AEE, Ameren Corp
Ameren also has other subsidiaries that conduct other activities, such as providing shared services.
Read top to bottom, the owner's questions in the order an owner asks them: what the business is, whether the record holds, whether it survives and is any good, and what you would be paying. New to the questions? Start with the Method.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, read from the numbers in its filings. The quantitative detail is in the sections below; the verdict is left to you.
- What it is
- Revenue is Electric (87%) and Natural gas (13%).
- What moves the needle
- How hard the assets work, and what the inputs cost. What decides it: utilization, how much of the capex merely keeps the assets running, and what a downturn does to a heavy fixed-cost base.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the 10-K is where you look.
Every line here is arithmetic from the company's own filings, not a model's opinion, and each figure appears in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Electric is 87% of revenue, so this is largely a single-line business.
- Electric87%$7.7B
- Natural gas13%$1.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing, no estimates| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueRevenue | $6.1B | $6.2B | $6.3B | $5.9B | $5.8B | $6.4B | $8.0B | $7.5B | $7.6B | $8.8B | $8.9B |
| Operating marginOp. mgn | 21.8% | 22.8% | 21.6% | 21.4% | 22.4% | 20.8% | 19.0% | 20.8% | 19.9% | 23.0% | 24.0% |
| Net incomeNet inc. | $653M | $523M | $815M | $828M | $871M | $990M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| EPS (diluted)EPS | $2.68 | $2.14 | $3.32 | $3.35 | $3.50 | $3.84 | $4.14 | $4.37 | $4.42 | $5.35 | $5.47 |
| Owner earningsOwner earn. | $41M | ($14M) | ($116M) | ($241M) | ($1.5B) | ($1.8B) | ($1.1B) | ($1.0B) | ($1.6B) | ($775M) | ($1.3B) |
| ROICROIC | 6% | 5% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% |
| CapexCapex | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $4.3B | $4.1B | $4.6B |
| Capex / revenueCapex/rev | 34.2% | 34.5% | 36.3% | 40.8% | 55.8% | 54.4% | 42.1% | 48.0% | 56.7% | 46.9% | 52.2% |
| Capex vs depreciationCapex/dep | 2.49× | 2.43× | 2.44× | 2.41× | 2.80× | 2.85× | 2.44× | 2.51× | 2.83× | 2.56× | 2.84× |
| Total debtDebt | $7.3B | $7.9B | $8.4B | $9.4B | $11.1B | $13.1B | $14.0B | $16.0B | $17.6B | $19.2B | $20.1B |
| Cash & investmentsCash+inv | $9M | $10M | $16M | $16M | $139M | $8M | $10M | $25M | $7M | $13M | $13M |
| Net debt / (cash)Net debt | $7.3B | $7.9B | $8.4B | $9.3B | $10.9B | $13.1B | $14.0B | $15.9B | $17.6B | $19.2B | $20.1B |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $2.0B ÷ interest expense $776M
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- HighTotal debt $19.2B ÷ operating income $2.0B
Years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt. A first read, not a credit rating: it's gross debt (not netted against cash) over EBIT (not EBITDA), and a cyclical year distorts it.
- Debt, net of cash $19.2BHeavy net debtCash $13M − debt $19.2B
Netting $13M of cash and short-term investments against $19.2B of debt leaves $19.2B owed, about 9.5× a year's operating profit, versus the gross figure above. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters; the gross ratio above ignores the cash already set against it. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $1.9B ÷ invested capital $32.6B (debt + equity − cash)
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; below ~8% the company may destroy value as it grows. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner Earnings ($775M) = operating cash $3.4B − capex $4.1B
What an owner could take out without starving the business. That's -9% of revenue. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves ($803M). Honest caveat: capex here blends maintenance and growth, so steady-state Owner Earnings may run higher (see capex vs. depreciation).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $3.4B ÷ net income $1.5B
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.56×ExpandingCapex $4.1B ÷ depreciation $1.6B
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
A moat is a high return that doesn’t fade, reinvested at high returns. Here is what the record says, judgments, not another chart of the numbers.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 22% (FY2016) → 23% (FY2025)
Margins held roughly steady across the record.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
Reinvested capital earned only a modest return, growth is getting expensive.
