AME, Ametek, Inc.
AMETEK is a leading global manufacturer of electronic instruments and electromechanical devices with operations in North America, Europe, Asia and South America.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is Process and analytical instrumentation (47%), Aerospace and power (30%) and Automation and engineered solutions (24%).
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). Owner earnings agree: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →EIG is 66% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
- EIG66%$4.9B
- EMG34%$2.5B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $3.8B | $4.3B | $4.8B | $5.2B | $4.5B | $5.5B | $6.2B | $6.6B | $6.9B | $7.4B | $7.6B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 20.6% | 21.0% | 22.2% | 22.8% | 22.6% | 23.6% | 24.4% | 25.9% | 25.6% | 25.8% | 25.9% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $512M | $681M | $778M | $861M | $872M | $990M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.19 | $2.94 | $3.34 | $3.75 | $3.77 | $4.25 | $5.01 | $5.67 | $5.93 | $6.40 | $6.65 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $694M | $758M | $843M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| ROICROIC | 12% | 14% | 13% | 13% | 12% | 12% | 13% | 12% | 13% | 13% | 13% |
| CapexCapex | $63M | $75M | $82M | $102M | $74M | $111M | $139M | $136M | $127M | $130M | $133M |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.7% | 2.0% | 1.6% | 2.0% | 2.3% | 2.1% | 1.8% | 1.8% | 1.7% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 0.35× | 0.41× | 0.41× | 0.44× | 0.29× | 0.38× | 0.44× | 0.40× | 0.33× | 0.31× | 0.31× |
| Total debtDebt | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $3.3B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.2B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $717M | $646M | $354M | $393M | $1.2B | $347M | $345M | $410M | $374M | $458M | $487M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $1.6B | $1.5B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $1.2B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.9B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.7B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 23.5×ComfortableOperating income $1.9B ÷ interest expense $81M
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- ConservativeTotal debt $2.3B ÷ operating income $1.9B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $1.8BModest net debtCash $458M + ST investments $5M − debt $2.3B
Netting $463M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT $1.6B ÷ invested capital $12.5B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Cash machineOwner Earnings $1.7B = operating cash $1.8B − capex $130M
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's 23% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $48M of SBC) leaves $1.6B. Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $1.5B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $719M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.7B
Of $1.7B Owner Earnings, $719M (43%) went back to shareholders, $285M dividends, $434M buybacks. Net of $48M stock comp, the real buyback was about $386M. Returning most of it signals a mature cash machine; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.31×HarvestingCapex $130M ÷ depreciation $423M
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 21% (FY2016) → 26% (FY2025)
Margins widened over the record, pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
Free cash to owners grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 20.6% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.1%/yr
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $12.6B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.0B · 8%
- Dividends$1.7B · 14%
- Buybacks$1.7B · 14%
- Retained (debt / cash)$8.1B · 64%
It reinvested $1.0B (8%) back into the business and returned $3.5B (28%) to owners, $1.7B in dividends, $1.7B in buybacks. Total debt fell $164M across the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- Stock-based compensation$48M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
4 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $7.4B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.06×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $177M WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +111%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $6.40/share and book value $45.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA price is the one input we don't pull, you bring it. Type today's close (read it off any broker or quote site) and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, set beside what Ametek, Inc. has actually delivered. Nothing is stored; the number stays in your browser.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go, a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. Read it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a ceiling on good sense.
The discount rate is your interest rate, what a dollar years from now is worth today, anchored to the long-term Treasury yield (~4–5% today, plus whatever premium you want for risk). Drag it toward the risk-free rate and watch how much growth the price suddenly “needs”: interest rates are gravity on valuations.
Owner earnings $1.7B on 230M diluted shares; net debt $1.7B. This is a lens, not a price target, it says what you'd have to believe, not what the company is worth, and it runs on one year of (noisy) owner earnings at assumptions you can see and change.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationBusiness
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“In 2025, 52% of EIG's net sales were to customers outside the United States.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$7.6B - Pricing power & competitionBusiness
Whether the company sets its price or takes it. Durable pricing power is the surest mark of a moat; price competition is the surest mark there isn't one.
“In general, AMETEK's markets are highly competitive with competition based on technology, performance, quality, service and price.”
From the recordOperating margin25.9% (TTM), near a 10-yr high - Supplier & input dependenceBusiness
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“Availability of Raw Materials AMETEK's reportable segments obtain raw materials and supplies from a variety of sources and generally from more than one supplier.”
From the recordGross-margin cushion (TTM)36% - Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“Our success is partly dependent upon properly executing and realizing cost savings or other benefits from our ongoing production and procurement initiatives.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)22% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“A breach of these covenants or our inability to comply with the financial ratios, tests or other restrictions contained in a Debt Facility could result in an event of default under one or more of our other Debt Facilities.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$1.8B modest net debt · interest covered 23.5× - Litigation & contingenciesRisk Factors
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“The Company (including its subsidiaries) has been named as a defendant in a number of asbestos-related lawsuits.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandMD&A
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“A number of our businesses operate in industries that may experience periodic, cyclical downturns.”
From the recordWorst year on record20.6% operating margin (FY2016)
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “When testing goodwill for impairment, the Company has the option to first assess qualitative factors to determine whether the existence of events or circumstances leads to a determination that it is more likely than not the estimated fair value of a reporting unit is less than its carrying amount.”
- “The recent tariff modifications did not materially impact our results for 2025, however, as the situation continues to evolve, we cannot be certain of the outcome, which could adversely impact demand for our products, costs, inflation, customers, suppliers, and the overall global economy.”
- “Our businesses have been proactive in addressing the potential impacts of tariffs, including targeted pricing initiatives, strategic adjustments to our global supply chains, and leveraging our worldwide manufacturing footprint to localize production and adapt to changing demand patterns.”
- “If the Company performs a qualitative assessment and determines that an impairment is more likely than not, then performance of a quantitative impairment test is required.”
- “Improvements include changes to similar risk assessment for cash flow hedges, a new model for Choose-Your-Rate debt instruments, a principles-based approach for nonfinancial forecasted transactions, clarification on net written options, and addressing the mismatch in dual-hedge accounting ASU 2025-0…”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Instruments
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KLACKLA Corporation | $12.2B | 61% | 6.4% | 8% | 31% |
| ROKRockwell Automation, Inc. | $8.3B | 48% | 20.4% | 25% | 16% |
| ROPRoper Technologies Inc | $7.9B | 69% | 28.3% | 6% | 32% |
| AMEAmetek, Inc. | $7.4B | 36% | 25.8% | 13% | 23% |
| AAgilent Technologies, Inc. | $6.9B | 52% | 21.3% | 17% | 17% |
| KEYSKeysight Technologies, Inc. | $5.4B | 62% | 16.3% | 11% | 24% |
| MTDMettler-toledo International Inc. | $4.0B | 79% | 27.8% | 45% | 21% |
| WATWaters Corporation | $3.2B | 59% | 25.4% | 20% | 17% |