AXP, American Express Co
Our businesses function together to form our end-to-end integrated payments platform, which we believe is a differentiator that underpins our business model.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not on an earnings multiple.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has run high across the record (median 30%, above 12% in 10 of 10 years). It runs at a 74% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $24.2B | $24.8B | $26.6B | $28.2B | $22.0B | $27.7B | $34.2B | $37.2B | $38.8B | $41.3B | $42.2B |
| Net interest incomeNet int. | $5.8B | $6.5B | $7.7B | $8.6B | $8.0B | $7.8B | $9.9B | $13.1B | $15.5B | $17.4B | $17.9B |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $5.4B | $2.7B | $6.9B | $6.8B | $3.1B | $8.1B | $7.5B | $8.4B | $10.1B | $10.8B | $11.2B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $5.75 | $3.10 | $8.06 | $8.14 | $3.89 | $10.20 | $9.99 | $11.38 | $14.21 | $15.56 | $16.36 |
| Return on equityROE | 26% | 15% | 31% | 29% | 14% | 36% | 30% | 30% | 33% | 32% | 33% |
| Return on tangible equityROTCE | 32% | 19% | 37% | 35% | 17% | 44% | 36% | 35% | 39% | 38% | 39% |
| Efficiency ratioEffic. | 72% | 72% | 72% | 72% | 75% | 78% | 78% | 74% | 73% | 74% | 74% |
| DepositsDeposits | $53.0B | $64.5B | $70.0B | $73.3B | $86.9B | $84.4B | $110.2B | $129.1B | $139.4B | $152.5B | $157.9B |
| Book value / shareBVPS | $21.95 | $20.61 | $25.95 | $27.80 | $28.52 | $28.07 | $32.86 | $38.12 | $42.45 | $48.09 | $49.56 |
| Tangible book / shareTBVPS | $17.89 | $16.20 | $22.05 | $23.48 | $23.41 | $23.00 | $27.63 | $32.76 | $36.40 | $40.97 | $42.32 |
| Dividends / shareDiv/sh | $1.29 | $1.41 | $1.54 | $1.71 | $1.83 | $1.83 | $2.08 | $2.42 | $2.80 | $3.26 | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 32%ExceptionalNet income $10.8B ÷ equity $33.5B
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ExceptionalNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $4.9B − intangibles $90M)
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 74%AverageNoninterest expense $53.2B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 11.2%Well capitalizedEquity $33.5B ÷ assets $300.1B
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 51%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits $152.5B ÷ assets $300.1B
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 21%ElevatedProvision for credit losses $3.6B ÷ net interest income $17.4B
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio814:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$551M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 19% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what American Express Co’s record justifies. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; every point of durable excess return above that is worth paying up for. Raise the cost of equity and the justified multiple falls: that is interest-rate gravity on a bank.
Tangible book $29.0B on 686M shares, a 35% normalized return on it. This is a lens, not a target. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“We face intense competition in the premium space and for cobrand relationships, as both card issuer and network competitors have targeted high-spending customers and key business partners with attractive value propositions.”
From the recordOperating margin12.9% now (TTM), off a 46.6% peak (FY2023) - Concentrated dependenceRisk Factors
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“From customer acquisition to cobranding arrangements, from providing rewards and benefits to customers to facilitating B2B supplier payments for our corporate clients, we rely on our business partners across many aspects of our company and our arrangements with business partners represent a signific…”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)34% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“As of December 31, 2025, we were in compliance with the covenants contained in the credit facility and no amounts were drawn on this facility.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$55.0B heavy net debt · interest covered 0.4× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“At any given time, we are involved in a number of legal proceedings, including class action lawsuits, mass arbitrations and similar actions.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandBusiness
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“The required minimum capital ratios for the Company may be further increased by a countercyclical capital buffer of up to an additional 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets, if enacted by the Federal Reserve, which must be held in the form of CET1 capital.”
From the recordWorst year on record29.1% operating margin (FY2020) - Regulation & policyBusiness
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“The Dodd-Frank Act requires U.S. financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to adopt rules on incentive-based payment arrangements at specified regulated entities having at least $1 billion in total assets.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “The Asset/Liability Management Committee oversees the implementation of the liquidity risk management policy through the establishment of strategies, processes and procedures to manage liquidity risk within our established risk appetite, including annually approving our funding plan and reviewing ou…”
- “The purpose of our risk identification and assessment process is to recognize and understand existing risks and risks that may arise from new business initiatives, external market forces, or regulatory or statutory changes, so that these risks can be properly assessed and incorporated into our risk …”
- “We define strategic risk as the risk to our current or projected financial condition and resilience arising from adverse business decisions, poor implementation of business decisions, or lack of responsiveness to changes in the industry or operating environment, or declining demand for our products …”
- “Our Internal Audit Group and Credit Review Group constitute the third line of defense and provide independent assurance by assessing the quality and effectiveness of our processes and systems of internal control, risk management, and risk governance, compliance with applicable regulations, and the r…”
- “Political developments, including those relating to recent shifts in trade policy and heightened geopolitical tensions, have resulted in and may further result in an increase in the number, complexity and scope of laws and regulations, heightened legislative and regulatory uncertainty, changes to su…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Financial services
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | Net int. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AXPAmerican Express Co | $41.3B | 32% | 38% | 74% | 5.8% |
| COINCoinbase Global, Inc. | $7.2B | 9% | 14% | — | — |
| SYFSynchrony Financial | — | 21% | 25% | 27% | 15.5% |