- Worst year 2022 · 19.0% op. margin
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +1.3%/yr
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Solvent is not the same as cheap; growing is not the same as good. These are vital signs, not a verdict, the judgment is yours, and the filing is one click away.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $22.9B of operating cash, and how management split it is, as Buffett insists, the job that matters most. Here it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$31.0B · 135%
- Dividends$5.6B · 24%
- Buybacks$75M · 0%
It reinvested $31.0B (135%) back into the business and returned $5.7B (25%) to owners, $5.6B in dividends, $75M in buybacks. Total debt rose $12.8B across the span. It returned and reinvested more than it generated, the gap was covered by debt or existing cash.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to employees; net of that, the real return to owners is lower (see Management & pay). And the mix alone doesn't grade management, what matters is the return earned on the dollars reinvested (see incremental ROIC in the durability report).
Management & pay
read the proxy →Two questions Buffett actually asks about pay: is stock compensation, a real expense, whatever the income statement pretends, quietly large, and is the top wildly out of line with the floor. He's no populist about it; he just wants pay that's rational and earned, and comp committees that aren't lapdogs.
- CEO pay ratio112:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio isn't proof of anything, some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill, but a runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job or just keeping the chair company.
- Stock-based compensation$28M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. And note the trap, the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Graham’s defensive-investor test
4 of 6 metGraham gave the defensive investor seven numerical criteria in The Intelligent Investor. Here they are, run mechanically on the filings, his framework, not our verdict. Meeting them is a floor of safety, not a reason to buy; missing one is no veto, since many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity tests by design. The worth is in seeing exactly where a company stands against the canon, every number sourced.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $8.8B
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.66×
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $19.2B vs ($1.3B) WC
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +90%
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Earnings are $5.35/share and book value $49.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Graham would be the first to say a checklist is a starting point, not an answer. These are his defensive, bargain-hunter's tests, the cigar-butt lens. Buffett and Munger grew past it, paying fair prices for wonderful businesses; that lens lives in the moat and owner-earnings work above, and both still matter. Clearing Graham’s tests earns a closer look; failing them earns harder questions, not a dismissal.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFOwner earnings are negative today, so the usual reverse-DCF has nothing to grow. But that's exactly when a price makes its boldest promise. So we flip the question: type a price, and see the future profitability you'd have to believe to justify it.
Enter a price to run it.
It flips the reverse-DCF: the company must reach owner earnings that, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, equal today's market cap, shown as the margin it must earn on revenue grown at your rate, from negative today. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this is for the genuinely unprofitable.
What the filing emphasizes, FY2025
read the 10-K →Each year a 10-K must name what could go wrong, in the company's own words. Here are the ones Graham and Buffett would stop on, each set against the figure from the same filings that bears on it, anchored to a period you can find in the record above. We point; the judgment is yours.
- Customer concentrationMD&A
Who the revenue leans on. When one buyer is a large slice of sales, that buyer holds the pricing power, and its troubles become the company's.
“The additional terms include a service term of 12 years plus a ramp period of up to five years to reach peak demand, minimum demand charges of 80% of contracted capacity, customer exit terms and fees, and customer credit and collateral requirements, among other terms.”
From the recordRevenue exposed (TTM)$8.9B - Supplier & input dependenceRisk Factors
A choke point upstream. A sole or limited supplier can dictate terms, and a single shortage can stop the line.
“Approximately 96% of Ameren Missouri's coal is purchased from the Powder River Basin in Wyoming, which has a limited number of suppliers.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Concentrated dependenceMD&A
What the whole business leans on, a product, a platform, a partner. Concentration cuts both ways, and the filing is where management has to admit it.
“During an outage, depending on the availability of its other generation sources and the market prices for power, Ameren Missouri's purchased power costs may increase and the amount of excess power available for sale may decrease versus non-outage years.”
