain Sanofi entities were named defendants in a Texas state court action in H…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Pharma
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LLYELI Lilly & Co | $65.2B | 83% | 40.9% | 35% | — |
| MRKMerck & Co., Inc. | $65.0B | 75% | 34.5% | 22% | 19% |
| PFEPfizer Inc. | $62.6B | 74% | 16.3% | 7% | 15% |
| ABBVAbbvie Inc. | $61.2B | 70% | 24.6% | 17% | 29% |
| BMYBristol-myers Squibb Company | $48.2B | 71% | 19.4% | 13% | 27% |
| ABTAbbott Laboratories | $44.3B | 56% | 18.2% | 11% | 17% |
| AMGNAmgen Inc. | $36.8B | 67% | 24.7% | 14% | 22% |
| GILDGilead Sciences, Inc. | $29.4B | 79% | 34.0% | 17% | 32% |