BKNG, Booking Holdings Inc.
We aim to provide consumers with a best-in-class experience with tailored planning, payment, language, and other options seamlessly connecting them with our travel service provider partners.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is Merchant Revenue (66%), Agency Revenue (30%) and Advertising and other revenues (4%).
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 30%, above 15% in 5 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 33% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. High, durable returns can mark a moat, but whether this one is real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Merchant Revenue is 66% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- Merchant Revenue66%$17.8B
- Agency Revenue30%$8.0B
- Advertising and other revenues4%$1.2B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $10.7B | $12.7B | $14.5B | $15.1B | $6.8B | $11.0B | $17.1B | $21.4B | $23.7B | $26.9B | $27.7B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 27.1% | 35.8% | 36.8% | 35.5% | −9.3% | 22.8% | 29.9% | 27.3% | 31.8% | 32.8% | 32.6% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $2.1B | $2.3B | $4.0B | $4.9B | $59M | $1.2B | $3.1B | $4.3B | $5.9B | $5.4B | $6.2B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $1.75 | $1.93 | $3.42 | $4.60 | $0.06 | $1.16 | $3.14 | $4.83 | $7.10 | $6.81 | $7.75 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $3.8B | $4.4B | $4.9B | $4.5B | ($201M) | $2.5B | $6.2B | $7.0B | $7.9B | $9.1B | $9.0B |
| ROICROIC | 16% | 14% | 30% | 60% | -5% | 33% | 131% | — | — | — | — |
| CapexCapex | $220M | $288M | $442M | $368M | $286M | $304M | $368M | $345M | $429M | $322M | $308M |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 2.0% | 2.3% | 3.0% | 2.4% | 4.2% | 2.8% | 2.2% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 1.2% | 1.1% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 0.71× | 0.79× | 1.04× | 0.78× | 0.62× | 0.72× | 0.82× | 0.68× | 0.73× | 0.52× | 0.51× |
| Total debtDebt | $6.2B | $8.8B | $8.6B | $7.6B | $12.0B | $10.9B | $12.5B | $14.2B | $16.6B | $18.7B | $18.4B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $11.7B | $13.0B | $6.3B | $7.3B | $11.1B | $11.2B | $12.4B | $12.7B | $16.2B | $17.2B | $25.5B |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | ($5.5B) | ($4.2B) | $2.4B | $330M | $951M | ($226M) | $89M | $1.5B | $434M | $1.5B | ($7.0B) |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $8.8B ÷ interest expense $1.6B
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- ModerateTotal debt $18.7B ÷ operating income $8.8B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $1.5BModest net debtCash $17.2B − debt $18.7B
Netting $17.2B of cash and short-term investments against $18.7B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. It also holds $10.4B in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $8.9B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -7664dNegative, funded by othersDSO 19 + DIO 0 − DPO 7683 days
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not meaningful hereInvested capital ($4.0B) = debt $18.7B + equity ($5.6B) − cash
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
- Cash machineOwner Earnings $9.1B = operating cash $9.4B − capex $322M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 34% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $66M of SBC) leaves $9.0B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $9.4B ÷ net income $5.4B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $7.7B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.1B
Of $9.1B Owner Earnings, $7.7B (85%) went back to shareholders, $1.2B dividends, $6.4B buybacks. Net of $66M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6.4B. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.52×HarvestingCapex $322M ÷ depreciation $623M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 7 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 27% (FY2016) → 33% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −9.3% op. margin
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −4.6%/yr
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $53.4B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a mature cash machine, most of what it earns goes straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$3.4B · 6%
- Dividends$2.4B · 5%
- Buybacks$48.4B · 91%
It reinvested $3.4B (6%) back into the business and returned $50.8B (95%) to owners, $2.4B in dividends, $48.4B in buybacks. Total debt rose $12.2B across the span. It returned and reinvested more than it generated, the gap was covered by debt or existing cash.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio351:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$66M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
3 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $26.9B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.33×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $18.7B vs $5.6B WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +84%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $165.57/share and book value $-170.90/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Booking Holdings Inc. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $9.0B on 794M diluted shares; net cash $7.0B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionRisk Factors
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“Gen AI also lowers barriers to entry and enables competitors to potentially replicate or improve core functionality, personalize recommendations and pricing, and acquire customers more efficiently through non-travel consumer interactions.”
From the recordOperating margin32.6% now (TTM), off a 36.8% peak (FY2018) - Debt terms & refinancingRisk Factors
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“We currently have $2 billion available under our revolving credit facility, which contains certain financial covenants that we need to comply with in order to access such liquidity.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$1.5B modest net debt · interest covered 5.5× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“In addition, the year-over-year decrease in general and administrative expenses in 2025 was impacted by a $78 million reduction in 2024 in the accrual related to the fine imposed by the Spanish competition authority.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - DilutionRisk Factors
Whether your slice quietly shrinks. New shares fund the company at the existing owner's expense.
“We may issue shares of our common stock in these transactions, which could result in dilution to our stockholders.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Regulation & policyRisk Factors
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“In addition, the U.S.'s Inflation Reduction Act includes a 15% corporate minimum tax on book income and a 1% excise tax on stock repurchases.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “General and Administrative Year Ended December 31, Increase (Decrease) (In millions) 2025 2024 General and administrative $ 857 $ 1,036 (17.2) % % of Total revenues 3.2 % 4.4 % General and administrative expenses decreased year-over-year in 2025 due to the impact of the $337 million accrual in 2024 …”
- “Depreciation and Amortization Year Ended December 31, Increase (Decrease) (In millions) 2025 2024 Depreciation and amortization $ 623 $ 591 5.4 % % of Total revenues 2.3 % 2.5 % Depreciation and amortization expenses increased year-over-year in 2025 due primarily to increased depreciation of compute…”
- “An increase or decrease of one percentage point to the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA") growth rates used in the cash flow projections would result in an increase of approximately $45 million and a decrease of approximately $40 million, respectively, to the e…”
- “Information Technology Year Ended December 31, Increase (Decrease) (In millions) 2025 2024 Information technology $ 908 $ 771 17.8 % % of Total revenues 3.4 % 3.2 % Information technology expenses increased year-over-year in 2025 due primarily to an increase in cloud computing costs, as well as chan…”
- “If laws or regulations are expanded to require changes in our business practices, or interpreted in ways that negatively affect our business, our results of operations, financial condition, or competitive position could be adversely affected. 11 Cyberattacks, system vulnerabilities, or inadequate sy…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Logistics
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BKNGBooking Holdings Inc. | $26.9B | 99% | 32.8% | — | 34% |
| CHRWC.h. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. | $16.2B | 92% | 4.9% | 23% | 6% |
| EXPEExpedia Group, Inc. | $14.7B | 85% | 12.7% | 75% | 21% |
| EXPDExpeditors International of Washington, Inc. | $11.1B | — | 9.5% | 75% | 9% |