From the recordOwner-earnings margin at stake (TTM)−15% - Debt terms & refinancingMD&A
The fine print behind the debt. Covenants and near-term maturities decide who is really in control when a year goes badly.
“During 2025, Ameren utilized net proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt of $2.0 billion for general corporate purposes and to repay $300 million of long-term debt maturities and then-outstanding short-term debt.”
From the recordBalance sheet (TTM)$19.2B heavy net debt · interest covered 2.6× - Litigation & contingenciesMD&A
Claims an owner inherits. Most disclosure is boilerplate; this fires only on an actual matter, a named suit, a settlement, a contingency, a number.
“Ameren Missouri Other operations and maintenance expenses decreased $21 million in 2025, compared with 2024, primarily due to the following items: The absence in 2025 of a $59 million charge, related to the NSR and Clean Air Act litigation associated with the Rush Island Energy Center, see Note 14 -…”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself. - Cyclicality & demandRisk Factors
How the business behaves when the economy turns. A cyclical earns its keep across the whole cycle, not at the peak.
“Higher inflation levels, as well as higher interest rates, tariffs, trade wars, or a recession could impact our ability to control costs, to make substantial investments in our businesses, to recover costs and investments, to earn our allowed ROEs within frameworks established by our regulators, and…”
From the recordWorst year on record19.0% operating margin (FY2022) - Regulation & policyMD&A
Rules that can rewrite the economics, tariffs, antitrust, data, export controls.
“In November 2025, the MoPSC approved Ameren Missouri's request to modify its existing large primary service tariff to require customers requesting 75 MWs or more of demand and who are served at transmission level voltage to comply with additional tariff terms.”
A judgment, not a number, weigh it against the filing yourself.
What changed, FY2025 vs FY2024
read the 10-K →Most of a 10-K is boilerplate carried over verbatim; the signal is in what's new. These lines appear this year and weren't there last, figure updates filtered out, so only the language shift remains.
- “Net income was unfavorably affected in 2025 compared with 2024 by increased financing costs, primarily resulting from higher interest rates on higher debt balances at Ameren Missouri and Ameren (parent) and by increased other operations and maintenance expenses not subject to formula rates, riders, …”
- “These provisions create modifications to the PISA and integrated resource planning, require electric utilities to submit service tariff schedules for certain large load customers, allow the MoPSC to authorize inclusion of construction work in progress in rate base for new natural gas-fired generatio…”
- “Earnings were also favorably affected by increased retail electric sales volumes at Ameren Missouri, primarily due to warmer July temperatures and colder winter temperatures in 2025, and by decreased other operations and maintenance expenses not subject to formula rates, riders, or trackers, because…”
- “Ameren Illinois Ameren Illinois' cash provided by operating activities increased $129 million in 2025, compared with 2024 primarily due to a $410 million increase resulting from higher customer collections primarily from higher electric and natural gas distribution sales volumes due to warmer July t…”
- “Cyber attacks could include viruses, malicious or destructive code, social engineering attacks, denial of service attacks, supply chain attacks, ransomware and other extortion-based attacks, improper access by third parties, attacks on email systems, and attacks leading to data loss, including data …”
Classic text analysis over the filing itself, no model wrote a word of this, and every quote is the company's own.
Peers, Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics, compare, don't rank by a single number.● marks best in the group.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EDConsolidated Edison Inc | $17.0B | — | 17.2% | 5% | 2% |
| SRESempra | $12.4B | — | 32.8% | 5% | -49% |
| PEGPublic Service Enterprise Group Inc | $12.2B | 75% | 24.5% | 7% | 0% |
| XELXcel Energy Inc | $11.5B | 67% | 22.4% | 5% | -59% |
| WECWEC Energy Group, Inc. | $9.8B | 67% | 22.9% | 6% | 7% |
| AEEAmeren Corp | $8.8B | — | 23.0% | 6% | -9% |
| CMSCMS Energy Corp | $8.3B | — | 20.8% | 5% | -2% |
| NINisource Inc. | $6.5B | 76% | 28.1% | 6% | -6% |